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Agent
X
Trust
no Trust
Agent
Y
X gets x
1
Y gets y
1
Honor Trust
Abuse Trust
X gets x
3
Y gets y
3
X gets x
2
Y gets y
2
Figure 8.4
Example of Classical Trust Game
Of course, in specific cases, the decision to do something for the other (which is
not
a
decision to trust him) can be joined with and even based on a decision to trust the other, when
X
is counting on an action of
Y
useful for herself as a consequence of her own action in favor
of
Y
. An example is in fact when
X
does something for
Y
or favors
Y
while expecting some
reciprocation from
Y
or for eliciting it.
This is not the only case:
X
might try to encourage an action in
Y
whichwouldbeofuseto
him (an action on which she decides to count and bet) not as a 'reciprocation' to 'helping' her,
but simply as a behavioral consequence due to
Y
's independent aims and plans. For example,
X
might give
Y
a gun as a gift, because she knows that he hates
Z
and she wishes that
Y
would
kill
Z
(not for
X
but for his own reasons).
Analogously, it is not the case that
X
always expects an adoptive act
from Y
and trusts
him for this (decides to depend on him for achieving her goal), as 'reciprocation' of her own
'adoption'. However, this is certainly an important group of situations, with various sub-cases
which are quite different from each other from the cognitive point of view.
In some cases,
X
counts on
Y
's feeling of gratitude, on a reciprocate motive of the affective
kind. In other cases on the contrary she trusts
Y
's interest in future exchanges with her. In
others,
X
relies just on
Y
's sense of honor and on his sensibility to promises and commitments.
In yet other cases she knows that
Y
knows the law and worries about the authority and its
sanctions.
20
In these cases the act of 'cooperating' (favoring the other and risking on it) is
conceived as a (partial) means for obtaining
Y
's adoption and/or behavior. Either
X
wants to
provide
Y
with
conditions
and instruments for his autonomous action based on independent
motives, or she wants to provide
Y with motives
for doing the desired action.
For a detailed analysis of the Yamagishi approach to trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994)
(Yamagishi, 2003), and of our doubts about his mixing the two concepts of trust and coopera-
tion, see Section 1.5.5.
8.5 Trust Game: A Procuste's Bed for Trust Theory
Figure 8.4 show the classical schema of a trust game.
20
Notice that
X
might also adopt
Y
's goals, while expecting
Y
's 'cooperation', but not as a
means
for this.
X
might for example be an anticipatory reciprocator; since she knows that
Y
is doing an act in her favor, she wants to
reciprocate and - in advance - does something for
Y
.
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