The Economic Reductionism and Trust (Ir)rationality - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 251

x 3 agent X does not trust Y ,makea
decision with a guaranteed outcome x 1 ,or,trust Y and let him decide on action; If Y honors
the trust, he will decide to benefit both, but if y 3 >

A trust game supposes this hypothesis: If x 2 > x 1 >

y 2 > y 1 Y may abuse trust and maximize his

own benefit.
Several authors use the trust game for characterizing trust. 'To isolate the basic elements
involved in a trusting interaction we may use the Trust Game' (Pelligra, 2005). On the
contrary we argue that the trust game (as the great majority of game theoretic approaches and
considerations about trust) gives us a biased and limited view of trust. It represents a Procuste's
bed for the theory of trust.
The first two conditions for characterizing trust, as identified by Pelligra, are rather good:

i) 'potential positive consequences for the trustor' from the trustee's behavior;
ii) 'potential negative consequences for the trustor' from the trustee's behavior.

This means that X - as for her 'welfare', rewards, goal-achievement, depends on Y ;she
makes herself 'vulnerable' to Y , and Y gets some power over X . However, one should make it
clear - as for condition (i) - the fact that X expects (knows and wishes) such consequences;
and has decided to count on Y to realize them.
Condition (i) is only vague, insufficiently characterized ( X might completely ignore that Y 's
behavior can produce good outcomes for him), but condition (iii) is definitely too restrictive
for a general definition of the 'basic elements involved in a trusting interaction':

(iii) ' temptation for the trustee or risk of opportunism '.

This is a wrong prototype for trusting interaction; too restrictive.
By relying and counting on Y (trusting him), X is exposing herself to risks: risks of failure,
of non-realization of the goal for which she is counting on Y ; and also risks of harm and
damages due to her non-diffidence and vigilance towards Y . This is a well recognized aspect
of trust (see Chapter 1). However, these risks (let us focus in primis on the failure; the non
realization of the expected and 'delegated' action) are not necessarily due to Y 's temptation
(see also Section 2.8).
On the one hand, as we said, trust is also a belief (and a bet) on Y 's competence, ability,
intelligence, etc. X might be wrong about this, and can be disappointed because of this. Y
might be unable or incompetent, and provide a very bad performance (service or product); Y
can misunderstand X 's request, expectation, or goals, and thus do something wrong or bad; Y
can be absent minded or forgetful, and just disappoint and damage X for this.
On the other hand, when X trusts Y to carry out a given action which she is waiting for
and counting on, Y is not necessarily aware of this. There are acts of trust not based on Y 's
agreement or even awareness. In these cases, Y can change his mind without any opportunism
towards X ;itisjust X 's reading of Y 's mind and prediction that is wrong. Even if Y knows that
X is relying on his behavior, he has no commitment at all towards X (especially if this is not
common knowledge); he can change his mind as he likes. Even when there is a commitment
and an explicit reliance (like in an exchange), Y changes his mind (and behavior) - violating
X 's expectations - just for selfish opportunism. He can change his mind, even for altruistic
reasons, revising his intentions in X 's interest.