Brain Brinksmanship - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 127

were naturally occurring or externally induced? Such questions are neither esoteric,
inappropriate, or premature.
Neuroweaponry in the hands of an aggrandizing state leader or rogue nation
is one thing. Having it available for terrorists and criminals, or excluded from
the arsenals of less developed states is quite another. Today, there are no ironclad
assurances against either scenario. Like nuclear weapons, neuroweapons convey
a special status to those who possess them, especially if the technology cannot
be readily shared, reverse engineered, or stolen through espionage or commercial
theft. It places a relatively invincible weapon in the hands of a state or actor that may
use this technology for domination or to simply extract submission and surrender
from foes and enemies. Unlike nuclear weapons, sophisticated mechanical, bio-
physical, and related scientific systems may not be necessary to develop or acquire
neuroweapons.
When a new weapons system is devised, it is almost axiomatic that the spon-
soring military must develop doctrine—a set of objectives and criteria—to define
the most effective use and focus of this technology in a warfare setting. This
compels raising additional questions that must be used to inform and formulate
any doctrine, strategy, and use guidelines. When, how, and to what degree will
neuroweaponry be used? Could it been seen as a WMD? Should it be seen that
way? Could it reside only inside a closed and concealed command and control
system not unlike the launch codes for nuclear missiles? Who could have access
and who should be trained? How would this weapons system be deployed along-
side conventional, or strategic weaponry? Is there an obligation to safeguard and
protect its existence or must it be globally declared? If the mere existence of a
neuroweapon is proven, how would it be revealed or demonstrated to a skeptical
world and press?
The global arms control record is sobering. Despite bilateral agreements on
nuclear arsenals and nuclear testing, proliferation of nuclear weapons technology still
haunts us. Worse, we know from bitter experience that treaties dealing with chemi-
cal and biological weapons have been of limited coercive value, have not stemmed
advanced research, and are unlikely to thwart actual use if a nation declared that
employing such weapons was warranted. This brings us to the threshold question:
when and under what circumstances would neuroweapons be warranted? Given
the likelihood that some neuroweapons' research will continue in the future, do we
know confidently that the actual emergence of such weapons can and will be some-
how constrained? Recall that first use of atomic weapons preceded written doctrine
about its use by at least a decade.
Assuming that several nations acquire this new weaponry within years of each
other, does this mean that the era of “neural conflicts” would then be fully upon us?
Would it stimulate serious international discussion of a treaty or similar mechanism
to curb excessive and warlike uses of neuroscientific research? Would it instead sig-
nal that the first nation who holds such a weapon can neutralize, overcome, and van-
quish any other armed power? How would neuroweapon strategies be adopted by an
insurgent opponent or renegade power? Is it reasonable to expect a period where neu-
roweapons would be tested (upon both among witting and/or unwitting subjects)?