Agreements & MOUs - The Ganga: Water Use in the Indian Subcontinent - page 193

but Bangladesh did not agree to go for augmentation unless New Delhi guaranteed
share of the principal common rivers.
In 1986, the two countries agreed to discuss the issue with Nepal but mean-
while, Dhaka added a rider to New Delhi that discussions with Kathmandu would
not be a precedent for any trilateral understanding. In October, that year, JCE del-
egates of two countries went to Kathmandu and called on its Water Resources and
Foreign Ministry officials but the discussions yielded no solution. The delegates
could not tell Nepalese leaders, how their country would be benefitted and what cost.
Nepal gave no data on water-related issues but insisted on knowing 'mutual bene-
fits' before parting with them. India and Bangladesh insisted that the data sought
was needed for a preliminary study and the mutual benefits could be decided and
disclosed later but Nepal stuck to its gun, rendering the meeting a waste of time and
money. India's desire for involving Nepal as a party to a tripartite agreement on the
augmentation issue made no headway and no approach paper, as per agenda, could
be prepared.
The situation forced Bangladesh to rethink. Dhaka was convinced that building of
storage dams in Nepal was a Utopian idea and could never materialize. Kathmandu
would never agree to such a thing and India would not compromise on its policy
of bilateralism. Mr. Mahmud veered to his new proposal, under which two barrages
would be constructed over the Brahmaputra and the Ganga with a link canal, con-
necting the two, all within Bangladesh. Though discussions on this in 1987 were
incomplete, Mr. Mahmud brought the matter to the surface for the first time.
In 1987, the relation between the two governments worsened again over
mass migration of tens of thousands of Chakma refugees from the hill tracts of
Bangladesh to India. They fled, following Army actions in the hilly regions of
Chittagong and insurgency in the hilly tracts of Tripura, an Indian province. In the
latter, Bengalees were ousting tribal people so that they could settle in their places.
To sharing the Ganga water, the 'hard-liners' in Bangladesh were stiffly opposed and
her Foreign Minister and Water Resources Minister appeared to be at loggerheads.
President Ershad and Mr. Mahmud thought that a joint visit by teams of India and
Bangladesh to Nepal could ease political pressures within Bangladesh on the 'old
line' and encourage the 'new line'. Mr. Mahmud once said that he did not believe
that Nepal would really provide a solution and that the Brahmaputra, not the Ganga,
could ultimately meet Bangladesh's need for additional water. Ben Crow quoted an
Indian official in the JCE on the situation:
My personal view is that we could have done something, if Anisul Islam Mahmud had been
backed politically and if Humayun Rashid Chaudhury had not taken a different line. I think,
a long-term agreement could have been negotiated, not on Anisul Islam Mahmud's figures,
but we could have compromised.
The severe floods of 1987 and 1988 in Bangladesh got a lot of international media
coverage and heightened concern within and outside the country. This gave a new
scope for further negotiation between the governments of India and Bangladesh.
Mr. Ershad travelled to another riparian country, China to know, how they were
solving their problems and to discuss regional cooperation in river development.
Meanwhile, the floods were so severe in Bangladesh that the government machinery