Comparative Research Design - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 61

The new significance of hydropower is even more noticeable in Tajikistan. Hydropower is
clearly defined as “priority no. 1” for the development of the country. 49 Currently, despite the
rich hydro energy potential, Tajikistan is a net importer of energy as (1) the storage capacities
are not sufficient to produce enough energy in winter; and (2) the northern part of the country
is not connected to the power system of the south. The northern Sughd province receives 85%
of its power from Uzbekistan. Tajikistan delivers the same amount of energy to the Uzbek
province Surkhandarya in the south (Petrov 2003). In winter, power has to be imported from
Uzbekistan (90%), Turkmenistan (7.5%) and Kyrgyzstan (2.5%). Import value exceeds export
value by 10% (UNDP 2003: 45f). Thus, Tajikistan is dependent on energy imports from Uzbe
kistan. Since dissolution of the water energy system, this situation has provided a constant
problem due to lack of financial means for payment resulting in power cuts on a regular basis.
The energy produced in summer has to be sold at a low price (due to low demand) and water is
sometimes even discharged without using it to generate power. Next to seeking energy inde
pendence, Tajikistan also strives to enter the export market for hydropower. 50 The hydropower
development strategy foresees the construction of 14 dams at the Vaksh and Amu Darya plus
about 60 small hydropower stations (MIWM, UNDP, EC IFAS 2006: 51; Giese, Trouchine
2006). In 2005, the construction of three new dams located at the Vakhsh, the most important
tributary to the Amu Darya, began: the Rogun and the two Sangtuda dams. 51 As international
financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF were reluctant to finance the projects,
Tajikistan turned to other sources. Sangtuda 1 HPP is financed by Russia (250 Mio USD) on
the basis of a government agreement between the two countries. Sangtuda 2 HPP is financed
by Iran (180 Mio USD), which will also import part of the energy produced. Concerning the
Rogun HPP, an initial agreement with the Russian investor RusAl (550 Mio USD) in October
2004 failed due to a dissent regarding the height, type, and costs of the dam. 52 In early 2007,
the government of Tajikistan announced that it would finance the dam completely on its own
(ICG 2002; Giese et al. 2004; MIWM, UNDP, EC IFAS 2006: 46; Fergana.ru 2007). 53
The economic crisis in both countries also resulted in a decline of finances alloted to the
water sector. This had severe consequences for the state of the technical infrastructure. Mean
while, most pumping and dam facilities are between 20 30 years old but have neither been
modernized nor renovated in the last 15 years. Necessary repairs are only possible with grants
and loans from the international development banks. The number of hydrometric stations and
posts decreased dramatically. They are essential for the exact measurements of water flows,
water withdrawal, and forecasts. In 2004, only 139 of the former 545 gauging stations and
posts of the whole Syr Darya basin were still in operation, in the Amu Darya basin 147 of 332
49 Author's interview with the chair of EC-IFAS, Dushanbe, 10/08/2003; with a representative of the EC-IFAS,
Dushanbe, 10/21/2003.
50 Declarations of intended cooperation have already been signed with Afghanistan, India, China, and Turkey (MIWM,
UNDP, EC-IFAS 2006: 46).
51 The construction of the Rogun dam began already in 1976, but was delayed in the 1980ies. At the end of the
1980ies, with the beginning perestrojka , security concerns (the dam is situated in a seismic active area) and protests of
local population against their displacement and the flooding of holy sites grew and were openly discussed. It was
agreed to minimize the dam so that less people had to resettle. After independence, however, the old plans were
reanimated, despite the fact that a flood destroyed the dam built so far in 1993 (Niyazi 2003).
52 This is the official statement. Unofficially, it is speculated that the closer relations of Russia with Uzbekistan were
the reason (IWPR 2007b; Eurasianet 2007).
53 Despite high expectations, the energy potential is often overestimated. Due to the seismic activity in the region,
many water resources cannot be fully made available or the costs are too high to make it a sensible investment. Various
estimates state that only between 30-50% of the water resources are suitable for economically reasonable exploitation
(Niyazi 2003; Petrov 2003). Ecological considerations also have to be taken into account: The salinity in the Nurek and
Kairakum reservoirs is already so high today that it has negative impacts on the crop yields (Niyazi 2003).