Can Existence Be Better for a Being Than Non-Existence? - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 87

relevant similarities between non-existence and situations of positive
and negative welfare holding the balance.
Here is Bradley's argument: Bradley claims that someone, let us say Kris,
will be indifferent, as far as his welfare is concerned, as to whether he
dies immediately, or lives through a period of zero welfare before he
dies. This is supposed to show that putative instances of zero P-hood
(non-existence) and known instances of zero P-hood (neutral welfare
of existing beings) are relevantly similar. It allegedly does not matter
for Kris as far as his prudential value is concerned whether he first lives
through a period of zero welfare or dies immediately. 9
What to think about Bradley's argument? Bradley argues that since
Kris would value immediate death or death after a period of zero
welfare equally, it follows that both future scenarios are comparable
in terms of welfare and thus that Kris must have zero welfare while
dead. However, Luper has replied that from the fact that Kris might be
indifferent, as far as his welfare is concerned, between a period of zero
welfare, followed by death, or immediate death, it does not follow
that Kris has zero welfare while dead. In this sense, one can say that
a shorter happy life is less valuable for a person than a longer happy
life without assuming that persons have a welfare level when they are
dead. The length of the person's life just determines, in this example,
how much he gets of what is intrinsically valuable for him, namely
welfare. 10
To recapture, Bradley argues that Kris is indifferent, as far as his welfare
is concerned, between dying immediately and dying after a period of
zero welfare. This is supposed to indicate that Kris has zero welfare in
both scenarios. Luper shows that the absence of intrinsic value for Kris
in the case of death could be explained without reference to zero welfare.
Thus, the absence of intrinsic value in both cases is not a relevant simi-
larity between a state of zero welfare and a state of death. It does not
show that Kris must have zero welfare when dead.
3. The Argument from Unification . This is the claim that instances of
zero P-hood and instances of positive or negative P-hood must show
similarities, related to the possession of P-hood. After all, they are all
instances of P-hood. Furthermore, having zero P should be shown to
be different from P-lessness.
Luper has brought forward an argument in order to show that those
who have zero welfare have relevant similarities with those who have