Materiel Command and the Materiality of Commands: An Historical Examination of the US Air Force, Control Data Corporation, and the Advanced Logistics System - History of Computing: Learning from the Past - page 91

ALS [2] 5 uses Air Force documents almost exclusively, and places much of the blame
for the project's shortcomings with lead computer contractor Control Data Corpora-
tion (CDC) [2]. 6 My paper takes advantage of a host of new resources, and seeks to
provide a more nuanced and balanced interpretation as to why this project failed. It
also places this important story within the broader framework of the history of
computing and history of technology. 7
Air Force historian William Elliott, author of the AFLC published history of ALS,
presents strong approval of the ALS plan by the Air Force, coupled with brief men-
tion of a few prominent skeptics. Throughout, he stresses that the Air Force trusted
the experts—this included outside advisors, consultants from the computer services
industry (COMRESS and Computer Sciences Corporation), and computer firms look-
ing to bid for the primary ALS contract [2].
Elliott mentions the RAND Corporation's early experience in computer time-
sharing and a presentation by RAND to the Air Force on this topic in 1966 [2]. How-
ever, he neglects to discuss RAND's role as a longtime top IT advisor to the Air
Force. The RAND Corporation, spun off from the Air Force's Project RAND in the
early post-World War II era, was a prominent advisor to the Air Force on many sci-
entific, technical, military, and strategic matters from the late 1940s through the
1970s. While the RAND Corporation, during the 1960s, shifted from a near exclu-
sive focus on military research and development to include a broader social and
economic research agenda, it continued to be a top advisor to the military, and espe-
cially the Air Force, throughout that decade and beyond. 8 By the start of the ALS
project, RAND had conducted pioneering research on inventory management for
nearly a decade [15]. The Computer Science (CS) Department (and earlier, the
Mathematics Department) at RAND advised the Air Force on computing and soft-
ware systems throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 9 RAND's head of CS, Willis
Ware, led a RAND advisory committee on ALS. In reflecting on the advice he and
his committee provided to Air Force leaders prior to the project and in its early
stages, Ware stated:
5 There are only several publicly available copies of this history worldwide.
6 Elliott, while acknowledging shortcomings and failed goals with the project (attributing most
of these to Control Data Corporation's inexperience and mistakes), does not present ALS
overall as a failure. At times, he in fact stresses the benefits of ALS—emphasizing the impor-
tance of the Air Force's early commitment to massive computer infrastructure to future logis-
tics efforts. He, however, generally neglects to provide concrete evidence of direct substan-
tive connections. Nor does he explore what alternatives might have looked like to expand IT
infrastructure for Air Force logistics outside of the ALS project.
7 These new resources include an oral history interview I conducted with the ALS project man-
ager for Control Data (Fred Laccabue); CDC documents, including correspondence with gov-
ernment officials; and an oral history I conducted and documents from the leading external
Air Force computer advisor of the time, RAND computer scientist Willis Ware.
8 For the early history of the RAND Corporation, its broadening scope in the mid-1960s, and its
continuing relationship with the Air Force see [13]. A more popular history of RAND covers
some similar ground [14].
9 Prior to the 1970s, computing research and expertise resided within the RAND's Mathematics
Department.