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antee timely water delivery to those who paid and punish violation of the rules. In theory, each
WUA has mechanisms to punish water theft. Many WUAs have a dispute resolution commit
tee and agreed on the amount people must pay when they violate the rules usually between
300 and 1000 som. At the WUA “kd orset”, the official penalty for water theft is 1000 som,
but to date no one has paid it and not a single case has been brough to the dispute resolution
committee or the general assembly. In most cases, stealing water has no consequences. Bichsel
(2006: 87) even encountered in her case study understanding for illegal water withdrawal
among those who suffered from it (i.e., the farmers located down stream). Unauthorized water
withdrawal is so common and accepted that it can be described as an informal institution as it
represents a widely non confronted rule of behavior which possesses a certain degree of legi
timacy. Bichsel (2006: 80f) therefore rightly points to the need to rethink the usage of terms
such as “water theft” or “stealing of water” in order to describe unauthorized water withdraw
al, as they have a negative connotation and involve moral judgmenst of people's activities that
the perpetrators might not perceive as illegitimate. Moreover, Thurman (2002: 19) links the
increase in unauthorized water withdrawal since independence to the vacuum created by the
erosion of responsibility of the FSK and the not yet accepted or created WUAs.
The roles of the
aiyl okmotu
and the court of elders display general attributes of Kyrgyz
culture, a strong hierarchical culture and respect for elders and community. Such values can
have more influence on people's actual behavior than incentives appealing to self interest or
formal rights. Hence, in the local context it is more disprized to appeal for one's right in court
(for example) than to illegally (but not illegitimately) withdraw water. For a farmer to receive
irrigation water in a timely manner and an adequateamount, it is much more rational to 'invest'
in stable patronage relations than in the payment of ISF. The former is a much more reliable
source of water than the latter. However, with the incorporation of the patrons into the WUA,
they could foster ISF payment. It can be argued that it is precisely the incorporation of existing
power structures that gives them the authority to work effectively and collect ISF, for instance.
As we have seen, more than half of the total ISFs are collected in WUAs even though they do
not guarantee water delivery. This payment can be attributed to the authority of the WUA
chairmen and directors. However, the effect is then that while ISF are paid, the ideas behind it
(the right to water and efficient use thereof) are not transmitted.
6.4.4
The Impact of Water Institutional Linkages on WIR
Besides these exogenous variables, the water institutions themselves also influence each other
and the reform or change of institutional elements. The analysis revealed a major discrepancy
between a predominantly patrimonial water administration and new policies and laws. Yet
linkages between water policy and law as well as intra institutional linkages within water law
also play a role.
The idea behind ISF payments is that they ensure people a right to water. However, a
right to water was only codified with the new Water Code in 2005. Before that, users had to
pay for water without a guarantee that it would result in factual delivery. Such a situation makes
it highly irrational to pay fees. This can explain why unauthorized water withdrawal and non
payment are common. The question is rather why farmers
do
pay for their water usage. Based
on the analysis given above, it can be estimated that payment occurs because of patronage
mechanisms. In those places where fees are collected by WUA staff, it is the authority of the
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