Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
generating capacity at a proposed geographical location, these committees used sophisticated
computer simulation models of existing regional interconnected grids to advise utilities about what
equipment might be necessary for effective and efficient interconnection of additional generating or
transmission capacity to each system. As new facilities were built, they were added to simulation
models (Hamilton 1980, 47). The exact number is unknown, but presumably hundreds of individu-
als had access to and participated in these modeling simulations using numerous versions of the
modeling software over the ensuing years, in exercises designed to reveal operational weaknesses
and bottlenecks of regional interconnected transmission grids—precisely what a terrorist would
want to know to cause the most widespread disruption. Widespread availability of this modeling
software, and the large number of individuals who learned how to use it, constitute a major unsung
vulnerability of bulk electric power transmission systems in the United States in 2012.
When it became evident that operation of the major bulk electric power systems on the continent
had extended beyond the borders of the United States, the National Electric Reliability Council
was expanded to include electric utilities in Canada and Mexico and renamed the North American
Electric Reliability Council.
However, increased efforts at coordination were not sufficient to prevent more blackouts. In
the West, major disruptions recurred on July 2, 1996, leaving 2 million people without electric
service in parts of fourteen states, two Canadian provinces, and northern Mexico for several hours;
on August 10, 1996, leaving 7.5 million customers in the dark in parts of the same fourteen states,
two Canadian provinces, and northern Mexico for up to nine hours; and on June 25, 1998, cut-
ting electric service to 152,000 customers in five states and three Canadian provinces for up to
nineteen hours (NERC 2011c).
In the East, on July 13, 1977, a lightning strike on two 345kV lines on a common tower
in northern Westchester County, New York, separated them from the interconnected system,
resulting in electrical isolation of the entire Consolidated Edison system from the surrounding
electrical grid, triggering a cascading blackout that left about 9 million customers in New York
City without electric service for up to twenty-six hours. Sloppy maintenance, flawed design of
safety equipment, improper settings of emergency relays, human error, communications failures,
equipment malfunctions, and unexpected behavior of operating systems during restoration of
service all played roles in this catastrophe (Lovins and Lovins 1982, 51-58). Again on August
14, 2003, electric service was severed to over 50 million people in eight northeastern states and
two Canadian provinces for up to thirty hours, in an event eerily similar to the 1965 blackout and
in roughly the same area (Hilt 2006, 3).
In response, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a national Electric Reliability Organization
(ERO), an independent, self-regulating entity that enforces mandatory electric reliability rules
on all users, owners, and operators of the nation's transmission system (16 USC §8240). The
North American Electric Reliability Council changed its name to the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (keeping the acronym NERC) in 2007, when the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted NERC the legal authority to enforce reliability standards
with all U.S. users, owners, and operators of the bulk electric power system and made compli-
ance with those standards mandatory and enforceable. NERC has been granted similar authority
by provincial governments in Canada. Thus, NERC is now an international regulatory authority
established to regulate reliability of the bulk power system in North America. NERC develops
and enforces reliability standards; assesses reliability annually via a ten-year assessment and
winter and summer seasonal assessments; monitors the bulk power system; and trains and certifies
industry operating personnel. NERC is the Electric Reliability Organization for North America,
subject to oversight by FERC and governmental authorities in Canada. However, NERC cannot
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