Brain Brinksmanship - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 128

ISSUES INVOLVING CONTROL, PROLIFERATION,
AND DETERRENCE
From this, we can safely conclude that like most other weapons systems in mod-
ern history, there will gradually but inevitably be an arms race to competitively
adopt and deploy neuroweaponry. Risks of proliferation will alarm the community
of nations possessing this technology. In turn, this will lead to global outcries for
control, restrictions, and curbs on such weapons. This may trigger the usual under-
ground behavior among some nations to proliferate and share technologies with the
aim of rivaling extant neuroscience capability with an aggressive edge. Anything
underground that has a criminal taint will, of course, find some appeal among trans-
national criminals and terrorists. Putting the proverbial genie back in the bottle will
be difficult, if not futile.
It will become the kind of technology that contains many of the same inherent
risks as nuclear energy. There are peaceful uses, and there are darker outcomes.
Speculating for a moment on the universal appeal of neuroscience in its most benign
forms, many nations would seek access to such technology for allegedly peaceful
purposes. There will be the corresponding problem of curbing excursions into neu-
roweaponry and keeping activities utterly peaceful in a global system. Absent that,
an unregulated environment would allow research at least on defensive measures
against neuroweaponry. However, when some degree of international neuroweap-
onry equivalence and balance is established, systems must be devised to develop
countermeasures, defensive doctrine, and deterrence systems.
Today, global research and development in neurotechnology or what may be
regarded as cognitive science continues in a relatively unrestricted environment. It is
to be expected that offshoots of this research will be applicable to affect and control
individuals or even populations. How can—or should—such research be controlled
so as to optimize its positive effects and minimize its dubious or frankly injurious
outcomes? What constraints, rules, and approaches seem best to steer such research
away from the darker side of neuroscience? One has to wonder whether any ethical
imperatives and research boundaries will operate at all. Openly progressive research
done in bioscience and synthetic biology with some restrictive measures imposed by
consensus may be one approach to consider (e.g., see Chapter 14).
Clearly, it is important to ask what can be done to address this emerging technol-
ogy. Some argue that programs of neuroscience education and training are needed.
Some would insist that students learn about the potential societal impact of their
work, its ethical and legal contours, and the specific ways it could be used by mili-
taries, or terrorists, to create weapons. Others may favor revision of international
treaties, particularly the chemical and biological weapons conventions, adjusted to
account somehow for the new scientific realities. Brain chemistry is still a nascent
field of inquiry, and there is some speculation that the questions are daunting enough
that we will have a few decades to prepare for neurowars. However, while such
debates continue, time is not on our side.
The quest to improve warfighter performance, assess and access human thought,
influence well-being, manipulate emotions, and control neurochemical properties
is unlikely to end. Instead, risks embedded in linking cybernetic, biotechnical, and