Total View versus Prior Existence View - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 71

5
Total View versus Prior
Existence View
1 Introduction
As has briefly been mentioned at the end of the previous chapter,
the Replaceability Argument works only if one takes into account the
welfare of an animal that will be brought into existence if and only if
an existing animal is killed. That animal does not exist while the choice
about killing the existing animal is made. It might possibly exist in the
future, namely in case the first animal will be killed. As its existence
depends on the killing of the other animal, it is a so-called contingent
being: whether it will exist at all is contingent upon the moral choice
under consideration, i.e. upon whether or not the other animal will be
killed. 1 This is the definition of 'contingent being': it does not exist yet,
and whether it will exist at all depends on the moral question under
consideration. The animal whose killing is considered is therefore not a
contingent being. It is an actual, existing being. The fact, if it is one, that
this animal exists only because it is part of a practice in which animals
are brought into existence in order to be used and ultimately killed is
irrelevant here. The existing animal whose killing is contemplated is not
a contingent being, because it is not a possible, but an actually existing
being. It already exists when the moral choice about whether or not
to kill it is contemplated and therefore its existence does not depend
on this decision. 2 As explained, the Replaceability Argument depends
on counting the potential welfare of contingent beings - namely the
possible newly created animal - in the aggregation of welfare. Should
the possible welfare of contingent beings count? This question is contro-
versial within utilitarianism.
The controversy is about whether or not to take into account the
possible welfare of contingent beings in the aggregation of welfare. The
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