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that they are members of a WUA. The greater part of the farmers in both countries is unaware
of their rights and responsibilities, as well as of the exact tasks of WUA. Similar observations
were made by the studies of Hassan et al. (2004: 34ff) and Alymbaeva (2004: 32f). This reflects
the general situation, in which the majority of the rural population is excluded from informa
tion and decision making in the villages.
It is important to note that the close interrelation of the WUAs with informal and formal
village organizations may have positive aspects as well: the involvement of existing institutions
can contribute to the acceptance of WUA and its principles by the population and enforce
ment by the village authorities. It can be assumed that when ISF are paid and WUA decisions
are accepted, it is mainly because of this integration of newly introduced institutions into exist
ing ones with an accepted authority to solve conflicts and power to enforce rules. However,
then the character of the new institutions changes. Local organizations like the court of elders
and the
mahalla
committee are embedded in local power structures and there are many reports
when the elders in their decisions protect distinguished members of the community, avoid
open conflict, and neglect claims of less powerful villagers. WUAs in some cases foster power
accumulation by those already powerful and enable a misuse of this position, which means
favored water distribution to their own network and insecure water access by the marginalized
part of the population. The manner in which projects are typically implemented by donors and
NGOs strengthens existing power patterns since donors rely on the village elite to realize their
project in the given timeframe. This is also the case in bottom up projects, like those described
for Tajikistan, though they have more awareness raising components.
Additionally, donors tend to, if not ignore, then idealize 'traditional' local institutions like
village assemblies and
hashar
and utilize them for their own objectives. For example,
hashar
as a
type of collective labor is used as a participation mechanism in projects by donors to ensure
community commitment and awareness. But
hashar
is a specific form of reciprocity, and not
participation in the sense of democratic decision making. The way
hashar
is used in these
projects has more in common with the instrumental way it was used by the Russian colonial
regime and the Soviet Union (as duty in kind) than with its original societal function and
meaning. Consequently, it also fails short in reaching community commitment. Most projects
hence work
with
local institutions rather than
for
them. While those projects want to be locally
adaptable, they use existing institutions in an instrumental way.
296
Thereby, the democratic
potential of these institutions wanes: An
hashar
is not participation in the sense of taking part in
decisions affecting one's own life, if it is simply announced by the local
rais
or an
aksakal
and
296
Therefore, some scholars distinguish between a 'method' and a 'process' orientation in community development
(Earle 2005; Freizer 2005): Are CBOs seen as an end in itself, i.e. is the empowerment of local communities the main
target, or are CBOs mainly seen as a means to reach more ownership and more sustainability of projects? The latter is
the approach of many donors that have rediscovered the CD approach since the end of the 1990s. On the one hand,
this reflects the critique addressed to Western donors of trying to introduce Western concepts of civil society and
neglecting 'traditional' civil society as represented in different informal institutions such as
mahalla
committees,
aksakals
or
hashars
. On the other hand, it often coincides with a romanticized notion of 'community' and its institutions, which
neglects local power asymmetries and thereby sometimes strengthens them. Also in scientific research, not a few
institutionalist studies that highlight indigenous or local strategies in natural resources management rest upon a naive
and idealistic image of 'community' and neglect social hierarchies and power relations (Mehta 2000: 14f). At this point,
it should be mentioned that my findings derive from one bottom-up developed WUA in Tajikistan and two top-down
established ones in Kyrgyzstan. There is no substantial difference in that respect to observe. The question is whether
these different approaches actually do make a difference or whether the local institutional setting is dominant. Further
research would be necessary here. See for discussion also Platteau 2004 and Chhotray 2004.
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