Comparative Research Design - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 67

and personalistic regime characteristics, coinciding with a centralization of competencies and a
lack of power control. In Kyrgyzstan, which had a more Parliamentarian system in the begin
ning, the President initiated several national referenda in 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2003 with
which Parliamentarian powers were gradually reduced and those of the President were en
hanced. 62 A dubious interpretation of the constitution allowed a third presidential term for
Askar Akaev (BTI 2003 1 2; Von Gumppenberg 2004: 157). Similarly, in Tajikistan two refe
renda in 1999 and in 2003 secured the presidential stay in power (Schwarz, Rakhmonova
Schwarz 2004: 265). Both presidents, Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan 63 and Emomali Rakhmon 64
in Tajikistan, prevented a change of power though elections, changed the law in order to pro
long their term in office, and relied on personal networks to secure their power. 65 The Parlia
ments in both countries effectively do not have any control function as the President can cir
cumvent its legislative function by ruling with referenda and decrees. Also the judiciary is fac
tually subordinate to the President (BTI 2003, 2003a, 2006, 2006a). Elections do not meet
OSCE standards.
In contrast to formal separation of power, in both countries the executive is the most
powerful state institution. The President and his personal apparatus dominate politics while the
Parliament plays only a marginal role. In Kyrgyzstan the Prime Minister is formally head of the
government, but he actually “serves as a figure shielding the president from policy failures and
criticism” (Lewis 2006: 21). The leading figures of the Presidential administration have more
power than the Prime minister. Lewis (2006: 22) describes the relation between the often dup
licating bureaucracies of the President and the Prime Minister as follows: “the presidential
administration has extensive powers but lacks accountability whereas the prime ministerial
administration accounts for all policy decisions but has few powers”. Consequently, while the
first president Akaev stayed in power 14 years, the average term in office of the Prime Minis
ters was only about 18 months (Lewis 2006: 21). In addition, Akaev's family was (and still is in
part) very active in politics, especially his wife Mairam Akaeva, his son Aidar, and his daughter
Bermet.
In Tajikistan, there is an enormous concentration of power with the President. The post
of Prime Minister is even described as “rather nominal” (Abdullaev 2004: 11). The President
appoints all of the ministers, governors, judges, and mayors. The policy development is mainly
in the hands of the presidential apparatus. The agreement of the peace accord to assign 30% of
all government positions to UTO is hardly implemented and if so, then only on lower levels of
the administration. In order to exclude UTO, executive powers were increasingly transferred to
the Presidential apparatus, which turned into a “super government” (Abdullaev 2004: 12),
partly duplicating the responsibilities of ministries and without effective control by the Parlia
ment. On the other hand, several experts mention that Rakhmon might not be as strong as he
appears but rather may be dependent on several powerful persons that act as “éminence grise”
behind him. Key actors from Kulyob fill major power positions such as important ministries,
general prosecutor, chairman of Majlisi Milli , or are members of the Committee on Radio and
TV (Abdullaev 2004: 11f).
62 The Parliament ( Zhogurku Kenesh ) with 105 seats was replaced by a system of two chambers. Later it was again
reduced to one chamber, which comprised only 75 deputies. Proportional representation was replaced by majority
vote.
63 The period after the end of the Akaev regime in March 2005 is considered only marginally in this study.
64 In early 2007, the President changed his surname from the russified version of Rakhmonov into Rakhmon.
65 In Kyrgyzstan, therefore the term keminism evolved, referring to the Kemin district, where Akaev and most part of
his political network com from (Lewis 2006: 16).