Comparing the Politics of Water Institutional Reform - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 175

level in the implementation), only in Kyrgyzstan reforms of the water administration in the
strict sense are conducted. Both countries inherited the administrative structure of the Soviet
Union and this legacy still shapes today's administrative culture. As public administration in
general, also water administration still follows a very hierarchical model with strong centraliza
tion and lack of horizontal coordination, dominance of the presidential administration, weak
position of local authorities, a top down command style, resistance to new management me
thods, lack of self initiative, lack of understanding of the new role of the state (e.g. in coopera
tion with NGOs) by the officials, and a general low level of transparency and accountability
(GoK n.d.: 43; GoT 2002: 18f; ISRI, Socinformburo, FES 2004: 38f). Patrimonial features
shape staffing policies and internal accountability, which is generally only perceived upwards
and not towards the target group. These internal, institutionalized rules of the water adminis
tration have a negative impact on the implementation of reforms.
First, they contradict principles of stakeholder participation and decentralization of com
petencies, as aimed for in WUA reforms: WUAs are generally perceived as subordinate and not
as independent and equal partners. Second, they do not encourage compliance to ISF payment,
as there is often no comprehensive information on reason for payments given to water users
and no accountability exists in respect to guaranteed water delivery in case of payment. This
affects the trust of water users in state agencies. Thurman (2002: 57) describes for Kyrgyzstan
that “stakeholders (…) appear to have abandoned any hope for a state led solution to their
difficulties. Indeed, (…) villagers assert that local officials are part of the problem instead of
the solution”. But the situation is similar in other countries of Central Asia: „Presently, under
funded and over burdened local ministries of water management, WUAs, local authorities and
farms are often unable to curb rent seeking by farmers with enough informal connections or
money to capture an unfair share of water“ (Bucknall et al. 2003: 6). While Soviet legacies in
public administration play an important role here, the described situation is not a typical for
many countries also outside the FSU region: “Transparency and accountability (…) are not
part of the institutional culture of most irrigation agencies” (Meinzen Dick et al. 1997: 55). As
these features are nevertheless critical ones of good water governance, internal rules of water
administration have to be addressed by reforms.
The importance of these inter institutional linkages was not adequately considered in the
reform programs. Interestingly, donors' policies toward the water administration turned out to
be different in both countries. In Kyrgyzstan, IFIs pressured for reductions in the state bu
reaucracy, which was the reason why the former MinVodKhoz was dissolved. Projects con
ducted with different agencies intensify fragmentation instead of overcoming it. The meso
level is directly addressed in the WUA reform by establishing WUA support departments that
are meant to become part of the water administration in the long term. However, the impact of
these and other capacity building programs is hindered by the existing patronage and hierar
chical patterns. In Tajikistan, in contrast, WUA reform has been so far mainly implemented by
INGOs, which tend to reduce cooperation with the state water agencies to a minimum. As a
result, the meso level is marginalized in the whole reform process and lacks knowledge on its
new role and responsibilities. This situation might change as WUA support departments are
now planned by the ADB. The whole water administration is affected by a brain drain of its
qualified staff to donor agencies. This seriously weakens the capacities of the meso level. In
this study, this was especially noted in Tajikistan. Pétric (2005: 325) notes a general “internal
brain drain” from state to INGOs and donor funded NGOs for Kyrgyzstan as well. The state
meso level, being itself in a precarious situation, is confronted with the support for NGOs and