Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
nearly pure Pu-
, the favorite of the weapons builders.
The plutonium from a power reactor where the fuel has
been in for several years is called reactor-grade and has a
mixture of several plutonium isotopes. It does not make as
good a weapon, but the experts say that you can make one
from reactor-grade material. To get at the plutonium, the
spent fuel has to be reprocessed to extract the material
from the radioactive spent fuel. Dealing with spent fuel is
called the back end of the fuel cycle.
Clandestine weapons-development programs have
already come from both ends of the fuel cycle (see
Technical Note
on producing weapons material).
South Africa, which voluntarily gave up its weapons in a
program supervised by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and Pakistan made their weapons from
the front end of the fuel cycle. Libya was headed that way
until it abandoned the attempt in
.
. There is uncer-
tainty about Iran
s intentions. India and Israel obtained
their weapons material from the back end of the fuel cycle
using heavy-water-moderated reactors, which do not
require enriched uranium, to produce the necessary plu-
tonium. North Korea used a related technology which
also does not need enriched uranium.
There is no nuclear fuel cycle that can, on technical
grounds alone, be made proliferation-proof to govern-
ments that are determined to siphon off materials for
weapons. Opportunities exist for diversion of weapons-
usable material at the front end of the fuel cycle where
natural uranium is enriched to make reactor fuel. Oppor-
tunities also exist at the back end of the fuel cycle to
extract
'
fissile material from the spent fuel removed from
reactors. While a completely diversion-proof system is
