Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Chapter 2
WHY ANIMALS MATTER
VIRTUALLY ALL WORK IN ANIMAL ETHICS attempts to establish or reform
the “moral status” of nonhuman animals. I will argue that for all its importance, such
work introduces confusion into animal ethics that in turn carries significant ramifica-
tions. I will first give a rough outline of status-establishing theories within animal eth-
ics. I shall then argue that we can safely eliminate the notion of status, preserving
what is of value in previous work. I will also outline the general assumptions that are
sufficient for determining the moral standing of animal-related practices. Fortunately,
these assumptions are widely shared.
TWO-STAGE THEORIES
Animal ethicists typically argue that animals possess “moral status.” Such status is
then supposed to underlie particular entitlements for animals. Under the rights view,
upgrading status can secure animals genuine rights. We can call such approaches “two-
stage” theories (stage 1: establish “moral status”; stage 2: generate moral prohibitions
on animal-related conduct based on the “status” secured at stage 1). Notions and con-
structions such as “moral considerability,” “moral entitlement,” “exclusion,” “inclusion,”
“moral status,” or “moral patienthood” constitute interchangeable terms through which
two-stage theories are articulated. The utilitarian version of a two-stage theory estab-
lishes moral entitlement via pain-pleasure awareness or through the capacity to satisfy
or frustrate an animal's (nonlinguistic) interests or preferences. After establishing moral
status in this way, the theory places conduct restrictions relating to pain, interests, or
preferences. Rights-based two-stage theories reject the viability of a selective (species-
ist) ascription of rights. After grounding animal rights in this way, the rights theorist
will formulate limitations on conduct issuing from some account of welfare constituents
that ought to be respected in any being that possesses rights.
Common to all two-stage theories is the premise that some actions ought not be
done to animals because they possess moral status. The assumption that moral glue
binds moral status with conduct is perhaps natural. Yet what is “moral status”? When
one scrutinizes this frequently used construction, it appears to mean nothing more than
protection: entities possessing “some degree” of “moral status” are entities to which
some actions should not be done. Note, though, that this last sentence pinpoints se-
mantic equivalence, not logical entailment. It is not the case that morally undesirable
actions ought not be done because the being “has” or “possesses” moral status. Rather,
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