Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
volumetric cost for water.
3
After the initial transaction costs, there is no payment for
the water itself (in comparison to the water market in Australia where there is a
volumetric fee), nor is there a basin authority setting priorities for different uses
(as in areas of the USA).
The application of usage factors, or 'factor de uso' in Chile has been complex.
4
The application of this principle exists as an internal DGA estimate, and therefore
comes with no legal obligation for the water rights holder to respect it. In some areas
of Chile, this legislative gap has led to disastrous consequences for the over-exploi-
tation of basins such as the Copiapo and more and more water rights being relegated
to 'derechos de papel' (paper rights) in that granted use rights far exceed availability.
According to interviewees (irrigators and administrators), there is little incentive for
farmers to reduce the amount of water they use, or sell it on, as most feel that as
scarcity situations mount, it is better to keep use rights for years in which there is
proportional reduction in the basin (currently most years).
8.2.4.3
Protection of Aquatic Ecosystems
Broadly, the environmental and ecological impacts of the market are not considered,
despite the fact that ecological flows are now in the Water Code (Art 129 bis 1).
However, these provisions are only in effect for new rights, of which there are none
in most of the regions in central and northern Chile, including the Aconcagua. While
the environmental legal framework (Environmental Law, 19.300) does provide pro-
tection for water resources and aquatic ecosystems (on a case by case basis), the
main pillar of protection is provided through the EIA (Environmental Law, Art
8-25
5
), which has already been highlighted as a highly flawed instrument in Chile.
Furthermore, quality rules are subject to a cost benefit analysis (Environmental Law,
3
A positive outcome of the market has been seen to be the highly developed and well-connected
water services provision. Yet in recent years, the tariffs have been rising quite considerably, with a
corresponding fall in consumption per person. While the costs of water have been rising consider-
ably for domestic consumers, the cost of water for companies (utilities) is deemed to be relatively
inexpensive and water losses are rising (Lentini
2011
). A similar perversity in the market system
is that efforts to improve irrigation efficiency tend not to lead to water savings, since the incentive
is to reduce water use for increased profits rather than decrease water to decrease costs.
4
Most water rights are registered as permanent (DGA, Expert), yet in reality these rights are not
permanent as rights holders do not tend to permanently use their water 24 h a day for the duration
of a year. This common contradiction in water rights terminology led to a new classification, intro-
duced in 2005, for 'effective use' (
factor de uso
). For example, a rights holder whose right is 10 l/s,
24 h a day, is unlikely to use that amount throughout the year, so the DGA introduced an 'effective
use' calculation to estimate the amount of water used, as opposed to the exact amount of the water
right. However, farmers are still allowed to sell the amount that they don't use from their total
water right. So, if out of that 10 l/s, a farmer only uses 6 l/s, then the farmer would be able to sell
the remaining 4 l/s. Or if a farmer only uses the water right 4 days a week, the remaining 3 days
per week could also be sold.
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