Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 109

to pay on time. Moreover, due to the deteriorated infrastructure and unauthorized water with
drawal (see below), timely payment is no guarantee for the timely water delivery. The RaiVod
Khozes are noe expected to cover their costs with ISF that do not come close to covering the
real costs, even if these were collected in full. The RaiVodKhozes hence do not have the means
to improve their services, e.g., to reduce water losses or ensure the reliability of water delivery
by way of technical improvement. This again results in a lack of benfits of ISF payment for
farmers and increases their unwillingness to pay. Due to the poor condition of the off farm
channels, for which the WUA is responsible, enormous water losses result that must be paid
for by the WUA. For example, one WUA director in the case study complained that of 50
cubic meter ordered, only 32 to 33 cubic meter would reach WUA territory. Thurman (2002:
12) cites a farmer from Talas: “the irrigators take the money from the population, but produce
no real improvements of the irrigation system.” Farmers do not see any benefits from pay
ment.
In the case study, it could be observed in the weekly meeting of WUAs with the Rai
VodKhoz that several directors complained to the RaiVodKhoz director that they had to collect
money from the people, and then the water was not be delivered on time. They had to organ
ize their members for rehabilitation work of the channels, and then the RaiVodKhoz would not
give them the full monetary value as it is dissatisfied with the quality. They had to solve all the
problems, argue with people, and then RaiVodKhoz would not fulfill its part. These complaints
also show that the payment problems do not only concern payment of WUA to the RaiVod
Khoz but also vice versa, meaning the fulfillment of the obligations on the part of the RaiVod
Khoz . It is hence also a problem of accountability. Yet water users are not used to asserting
their rights, as the following situation of the case study shows: A WUA director, when telling
the author about a conflict with the RaiVodKhoz about undelivered water, 158 seemed to want to
justify his behavior as he stressed that this situation lasted for some time and they were in dire
need of the water. Interestingly, he did not argue that they paid for it and they therefore had
the right to receive it.
Water fees are obviously not perceived as legitimate rules even by those who should en
force them and who would in theory benefit from them. This can be seen by the fact that
non payment is rarely followed by any sanctions. Farmers who do not pay still receive water,
and often those farmers who do pay are not guaranteed the delivery of water due to the deteri
orated infrastructure). While different mechanisms are in place to enforce payment (like partial
payment in advance), they are not generally implemented in practice. There is no correlation
between actual water payment by the individual farmer and water delivery from the WUA and
consequently also no incentive for farmers to pay ISF. The reform is thus not effectively im
plemented: technical implementation measures were not taken; non payment is widespread and
does generally not result in sanctions. Under these circumstances, the question arises why
farmers pay at all. This will be addressed in the subsequent analysis (chap. 6.4).

6.3.5 Transfer of Irrigation Management

The last major water institutional reform is the transfer of local irrigation management from
the state to independent Water User Associations (WUAs). The study of this reform process is
especially useful as it involves elements of the previously mentioned reforms: introduction of
158 One head of section sold water to several WUAs without delivering the full amount and taking the money for
himself.