Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Uncontrolled
access
R.1
Total
exclusion
Figure 10.12
Reserves and the continuum of resource use allowances
UA
-
L
,
B
-
m
+
f
, -
f
t
D (
)
~D (1 -
)
RA
-
m
-
L
,
B
R.1
~t
M.1
-
m
-
l
,
b
-
M
-
L
+
F
, -
F
t
D (
)
~D (1 -
)
~A
-
M
-
L
,
B
M.2
~t
-
M
, 0
Figure 10.13
The trespassing game with two players
communities (Figure 10.13). R.1 is the i rst and only decision node for the
reserve managers (or the state) in this game and M.1 and M.2 are two dif-
ferent nodes for the members of the resource-adjacent communities. For
simplicity consider the three available strategies for the managers of the
reserve to be (1) uncontrolled access denoted by UA, (2) regulated access
denoted by RA and, (3) total exclusion denoted by ~A (no access). For
the adjacent communities, consider the same available strategies at each
decision node as those in Figure 10.11.
If the state decides to impose a policy of unregulated access, the reserve
will bear a cost from the loss of resources (−
L
) and the adjacent com-
munities will receive a benei t (
B
) from unregulated access to additional
resources within the reserve.
11
If the state decides to regulate access,
allowing uses that do not threaten the ecological stability of the reserve,
