Definitions of Trust: From Conceptual Components to the General Core - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 4

concept contain the other?). What are their exact roles in the processing of trust: For instance,
what is the procedural relationship (e.g. sequential) between belief and willingness , which
certainly is not a kind of belief? And why do some authors define trust only as a belief , while
other authors only consider it as willingness and as a decision or action ? Statistical relations
do not even begin to address these questions.
An in-depth analysis of the conceptual interconnections among different facets of trust is
also instrumental to achieve a more adequate characterization of this notion , since a good
definition should be able to cover these different aspects and account for their relevance and
their mutual relationships, or motivate their exclusion.
In particular, any theoretical model should take into account that trust is a relational con-
struct, involving at the same time:

A subject X ( the trustor ) which necessarily is an 'intentional entity', i.e. a system that
we interpret according to Dennett's intentional stance (Dennett, 1989), and that is thus
considered a cognitive agent.
An addressee Y ( the trustee ) that is an agent in the broader sense of this term (Castelfranchi,
1998), i.e. an entity capable of causing some effect as the outcome of its behavior.
The causal process itself ( the act, or performance ) and its result; that is, an act α

of Y

possibly producing the desired outcome O .

Moreover, we should also never forget that trust is a layered notion , used to refer to several
different (although interrelated) meanings (see Chapter 2):

in its basic sense, trust is just a mental and affective attitude or disposition towards Y ,
involving two basic types of beliefs : evaluations and expectations ;
in its richer use, trust is a decision and intention based on that disposition;
as well as the act of relying upon Y 's expected behavior;
and the consequent social relation established between X and Y .

If we now apply this analysis to the results summarized in Table 1.2, we can make the
following observations:

As for the terms Will , Expect , Belief , Outcome , Attitude , they match the relation we postulate
quite closely: will refers to the future (as Castaldo emphasizes), thus it is also included in
the notion of expectation , which in turn involves a specific kind of belief : in its minimal
sense, an expectation is indeed a belief about the future (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2002;
Castelfranchi and Lorini, 2003; Castelfranchi, 2003). Moreover, the term belief implies a
mental attitude, and we can say that trust as evaluation and expectation is an attitude towards
the trustee and his action: the outcome , the events, the situation, the environment.
As for the terms Action and Decision , they refer to trust as the deciding process of X and
the subsequent Y 's course of action; hence they are general, but only with reference to the
second and richer meaning of trust discussed above (see also below and Chapter 2).
As for the terms Expect , Outcome , Rely , Positive , Exploit , and Fulfill , again they are tightly
intertwined according to our relational view of trust: the positive outcome of the trustee's
action is expected, relied upon, and exploited to fulfill the trustor's objective. In short: X has