Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 110

the hydrographic management principle on the local level and the collection of ISF. As these
aspects were already discussed in a separate chapter, the analysis of WUA will concentrate on
the transfer of state responsibilities to an independent organization and the participation of
water users. In this respect, the concept of the Water User Association (WUA) seems ideal for
merging all the main normative objectives of the current water governance discourse: It is a
democratic grass roots organization of the water users themselves at a decentralized level,
independent from state structures, financed with members' payments for the service of water
delivery. Its main tasks are the maintenance of the tertiary irrigation system; the operation of
this system, i.e. the distribution of the water obtained by the district water agency to the mem
ber farms in an equitable manner; and the collection of ISF from its members. Due to the
accountability of the democratically elected board vis à vis its members the farmers equita
ble water distribution should be guaranteed.
During the Soviet regime and in the first years of Kyrgyzstan's independence, the state
and collective farms were in charge of irrigation management in their areas. Regarding their
dissolution during land reform (see chapter 5.5.3), the government in 1994 transferred the
responsibility for O&M of the on farm irrigation system to the newly established local gov
ernment bodies, the aiyl okmotu . However, it soon became apparent that this places too exces
sive demands on the local authorities. 159 A government decree therefore envisaged the transfer
of these systems to the farmers themselves (Alymbaeva 2004:8f).
The first legal foundations of WUA were the government decrees “Regulations on WUAs
in Rural Areas” (1995) and “Statute of WUAs in Rural Areas” (1997). These decrees roughly
defined the WUA concept, regulated its activities in O&M, and determined its organizational
and financial structure. The latter already regulated the transfer of on farm infrastructure to
WUAs, allowed the trade of water, stipulated bookkeeping procedures and fees, and allowed
WUAs to impose sanctions in the event of violation of regulations. Neither, however, paid
much attention to transparency and democratic processes. Alymbaeva (2004: 9) therefore
comes to the assessment: “The legacy of a centralized management model was translated into
the contents of these laws.” The shortcomings of the inadequate legal framework resulted in
WUAs that were neither financially nor organizationally viable. In 2002, therefore, a new “Law
on WUAs” was passed that also addressed the governance aspects of WUAs issues of rule
of law, participation, transparency, etc. (Alymbaeva 2004: 10; Otdel podderzhki AVP 2001;
ADB 2000a: 1; Hassan et al 2004: 15; Kozhoev 2004: 4f). 160
The Structure and Tasks of a WUA
Figure 10 presents the model structure of a WUA. A WUA is headed by an elected council
(usually seven to eleven members) with a chairperson, all of whom work in an honorary ca
pacity. The election modalities vary: sometimes all council members as well as the chair are
elected directly by the WUA members; sometimes the members are divided into groups of
users (e.g., village or side canal) that each elect one representative to the council, which then
elects the chairman (Hassan et al 2004: 16). The paid staff usually encompasses a director, a
hydro engineer, and an accountant. These are appointed by the council. Apart from them a
number of mirabs (water masters) are employed during irrigation season for daily operation of
159 At the same time, it was also given responsibility for other tasks the government did not have money for any more:
schools, roads, drinking water systems, etc. without having enough funds.
160 Author's interviews with two officials of WUA support departments, Bishkek, 09/23/2004; with a university
professor, Bishkek, 10/01/2003.