Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
literature. It is said that the local people of authority abuse their power in order to supply their
relatives or clients with water. This is possible among other reasons because there are no effec
tive intra WUA control mechanisms of exact water amounts (see above). However, the access
question was often already decided with the land distribution during land reform: Powerful
villagers were able to secure the better fields for themselves, meaning the plots situated near
the main channel and at the upper end where water delivery is more secure than in the fields
located further down the channel. Although the area of the case studies is not a water scarce
and thus conflict prone region, tensions persist and scandals occur on a regular basis because
of water distribution, even if everyone initially denies it. In particular, villagers who have their
plots at the end of channels complain that the water does not reach their fields. Interestingly,
corruption and bribes were not mentioned in the interviews. Other studies also stress that this
seems to not be a common phenomenon in securing water access. This may be surprising. I
would explain this by the fact that other strategies exist and have proven to be successful in
securing access to water, which makes reliance on corruption less necessary for those who are
already close to the channel and the WUA chair. And for those at the end of the channel, it
would be difficult to secure enough water even with bribes. More successful strategies that are
in compliance with existing local institutions will be discussed in the next section.
Differing Institutional Logics
One finl point to consider is that new water governance institutions can come into conflict
with other local institutions. In such a situation the actor can choose toward which rule set he
or she wishes to orient his of her behavior as both institutional logics provide a legitimate way
of behavior.
One important local value is social harmony. Consequently, the avoidance of conflicts
evolved as a rule, the enforcement of which is monitored by village organizations such as the
mahalla
committee and the
sud aksakolov
. One of their main functions is to solve conflicts
peacefully within the village preferably without involvement of official authorities, especially
those outside the village. Many WUAs also have a conflict committee, at least on paper. Yet
farmers hesitate to contact it or even the
RaiVodKhoz
due to the above mentioned culture of
conflict avoidance. Not a single case was reported when a dispute resolution committee at any
WUA got became active. Alymbaeva's findings (2004: 28f) also revealed that farmers hesitate
to approach the conflict commission or are not aware of its existence. Most members of a
WUA know each other and will not directly confront the person with whom they have a griev
ance, especially if it is a rich or respected person. This is even reinforced when one must follow
an official procedure. If someone has the authority to solve conflicts, then it is the elders or the
aiyl okmotu
, but not a little known, new organization like the WUA. The elders can make deci
sions in water disputes, as in cases where one farmer lacks water because of excessive with
drawal by others. Hence, the
sud aksakalov
may fill this gap. But it is embedded in local struc
tures and there are many reports of elders protecting distinguished members of the community
in their decisions. Avoidance of an open conflict by peaceful persuasion may also mean that
conflicts are suppressed and individuals are urged not to go to court to assert their rights as
they would bring shame to the village. This is in conflict with the idea of a right to water
through the payment of ISF. It seems that in case of doubt, community values are given pre
cedence over individual rights.
The situation is reinforced by the widely observable and widely accepted illegal withdraw
al of water. It is often referred to as “water theft”, as it formally is a violation of the water
allocation prescriptions. In this case, the task of the WUA is to control water withdrawal, guar
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