Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
the rehabilitated irrigation channels serve mainly his
network while the work has to be done by
poorer farmers that will not have any benefit from it.
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WUAs inherited the bad infrastructure of the canals. WUAs lack the technical equipment
for adequate cleansing and rehabilitation work and the financial means to hire professionals.
Rehabilitation is therefore only done when funded by donor programs. As access to grants is
often the main incentive to set up a WUA, donors get incorporated in the patronage logic.
Reforms are conducted (on paper) in order to get access to urgently needed financial resources
and technical assistance. In Tajikistan, where the role of the local patron was more uncontested
than in Kyrgyzstan, at least in the local case study, the ambivalent role of donors is especially
apparent. They become incorporated into the logic of patronage and rely on local development
brokers. Their power base is not only the access to resources, but also to information. They
receive training from donors, WUA support departments, or other projects, which reinforces
the power and brokerage position. This aspect is also emphasized by Wegerich (2005: 189) on
WUAs in Uzbekistan, where he states that “expert 'knowledge' and 'information' were power
tools to keep the original hierarchy in place.” With the incorporation of WUAs into the patro
nage system, there is the danger that they will stop functioning as soon as the financial support
by the patron, i.e. the donor agencies, ends. It is questionable whether the reforms will be
sustainable under these circumstances. Hence, donors have a considerable impact here as well,
even if they try to be sensitive to the local context. This is also observed in local level projects
beyond the water sector:
“[I]nternational donors' inadequate conceptualization of the nature of local politics and power relations can
negatively impact community driven projects. Thus community driven development is often conceived as a de-
politicised project, and it ignores the important political and institutional constraints on the civic sphere.”
(Babajanian, Freizer, Stevens 2005: 221)
To summarize, some of the new water rules can come into conflict with existing local rules
such as conflict avoidance or patronage principles. These are obviously more reliable in ensur
ing access to water than the formal principles (such as payment) and they prevent sanctioning
of non payment or unauthorized water withdrawal. But rather than providing two alternative
systems, both are merged: Reforms to introduce new institutions rely on old institutions.
WUAs are active when the heads of local patronage networks are committed to it. ISF are paid
when local authoritative persons demand it and not because of the market logic associated with
it.
Water Institutional Linkages
Concerning the mutual influence of the water institutions to be reformed themselves, it be
came obvious that linkages are evident. They have a negative impact on reform processes
when they lead to contradictions between water policy, law, and administration. One reason
are different time horizons of change: legal processes for water rights require more time than a
presidential decree on a new policy; and informal rules within the water institutions cannot be
changed by a decision at all, but require long term strategies. Another reason for inconsisten
cies is that reform efforts in both countries focused on water policy and water law and neg
lected water administration.
Therefore, in Kyrgyzstan as well as in Tajikistan the most serious endogenous impact
comes from the water administration. Despite the importance of the water administration for
overall reform (the central level of bureaucracy is involved in the rule formulation, the meso
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For such an example see the case study in Earle 2005:252ff.
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