What Went Wrong? - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 217

c) Many issues were complex, affecting the interests of two countries and there-
fore, deserved a closer look. For India, the major issue was resuscitation of the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and reactivation of Calcutta Port. The main aim of
constructing barrages at Farakka and Jangipur was diversion of 40,000 cusecs of
the Ganga water into the channel, which would restore it to 1935 condition. If it was
fulfilled, loaded ships of 26 feet (7.93 m) draught could visit Calcutta Port, round
the year, 28 feet (8.54 m) draught vessels at least 200 days and 29 feet (8.84 m)
draught vessels at least 100 days, in a year. This did not come to pass because of
restrictions under the 1977 agreement. Belying hopes of India, only 22-feet draught
vessels could visit Calcutta Port, round the year from 1978 because of reduced water
in the channel. Though the target of 40,000 cusecs was not reached, the activities
of Calcutta Port could return to normal. The river was somewhat resuscitated, nav-
igation improved with 2 m draught vessels coming to the port. As the Ganga flows
through Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, much of its catchment area is spread over these
two large States; therefore, their present and future needs and of West Bengal should
have received priority. Those of Nepal could also not be ignored; being a land-locked
country, it has every right to use water of rivers, flowing through its territory.
Other issues before India were reduction of salinity, siltation and the frequency,
intensity and the height of tidal bores in the port area, of the cost of dredging of
the channel and the estuary and the maintenance of a navigation channel. Urgent
issues before Bangladesh were the legitimate demand of water from a long and
mighty river, originating in another country but flowing partly through it. On this
depended navigation and agriculture, reduction of salinity and other environmen-
tal issues. Under international law, interests of a lower riparian country are to be
safeguarded, while an upper riparian country develops itself. Bangladesh indeed
suffered some ill-effects of diversion from the Farakka Barrage; its navigation, irri-
gation and water-supply to industries were all affected and the ecology degraded.
These issues were of its national interest and should have been addressed by the
accord.
d) In both the countries, many other affected parties were not consulted. In
India, they were the Ministries of Surface Transport, of Water Resources and of
External Affairs, Calcutta Port Trust, various departments of West Bengal, Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh governments, various chambers of commerce and industries.
In Bangladesh too, its ministries of water resources, irrigation and waterways,
agriculture, public health and of foreign affairs were concerned but were not
consulted.
Questions arise, why was the Treaty signed in so much haste and why vitally con-
cerned government departments and organisations were not taken into confidence?
A solution through another agreement was indeed overdue, but did not justify such
haste and marginalisation of concerned parties. National interests and objectives of
both countries were sacrificed. All these strengthen a suspicion that there was a hid-
den motive in two governments, collective or individual interests of the signatories
that compelled both sides to ink the treaty, post-haste. There was some deeper think-
ing which was not divulged to the people of two countries, because it was more
political than pragmatic. This was to demonstrate to their people that they could