Identifying and Evaluating Impacts - Mining and the Environment: From Ore to Metal - page 451

Residual Risk
Initial investments in risk mitigation can signii cantly and cost-effectively reduce the vul-
nerability of a mining project to identii ed hazards and can reduce risk consequences. After
basic precautions are taken, however, considerably larger expenditures may be required to
achieve an additional reduction in risk. As shown in Figure 9.16 , at some point it may be
more cost effective to transfer the remaining risk or i nd alternative ways to manage or to
i nance it than to attempt to mitigate it completely. For example, constructing a 'perfect' tail-
ings dam to resist all seismic shocks or l ood events is likely to be inordinately expensive in
some situations.
Risk preparedness and emergency response planning are common tools to manage residual
risks with a low probability of occurrence. In the mining sector APPEL (2000) is the accepted
standard for residual risk management. The consequences of likely, irreducible environmen-
tal risks of course are the subject matter of environmental impact assessment studies.

Risk Perception and Risk Communication
A myriad of characteristics other than mortality are factored into everybody's working
dei nition of risk as illustrated in Table 9.13 . The very same risk is likely to be understood
quite differently by the EIA practitioners, community members, and mine engineers since
the perceptions of risk will depend on where an individual stands on the listed dimen-
sions. People's perception of risk is also inl uenced by the social context. Our responses to
new risks, in fact, are largely predictable based on our enduring values and social relation-
ships. Trust and credibility are important. Do the host communities like or dislike, trust or
distrust the mining company that is putting them at risk? It is fair to say that few people
trust their government or the mining industry to protect them from environmental risk.
This is equally true of the passive, apparently apathetic public as it is of the activist, visibly
angry public. Both publics will listen to the reassurances of the government and the min-
ing company - if they listen at all - with considerable suspicion.
Risk communication strongly inl uences risk perception. For example, risk judgement is
very responsive to verbal cues. Host communities are likely to be more concerned with the

Our responses to new risks are
largely predictable based on
our enduring values and social
relationships.

Risk judgement is very responsive
to verbal cues.

CASE 9.7
Lafayette's Rapu Rapu Mine in the Philippines

Small Australian mining company Lafayette Mining
established its Rapu Rapu mine on a small island
located in Albay Province of the Philippines. First
established in 2005 the open pit produces a
polymetallic ore that is concentrated and exported.
Initially, oxidised ore was mined and processed using
cyanide leaching to extract gold. Early in its life, there
were two unplanned releases from the tailings storage
facility, the main cause of which were, reportedly, lack
of suffi cient freeboard to accommodate infl ows from
an extreme rainfall event. While both releases were
relatively minor, Lafayette's reputation was seriously
effected. The reputation of the mining industry as
a whole had previously suffered as a result of the

Marcopper incident in which large quantities of tailings
had been discharged. Consequently, the general public
and government regulators became highly sensitized
to tailings and the potential impacts of tailings spills.
The industry declined and it became more diffi cult
to obtain environmental approvals for new projects.
Ironically, the Rapu Rapu project was cited as a
forerunner in a new generation of mining projects in
which environmental management would be a major
component. It was in this context that the Rapu Rapu
releases occurred and, perhaps understandably, there
was an over-reaction by the public and its political
representatives. Accordingly, Lafayette was involved
in extensive and extended negotiations and

remedial actions before it regained its permits to
operate.
Following many months when mining and
processing activities were curtailed, operations were
eventually permitted on a trial basis. However, soon
after, the facilities suffered damage from a typhoon,
causing further production delays. The combined
effect of both production delays was to bankrupt the
project which was placed in receivership in December
2007. In addition, the tailings incidents have further
damaged the reputation of the mining industry in the
Philippines, and (in the eyes of many Filipinos) the
ability of the Australian mining industry to introduce
good mining practices in the Philippines.