Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
the adjacent communities have two options, to trespass and carry out
activities that are not allowed (t) or not to trespass (~t). If they trespass (t),
and are detected (D), the reserve will bear the costs of monitoring illegal
activities (−
m
) and will receive the level of the i ne (
f
), whilst the adjacent
communities will bear the cost of the i ne (−
f
). If community members
are not detected (~D), the reserve will bear the costs of monitoring (−
m
)
anyway and the total losses from activities (
L
). In this case, the members
of the adjacent communities will receive the benei ts from the additional
resources (
B
). If the communities do not trespass (~t), the reserve will bear
the cost of monitoring (−
m
) plus a smaller loss (−
l
) due to allowed activi-
ties. The communities in this case will receive a smaller benei t due to the
allowed activities (
b
). In the third strategy, if no access is allowed (~A), the
reserve will carry the costs of monitoring for all types of activities (−
M
).
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The adjacent communities, if trespassing and detected, will receive the
level of the i ne (−
F
), minus the loss from additional resources (−
L
). If
members are not detected (~D), the reserve will bear the no access moni-
toring costs (−
M
) minus the loss from resources (−
L
). Communities in this
case will receive the additional benei ts (
B
). If adjacent communities do
not trespass, the reserve will bear the monitoring costs of no access (−
M
)
and the adjacent communities will remain under status quo conditions
(SQ).
Let us give hypothetical numerical payof s to solve for this game.
Suppose that:
L
5 180
B
5 150
m
5 20
f
5 20
l
5 20
b
5 80
M
5 30
F
5 40
a 5 0.5
Solving by backward induction, in M.1 the best the member can do is
not to trespass since her or his expected payof from not trespassing is
higher that that of trespassing:
Ep
(~t) 5 80 .
Ep
(t) 5 −20(0.5) 1 150(0.5) 5 −10 1 75 5 65
If the member were in M.2, the best she or he can do is to trespass since the
expected payof from trespassing is higher than that of not trespassing:
Ep
(t) 5 −40(0.5) 1 150(0.5) 5 −20 1 75 5 55 .
Ep
(~t) 5 0
Given this preferred strategy for the community member, the best the
reserve can do is to regulate access (RA) since the expected payof s from
regulating access are higher than those of unregulated access (UA) and
higher than those of no access (~A):
