Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
TABLE 7.3
Estimates of rice supply and use, 1985/86 to 1998/99 (thousand tons)
Item
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
Total supply
7,295.00
7,292.30
7,110.60
7,447.20
7,424.80
8,186.50
Beginning stock
a
999.5
1,541.20
1,417.20
1,230.80
1,079.70
1,366.60
Production
b
5,949.50
5,858.40
5,681.90
6,045.20
5,876.40
6,464.10
Imports (exports)
c
346
-107.3
11.5
171.2
468.7
355.8
Percentage of supply
4.74
-1.47
0.16
2.30
6.31
4.35
Total requirement
5,753.80
5,875.10
5,879.80
6,367.50
6,058.20
6,365.30
Food
d
5,200.20
5,327.40
5,349.50
5,803.70
5,512.40
5,776.70
Seeds
166.9
166.9
160.9
170.9
163.9
168.3
Feeds and waste
386.7
380.8
369.4
392.9
381.9
420.3
Ending stock
1,541.20
1,417.20
1,230.80
1,079.70
1,366.60
1,821.20
Commercial
274.1
335.1
363.6
389.3
593
603.4
NFA
584.6
552.7
320.4
104
333.2
534.6
Household stock
682.5
529.4
546.8
586.4
440.4
683.2
Daily consumption
Total
15,900
16,200
16,700
17,700
17,900
16,700
Per capita (kilogram)
94.9
95
93.3
98.7
91.6
91.9
Number of days' supply
97
87
74
61
76
109
Population (January 1)
54,808
56,103
57,432
58,799
60,203
62,865
SOURCE
: Data from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.
NOTE
: Blank cell indicates not available.
a
July 1 stock inventory is based on the monthly survey of household stocks (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics),
monthly survey of commercial stocks (NFA), and NFA stock inventory reports.
With the 650,000 tons of imported rice, the supply reached 3.43 million
tons, which was enough to last until the first week of December, a month be-
yond the lean period. During the October 1998 meeting of IAC, the Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics concluded that the
palay
production would increase by
3 million tons in 1998/99 for a 35.7 percent increase over the previous crop year.
Thus, IAC concluded that the contract to import 300,000 tons and standby au-
thority for 350,000 tons more were adequate to stabilize rice prices in that year.
Ignoring these recommendations, NFA unilaterally contracted another 350,000
tons based on the standby authority and secured approval from the president to
import another 300,000 tons, bringing total rice imports in 1998 to an un-
precedented 950,000 tons. These events clearly manifest NFA's tendency to ex-
tract rents from its monopoly control over rice imports.
Two other aspects of current rice import mechanisms can provide more in-
sights about the inefficiency of government monopoly. First, import contracts
are normally negotiated on a government-to-government basis and at terms that
were advantageous to the government, after a bidding process. NFA believes
that government-to-government contracts protect it from any default or delay in
the delivery of stocks, a situation that could destabilize domestic supply. How-
