The Negative Side: Lack of Trust, Implicit Trust, Mistrust, Doubts and Diffidence - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 116

(4.1a) without (4.1) one should say: (4.1a) + (4.1c) = (4.1b); that is, pending

judgment: neither trust nor mistrust.

(4.1a) is incompatible with (4.1d), but compatible with (4.1) and (4.1c);

(4.1c) is incompatible with (4.1) and with (4.1d), but compatible with (4.1a)

(4.1d) is incompatible with (4.1c), that is, (4.1c) can cover (4.1d) too, while (4.1d)
logically entails (4.1c) (thanks to the principle of 'non-contradiction').

4.5 Trust and Fear
'Fear' is not just the expectation of a danger or harm, neither is it the emotion due to (elicited
by) such an expectation: by the simple explicit representation of a possible harm. To feel
fear the danger should be 'significant', not just explicitly taken into account: the subjective
expected (dis)utility must be greater than the personal and contextual threshold of acceptable
'risk'. A perceived risk that cannot be coped with and is unbearable, elicits fear (Lazarus,
1991). In fact, every moment we consider (view) possible harms or risks in our situations and
decisions, but not all of them elicit 'fear' as a specific emotion.
'Fear' is the extreme lack of trust, is a possible part and reason of 'distrust': X not only
believes that Y is unwilling or unable to do as needed, and one cannot rely on him; but,
in particular, X believes that Y is untrustworthy because he is dangerous: either out lack of
attention or through a bad disposition, character, or out of hostility, envy, etc. Y can produce
some harm to X (even intentionally), especially if X is exposed and unprotected because of
her trusting attitude; some harm going beyond the simple unattainment of the delegated task
(failure).
So 'fear' usually is one basis for 'distrust' and is difficult (but not impossible) when it
coexists with a decision to trust. Sometimes X - although perceiving her exposition and
vulnerability, and considering a risk and even feeling some fear - either has no alternative for
τ

, that she decide to trust Y and
rely on him, in spite of having some worry and fear. As we said, trust is a bet, necessarily
entails some risk, and frequently implies some perceived risk.

or believes Y to have the willingness and competence to do τ

4.6 Implicit and by Default Forms of Trust
Given the two different opposites of trust (the two kinds of negative evaluations), one can
identify an important implicit form of trust where X neither has specific and explicit positive
evaluations about Y , nor has she explicit suspects and worries. She is just without doubts,
suspect and worries , she naively relies upon Y : not because of an explicit and reason based
evaluation of Y . She trusts by default and because she has no reason to be cautious and to
suspect, does so without any explicit examination of whether Y is able, willing, or dangerous.
One could represent this attitude as the absence of mistrust, of suspicion, but also of explicit
positive evaluation and trust.
This implicit, passive, and spontaneous or naive form of trust consists of not having the
typical trust beliefs, but also in not having negative ones, negative expectations: to be without
any alarm and suspicion. Consider in fact that not having a given belief ( I do not believe that