Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
be a complicated and surprising process. Nevertheless, the four scenarios offered here do provide a
rudimentary map of some of the main possibilities for societal response.
These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. A single nation might traverse two, three, or all of
them over a period of years or decades.
If our premise is correct, then Strategy A (the pursuit of business-as-usual) is inherently unten-
able except over the very short term; it must soon give way to B, C, or D.
Strategy B (austerity) seems to lead, via social and economic disintegration, quickly to D (local
provision of the basics), as evidenced in a 2012
New York Times
article about Greeks reverting to
subsistence farming in the face of government cutbacks.
13
Strategy C (central provision of the basics) would probably lead to D as well, though the path
would likely take longer—possibly much longer—to traverse. In other words, all roads appear to
lead eventually to localism; the questions are: how and when shall we arrive there, and in what con-
dition? (And, how local?)
The route via austerity has the virtue of being quicker, but only because it induces more misery
more suddenly.
Centralized provision of essentials might be merely a way of prolonging the agony of col-
lapse—unless authorities understand the inevitable trend of events and deliberately plan for a gradu-
al shift from central to local provision of basic needs. The US could do this by, for example, en-
acting agricultural policies to favor small commercial farms and subsistence farms while removing
subsidies from big agribusiness. Outsourcing, offshoring, and other practices that serve the interests
of global capital at the expense of local communities could be discouraged through regulation and
taxation, while domestic manufacturers could be favored (this “protectionism” would no doubt be
decried both domestically and internationally). Altogether, the
planned
transition from C to D may
constitute its own scenario, perhaps the best of the lot in its likely outcomes.
The success of governments in navigating the transitions ahead may depend on measurable
qualities and characteristics of governance itself. In this regard, there could be useful clues to be
peace and security, rule of law, human rights and participation, sustainable development, and hu-
man development. For 2011, the United States ranked number 32 (and falling: it was number 28 in
2008)—behind Uruguay, Estonia, and Portugal but ahead of China (number 140) and Russia (num-
ber 148).
On the other hand, “collapse preparedness” (Dmitry Orlov's memorable phrase) may coexist
with governmental practices that appear inefficient and even repressive in pre-collapse conditions.
In his topic
Reinventing Collapse
,
15
Orlov makes the case that the Soviet Union, for all its dreari-
ness and poor governance, provided more collapse preparedness than does the United States today,
partly because people's expectations in the USSR were already low after decades spent barely get-
ting by. Or was the USSR's high level of collapse preparedness largely a matter of its having long
guaranteed the very basics of existence to its people? No one became homeless when the Soviet sys-
tem disintegrated, since no one had a mortgage to be foreclosed upon; when the economy crashed,
people simply stayed where they were.
In the era of economic contraction governmental competence will not determine all the pro-
spects of nations. Demographics will also be decisive: Egypt's political and social tumult has been
driven not just by weariness with corruption, but also by high birth rates—which have led to 83
percent unemployment for those between 15 and 29, inadequate education, high poverty rates, and
