WHY ANIMALS MATTER - Ethics and the Beast - page 15

beings possessing moral status are beings to which some actions ought not be done
on moral grounds. The interchangeability of status with limitations on conduct is
readily perceived when one attempts to (impossibly) define moral status through terms
that are irreducible to protection. Moral status is not a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for moral protection; moral status just is moral protection. Put another way, noth-
ing is lost if one admits that many actions ought not be done to an entity, rather
than contending that the entity “possesses” moral status and “therefore” is not to be
maltreated.
I shall soon claim that we are not merely splitting hairs and that noting this sub-
tlety early on prevents us from paying high prices later. Yet I first need to explain
why moral status has been introduced into animal ethics literature in the first place.
There are two sources for this, and the first is clear enough. Opponents of animal re-
form have rejected extending moral protection to animals by inversing the two-stage
move above: they claimed that animals ought not be morally protected because they
lack moral status. And so while a two-stage response on behalf of animals was mis-
guided, it was a natural rejoinder given the misleading parameters of the debate. The
second reason for adopting this obfuscating framework stems from misleading estab-
lished uses of “status.” Take citizenship. John is entitled to enter his country without
a visa because he is a citizen of that country. John's status (citizenship) here desig-
nates properties that he has. Animals appear to resemble this example. They possess
properties that are deemed morally relevant, entailing moral restrictions on conduct in
relation to them. The mistake here relates to missing a distinction between two dis-
tinct relations between properties and the conduct entitlements with which they are
linked. Some relations involve an intermediary stage of establishing status that then
generates rights or restrictions. Other relations do not involve this mediating step.
John's daughter becomes a citizen by exemplifying a relevant property (being the
daughter of another citizen) and is then allowed to enter her country without a visa.
On the other hand, a person who is, for example, kind, elicits a certain response
from others (for example, respect) not because exemplifying kindness establishes some
status (which then, in turn, induces respect). Kindness calls for respect, and explain-
ing this need not appeal to some mediating “status” attained by exercising benevolent
conduct.
Why does this imperceptibly minor point matter? The most obvious gain of repla-
cing the vocabulary of moral considerability with that of moral restrictions is that we
begin from consensual premises: some animal-related conduct is immoral. 1 Sadists
aside, it is universally acknowledged that some actions ought not be done to animals.
Anticruelty laws that exist in many countries dress this sentiment in legal trappings,
and various religions manifest concern over limiting pain suffered by animals. Ethical