What Went Wrong? - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 216

to be settled by these two countries through mutual discussions only. Bangladesh,
on the other hand, wanted to involve Nepal, Bhutan and China on the issue and
wanted to get moral support of those countries by pressurizing India to come to a
solution in its favour on the sharing as well as augmentation issue. The proposals on
augmentation of the flow also varied widely on the same ground, as India wanted to
involve only the two countries between him and Bangladesh; whereas Bangladesh
wanted to involve Nepal also on the issue on the ground that most of the tributaries
of the Ganga on its upper reaches originated from Nepal. Both sides tried to find
flaws on technical, environmental and financial aspects on other's scheme and were
rigid on their respective stands. However, Bangladesh could realize the limitations
of its own proposal, when the issue was discussed by both sides with Nepal at a
later date, Nepal imposed certain preconditions and also expressed its reservations
on the proposal of Bangladesh. Lastly, political instability during the period on each
side prevented either side to come close and arrive at an agreed understanding on
the issue. Bangladesh side was more disturbed and the instability in government
gave rise to some sort of suspicion and mistrust amongst the common people of that
country towards India.
The differences could not be resolved, as each side did not see merit in the other's
stand and the necessity of the volume of water demanded. India thought, Bangladesh
did not need so much water, as it had surplus run-off of rain-water as well as ground-
water going waste and flowing into the sea, unused. On the contrary, Dhaka took the
diversion of water from Farakka to resuscitate Calcutta Port as wastage, because this
could not be achieved by diversion of the Ganga water alone. The exchange of data
by either side was deemed a way of delaying a solution.
b) Both sides were indeed interested to resolve differences on the two issues and
to clear the air of suspicion and mistrust that had developed after the death of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman. The excessive haste in two sides, especially of Jyoti Basu, West
Bengal Chief Minister, was inexplicable by experts and observers and a mystery
to common people of the State. Governments changed in both countries between
March and June 1996; the Treaty was signed in December, that year. Mr. Basu took
extra interest, visited Dhaka in November amid overwhelming reception (his parents
had migrated from that country, when it was East Bengal) and paved the way for a
return visit by Sheikh Hasina, the then premier, to New Delhi, next month to ink
the Treaty. The two new governments in Dhaka and Delhi were in power for a few
months only, when the Treaty was signed. Why this unseemly haste when differ-
ences persisted for years? The new governments should have gone through records
of about last 50 years, proceedings, prototype data, ground reality/field condition,
views of experts, concerned States, engineers and scientists who knew the problems
of the affected and the beneficiaries of two countries before signing such a long-
term accord. On the plea of time being short, these were not done. The issues were
sensitive, had far-reaching effects and needed a thorough scrutiny. Jyoti Basu, being
the Chief Minister of West Bengal since 1977 knew the problems, but the same can-
not be said of Inida's Prime Minister, H. D. Deve Gowda and Bangladesh premier,
Sheikh Hasina. Both appeared to have been guided by officers and inked the Treaty
without understanding the implications of a 30-year accord in depth.