Can Existence Be Better for a Being Than Non-Existence? - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 86

have tried to argue for one or the other position by way of analogies. For
instance, some have drawn an analogy with temperature. The scale with
which we measure temperature, just like the welfare scale, ranges from
positive to negative values and includes a zero value. Now, it would be
nonsense to claim that the colour green, or the letter R, is neither hot
nor cold, thus it must be given a zero on the thermometer. However,
the claim that the absence of welfare is the same as zero welfare cannot
be refuted so easily. The temperature example might not be a good
analogy because the zero point on the thermometer does not indicate
the absence of temperature.
In order to decide whether something is an instance of zero value
or rather of the absence of value, or both, it makes sense to employ
some general principles of empirical inquiry. The idea is, quite simply, to
assemble known instances of a certain property, P, and find among them
putative instances of P=0 and, then, oppose such instances to those in
which P is absent. I will sketch four general argumentative strategies
along those lines. I will show how those argumentative strategies have
all been used in the recent dispute about whether the absence of welfare
in case of non-existence should count as zero welfare.
1. The Argument from Composition . This is the argument that a combina-
tion of two or more P-hoods (positive and negative) cannot amount
to complete P-lessness. With respect to welfare, this means that we
can speak of zero welfare if instances of positive and negative welfare
(in terms of enjoyment and suffering, desire-satisfaction and frustra-
tion or items on an objective list) hold the balance. If positive and
negative welfare hold the balance, this is different from not having
any welfare. This point can easily be granted. Nobody claims that
existing people who score zero on the welfare scale lack welfare. They
are considered as having zero welfare. The dispute is about whether
there are other instances of zero welfare, besides positive and nega-
tive welfare holding the balance. The following arguments are rele-
vant for that dispute.
2. The Argument from Parity . This is the argument that if anything else,
except the above-mentioned states of combinations of positive and
negative P-hoods, claims to have zero P-hood, it must show relevant
similarities with the known instances of zero P-hood. Thus, when
one claims that the non-existent have zero welfare, one must point
to relevant similarities between the non-existent and those in which
positive and negative welfare hold the balance. In the recent debate,
Bradley has brought forward an argument that is supposed to show