Materiel Command and the Materiality of Commands: An Historical Examination of the US Air Force, Control Data Corporation, and the Advanced Logistics System - History of Computing: Learning from the Past - page 92

The Air Force did have a big problem to retrofit the logistics institution
with an advanced computer system. Unfortunately the primary message
that we delivered to the Air Force at the time was, “whatever you think
you're doing, you're doing it poorly and you're not organized to do it
well.” Which is not a pleasant message to deliver, but the fact of the
matter is that Air Force at that juncture…had never faced or managed
the conversion of a huge computer system. And this was a huge
operation [16].
Ware's correspondence and reports in the RAND Corporate archives fully corroborate
these comments. Repeatedly, RAND computer scientists conveyed to the Air Force
the great risks of implementing such a massive, real-time, third generation computer
networked system—with which the Air Force had no prior experience. As the project
moved forward, Ware and other RAND computer scientists provided advice regarding
specific areas—such as file conversion, performance analysis and test simulation, and
computer security—to improve the likelihood for success with ALS, but did not
waiver from their assessment of the major risks involved. 10 While COMRESS and
Computer Science Corporation, two computer services firms serving as pre-project
consultants, undoubtedly presented less dire assessments, 11 no organization (given
JOSS—RAND's pioneering time-sharing system—and RAND's connection with its
spin-off, System Development Corporation) was better equipped to advise on a mas-
sive, pioneering real-time computer and software project than RAND. 12
Prior to the launch of the ALS project, the House Appropriations Committee
asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to produce an assessment report on the
Air Force's ALS plans. The report cited a number of potential difficulties [4]. Specifi-
cally, it reported that “there are strong indications that problems may be encountered
in obtaining and implementing computer software.”[4] The GAO cited a recent major
airline's canceling of a $56 million contract with a computer vendor for a large-scale,
multifunction data processing system (less ambitious than ALS)—resulting from re-
current delays and problems with software implementation and data security [4]. The
AFLC leaders did take some suggestions, such as implementing a pre-bid benchmark
test, but they did not seem to take to heart the direct warnings regarding software
challenges [4]. While Elliott cites this report, he only uses it for the Air Force data
and projections it presents, or to record early project delays, not to convey the GAO's
reservations regarding ALS software [2].
Following a Request for Proposals (RFP) for ALS, meetings in spring and summer
1968 were held at Hanscomb Field (near Bedford, Massachusetts) with firms likely to
bid for the project's primary computer contract. 13 Elliott highlights the enthusiastic
reception to the RFP by the computer industry, yet one of Control Data Corporation's
10 This is based on examining numerous reports and extensive correspondence files of Willis
Ware while conducting research at the RAND Corporate Archives in 2004.
11 There were current and potential future financial incentives for these software consultancies
to favor continued exploration and development of what became ALS.
12 The RAND Corporation's early pioneering work and considerable expertise in computer
networking and time sharing, computer security, and other areas is documented in [17].
13 The computer firms that attended these meetings were IBM, Sperry Univac, Control Data,
Burroughs, and RCA.