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Trust as decision has to do only with 'taken' risks:
perceived, imagined (true or false) risks
to whom X believes to expose himself as a consequence of his decision/action
.
To 'feel confident' (we accept Luhman's proposal) has to do with any danger I (do not)
feel exposed, independently from my own actions, in a given environment, context, situation
(zones 3 and 4). However, trust as behavior and social phenomena (in economics, politics,
etc.) also requires the theory of the 'objective' risks to which people or institutions are exposed
thanks to their interdependence and reliance.
A particularly interesting case is risks X perceives (predicts) and in a sense 'chooses', but
actually has no alternative: she has no real 'freedom of', she has no real responsibility in
'taking' that risk, since the alternative is even worst. Thus, even if X chooses a path which is
not convenient at all, a bet which per se, in isolation, would be irrational, she is acting in a
rational way: minimizing her risk and damage.
2.8.2 What Kinds of Taken Risks Characterize Trust Decisions?
When
X
trusts
Y
there are three risks:
a) the risk of failure, the frustration of
g
X
(
missed gains
) (possibly for ever, and possibly of
the entire plan containing
g
X
);
47
b) the risk of wasting efforts and investments (
losses
);
c) the risk of unexpected harms (frustration of others goals and/or interests of
X
).
As for the first risk (case
a
), the increment of
X
's dependence from
Y
is important.
Two typical cases are the dependence from time resources and trusted agents' resources.
Maybe that after
Y
's failure there is no time for achieving
g
X
(it has a specific time expiration);
maybe that initially
X
might have alternatives to
Y
(rely on
Z
or
W
) after her choice (and
perhaps because of this choice)
Z
and
W
might be no more at her disposal (for example they
might be busy); this means that
X
's alternative means (partners) for
g
X
are reduced and then
X
's dependence on
Y
has increased (Sichman
et al.
, 1994).
Given those (in part perceived) risks and thus the explicit or implicit additional goals of
avoiding these harms,
X
becomes - relative to these additional goals -
more 'dependent' on
Y
, since actually it is up to
Y
(after
X
s
decision to trust him and relying on him) do not cause
those harms to
X
.
As for becoming more vulnerable (case
c
), since
X
expects some help from
Y
(as for goal
g
X
)
X
feels well disposed towards
Y
. The (implicit) idea that there is no danger from
Y
(as for
g
X
), reduces
X
's diffidence and vigilance;
X
feels confident towards
Y
, and this
generalizes
beyond
g
X
. This makes
X
- less suspicious and careful - more accessible and undefended.
This is also due to a bit of
transitivity
in Positive Trust from one goal to other: if
X
trusts
Y
for
g
X
,
X
can be a bit prone to trust
Y
as for a goal
g
X
(where
g
X
is different from
g
X
)evenifwe
have to consider all the limits of the transitivity applied to the trust concept (see Chapter 6).
47
Moreover there might be not only the frustration of
g
X
, the missed gain, but there might be additional damages
as effect of failure, negative side effects: the risks in case of failure are not the simple counterpart of gains in the case
of success.
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