The Negative Side: Lack of Trust, Implicit Trust, Mistrust, Doubts and Diffidence - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 117

it is raining ) is a very different cognitive state than having the opposite belief ( I believe that it
is not raining ).
As not trusting Y for g is not the same as expecting harm from Y , analogously not
dis/mistrusting, not worrying, is not the same as positively believing that Y is capable and
willing. However, this lack of dis/mistrust can be sufficient for relying upon Y . It depends on
the agent's rule. If the agent has a default which in order to delegate requires specific positive
evaluations, specific trustworthiness beliefs, the absence of these beliefs actually is distrust.
On the contrary, if the agent's default rule is ' except you have specific reasons for not relying
on Y, specific negative evaluations, then trust Y ', the lack of mistrust is factually an (implicit)
form of trust.
In this weak form the behavior/action of trust consists of the absence of cautions, of controls,
of any search for evidence for evaluation, and in the absence of a true 'decision' about trusting
or not Y . Only after some negative unexpected experience, this kind of trust is damaged.
Whoever uses explicit, evaluation-based trust, based on evidence, is no longer naive: she has
already considered the situation as problematic; she has some doubt. There is, on the contrary, a
form of trust without and before any question like: 'Can/should I trust Y ?' (See also Chapter 5).
It is important also to distinguish between uncertainty (the fact that we do not have complete
evidence of our positive evaluation of ( trust in ) Y , we are not 100% sure of our beliefs), that
make Y 's behavior (and results) not completely subjectively predictable; from the actual pres-
ence of contrasting, negative evaluations and expectations. The absence of a belief is a mental
state significantly different from the presence of the negative belief, with completely different
consequences at the reasoning and at the pragmatic level. When X has positive evaluations
of Y , and does not have any negative (pertinent) evaluation, although this positive evaluation
leaves some room for ignorance and uncertainty, this is very different from a situation where X
has negative beliefs about Y which make Y 'ambivalent' (attractive and repulsive, positive and
negative, at the same time) and destroys X 's 'trust in' Y , his trustworthiness. Non-ambivalent
although uncertain evaluation is very different from ambivalent evaluation. Thus, we have to
distinguish between two types of 'unharmfulness': 'safety' and 'there is nothing to worry'
etc.: the implicit and the explicit.
Implicit un-harmfulness simply consists of the absence of suspicions, doubts, reasons to
worry, diffidence, no perceived threats; some sort of 'by default' naive and non-arguable
confidence. I do not have reasons to doubt Y 's pro-attitude (active or passive adoption), I do
not have negative beliefs about this.
Explicit un-harmfulness consists of explicit beliefs about the fact that 'I have nothing to
worry from Y '.
Both, the implicit or explicit un-harmfulness can be based on other beliefs about Y , like 'He
is a friend of mine', 'I'm likeable', 'I feel his positive emotional disposition' (empathy), ' He is
honest and respectful of norms and promises', 'He fears me enough' , ... and also 'He trusts

me and relies on me' . 7
Another important kind of 'implicit trust' is the procedural, automatic trust, or better
'confidence', based on perceived regularities, learning, and confirmation of practices.
For example, in motor behavior there are a lot of implicit 'expectations' about objects,
movements, etc. and their 'reliability'. And when we (as expected) successfully perform a

7 This unharmfulness perception and then trust in Y based on Y 's trust in X , is important for the circular dynamics
of trust and to explain how trust can create trust (Chapter 6).