Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
impractical, one maxim can guide thinking on lowering
the odds of proliferation: the more places this work is
done, the harder it is to monitor.
The only way to prevent proliferation by a nation is
through binding international agreements that include
both incentives and sanctions. Close monitoring of the
uranium enrichment process and of facilities where spent
fuel can be reprocessed and plutonium extracted is also
required so that there is an early warning when some
nation strays. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) headquartered in Vienna is the international
organization that monitors all nuclear facilities. Its
authority comes from the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) that has been signed by almost all nations. The
NPT gives all signers the right to develop nuclear
power for peaceful purposes and the right to withdraw
from the treaty if their national interest is threatened
(
Technical Note
.
gives the relevant sections of
the treaty).
The two problem states that illustrate the dif
culties of
controlling proliferation even among those nations that
have signed the NPT are Iran and North Korea. Iran has
insisted that it will do its own enrichment as is allowed
under Article IV of the NPT. Although Iran insists its
program is peaceful, there is widespread suspicion that its
real intention is to pursue a weapons program. The prob-
lem is that it is only a tiny step beyond enriching uranium
for a power reactor to enriching some still more to make a
weapon (
Technical Note
gives numbers). Though
sanctions have been imposed by the United Nations, they
have not been effective yet, although as they get tougher,
they might be.
.
