Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
order construction of generation or transmission facilities or adopt enforceable standards having
that effect (NERC 2011c).
Minor disruptions are not uncommon in the three grids that make up the U.S. bulk electric power
supply system, but most are so brief they may go unnoticed by the public. In 2009 there were a
total of 128 disturbances across the United States reported by regional reliability councils to the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. More than half were caused by weather-related
factors, about 17 percent by equipment failure, and less than 1 percent by human error. However,
reports of equipment failures did not explain why the equipment failed; causes of four outages
were unknown, and one was caused by a software virus (NERC 2010). The number of disturbances
per year increased steadily from 2004 to 2009, with the greatest increases in 2007 and 2009 (no
report was prepared for 2008). This suggests grid stability and control issues are worsening, not
improving. An industry review of the causes of major blackouts concluded that “system operators
have been at the center of every blackout investigation since the 1965 Northeast blackout, which
was the catalyst for the formation of NERC. In almost every instance, had system operators taken
appropriate actions, these blackouts would not have occurred” (NERC 2004, 3).
It is possible for the human mind to conceive of technology so sophisticated and complex
that we are able to build it but unable to understand or control it after it is built. “There is a good
deal about the operation of modern large-scale power grids that able engineers are hard pressed
to anticipate even in normal operation. In abnormal operation, as Con Ed found, grids can be
complex enough to defy prior analysis. This is in itself a source of vulnerability” (Lovins and
Lovins 1982, 139).
No long-term blackouts have been caused in the United States by sabotage to bulk electric
power facilities. But electric power system components have been targets of numerous isolated
acts of sabotage in this country, and several incidents have resulted in multimillion-dollar repair
bills. Some terrorist groups hostile to the United States clearly have the capability of causing
massive damage (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1990, 14).
It has been estimated that an average of thirty-nine attacks per year took place on U.S. energy
assets during the 1980s (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1990, 15). Between 1970
and mid-1980 there were at least 174 incidents of sabotage or terrorism against energy facilities in
the United States (Lovins and Lovins 1982, 83-84). More than half of those in the United States
were against power lines, power stations, or substations, almost one-third of them against power
lines alone. A manual on how to attack power lines and electrical equipment was published and
widely distributed some years ago (Foreman and Haywood 1987). “If foreign terrorist groups wish
to attack the United States, they can probably find assistance here in obtaining target information
and in camouflaging their activities” (Alexander 1982).
The resources necessary to conduct successful attacks against electric transmission facilities
are readily available to those who might wish to do so. Mortars, bazookas, rocket-propelled gre-
nades, shoulder-fired precision-guided rockets, poison gas, explosives, aircraft, ships and small
submersible vessels, tanks, and similar vehicles “are sufficiently available at National Guard and
Army bases, where a wide variety of other sizable weapons have been stolen in the past” (Lovins
and Lovins 1982, 79-82). Some equipment is available legally over the counter to determined
terrorists. In 1977 a U.S. Department of the Interior official testified in Congress that “a relatively
small group of dedicated, knowledgeable individuals . . . could bring down [the power grid sup-
plying] almost any section of the country” or could black out “a widespread network” if more
widely coordinated (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee 1977, 87). It seems clear that “the United
States has reached the point where a few people could probably black out most of the country”
(Lovins and Lovins 1982, 1).
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