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decades, was out of the government. Key diplomatic and technical positions went
to strong believers of the new line. Also, by this time, funds flowed to Bangladesh
from the World Bank for a pre-feasibility study of constructing a barrage over the
Brahmaputra at Bahadurabad. A team of foreign engineers, who were examining
alternative options, was inclined to support the new line.
The JCE and government-level discussions supported this new approach, partic-
ularly on utilization of the Brahmaputra water for augmentation of the dry-season
flows of the Ganga at Farakka. India's representatives indicated three possibilities
and asked Bangladesh experts to consider them, so as to place some concrete pro-
posals before the ministerial-level meeting but the latter did not accept them. The
three Indian proposals were
a) Construction of a barrage over the Brahmaputra at Jogigopa in Assam with a link
canal through India, northwest Bangladesh and back to India to join the Ganga
upstream of the barrage;
b) A barrage over the Brahmaputra at Bahadurbad and a link canal from upstream
of barrage joining the Ganga near the Hardinge Bridge, all in Bangladesh; and
c) To utilize the waters of the Brahmaputra to meet some requirements of
Bangladesh which were being met, or were to be met, from the Ganga without
necessarily linking the two rivers with a canal.
When Bangladesh official put up these proposals to Mr. Mahmud, he endorsed
the second which was consistent with the new approach. Ramswamy Iyer, the
Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Water Resources, who led the Indian team held
that the feasibility of a barrage and the gravity link canal within Bangladesh could
be discussed on the condition that Bangladesh would not claim the minimum Ganga
flow of 34,500 cusecs, as reflected in the 1977, 1982 and 1985 agreements / MOUs
and India would not bring down to zero the flow at Farakka. He proposed about half
a dozen possibilities which were accepted by Bangladesh. Mr. Mahmud proposed
that his country be guaranteed a minimum dry-season flow of 25,000 cusecs from
the Ganga in the last 10 days of April (21-30), 75% of the Brahmaputra flow and
50% of the flow of other common rivers, which Indian negotiators did not commit,
causing a setback in the discussions.
In the ministerial-level meetings in 1986, two different attitudes surfaced.
Shankaranand, India's Water Resources Minister, wanted the meeting to take up
the two issues together, but Mr. Mahmud insisted on dealing with the sharing issue
first. India reiterated its rejection of Dhaka's proposal for augmentation of the Ganga
water by constructing storage dams in Nepal and stressed on reaching a long-term
accord on the two issues but did not guarantee share of water of all common rivers,
which Dhaka demanded. Bangladesh argued that sharing was an immediate bilateral
problem, while augmentation was a long-term issue, requiring her co-operation with
India and Nepal. Bangladesh also took the stand that it would not consider the aug-
mentation proposal, unless India assured a definite share of the water of all common
rivers. In short, India stood for sharing along with augmentation of the Ganga water
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