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stopping the bus and
Y
relies on
X
for stopping the bus, there is bilateral (unaware) trust and
delegation; nobody stops the bus and both fail!
To have
reciprocal trust
, mutual understanding and communication (at least implicit) are
needed:
X
has the goal that
Y
knows that she (will) trust
Y
, in order that
Y
trusts her, and that
she trusts
Y
if and only if
Y
trusts her.
Exchange
is in fact characterized by
reciprocal conditional trust
: how the act of trusting can
increase
Y
's trust and then my own trust which should be presupposed by my act of trusting.
However, no paradox or irrationality is there, since my prediction of the effect anticipates my
act and justifies it. For example,
X
can be more sure (trust) about
Y
's motivation, because she is
proposing to
Y
(or accepting from
Y
) a specific and reliable motive of
Y
for doing as expected:
an
instrumental
goal-adoption for
selfish reasons
(see Section 2.8 A. Smith citation).
Y
has a
specific interest and advantage for doing something 'for'
X
(provided that he believes that
X
will do as expected).
Given our agents
X
and
Y
and two possible tasks:
τ
, we suppose that:
τ
and
6
DoT
XY
τ
<σ
1
The value of the
DoT
XY
τ
changes on the basis of its components' variation. One of the
ways to change the elementary components of
DoT
XY
τ
is when the trustee (
Y
in our case)
communicates (explicitly or implicitly) his own trust in the trustor (
X
) as for another possible
task (
τ
) for example delegating the task
τ
τ
). In our
to
X
(relying upon
X
as for the task
terms will be true the formula:
τ
) (that always implies
MutualBel
(
XY S
-
Delegation
(
YX
τ
)))
S
-
Delegation
(
YX
.
In fact, this belief has various possible consequences in
X
's mind:
i) there exists a dependence relationship between
X
and
Y
and in particular the
Y
's achieve-
ment of the task
τ
depends on
X
. Even if it is important to analyze the nature of the
Y
's
τ
7
delegation as for
, in general
X
has the awareness to have any power on
Y
(and that
Y
believes this).
ii) if this delegation is spontaneous and in particular it is a special kind of delegation (for
example it is a display of esteem) and
X
has awareness of this, i.e.
Bel (X (DoT
YX
τ
'
>
σ
2
))
8
, in general an abstract benevolence could arise in
X
as for
Y
.
iii)
X
could imply from point (i) the
Y
's unharmfullness (if the delegation nature permits it).
iv) trusting as a sign of goodwill and trustwortiness: Agents with bad intentions are frequently
diffident towards the others; for example, in contracts they specify and check everything.
Since they have non-benevolent intentions they ascribe similar attitudes to the others. This
is why we believe that malicious agents are usually diffident and that (a risky abduction)
suspicious agents are malicious. On such a basis, we also feel more trusting towards a
non-diffident, trusting agent: this is a sign for us that it is goodwilling, non-malicious.
6
where
σ
1
is the
X'
s reasonable threshold for delegating to
Y
the task
τ
.
7
for example, if there is already an agreement between
X
and
Y
about
τ
with reciprocal commitments and possible
sanctions in the case in which there could be some uncorrect behaviour.
8
where
σ
2
is the
Y
s reasonable threshold for delegating to
X
the task
τ
.
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