Can Existence Be Better for a Being Than Non-Existence? - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 91

non-existence. Therefore, it cannot be true that her non-existence has
zero value for a person. The non-existent is not standing in any rela-
tions. So, nothing can be neutral for her. 16
Neither does it work to claim that non-existence has zero value for the
existent . After all, something (A) can only be better for somebody than
something else (B) if (B) is worse for that being than (A). Hence, if exist-
ence is said to be better for the person, this implies that non-existence
must be worse for her. However, non-existence cannot be worse for her,
as we have just seen. If a person does not exist, she does not stand in any
relations. Furthermore, if something (A) is better for a person than (B),
this must be true, no matter whether the person actually receives (A) or
(B). It must be true, no matter whether (A) or (B) actually obtain. So, if it
is claimed that non-existence can be better or worse for the existent, this
must be true even if non-existence obtained. However, as we have seen,
non-existence cannot be better or worse for the non-existent, because
nothing can have any value for the non-existent.
Ascribing zero value or 'neutral value' to non-existence is ruled out
by these arguments. However, ascribing zero welfare to non-existence is
necessary in order to claim that it can be better or worse than existence
in terms of the being's welfare. So, we cannot claim that existence can
be better or worse for a being than non-existence.
One might argue that in comparisons with non-existence one should
relax the above-mentioned logical requirements. After all, non-existence
is a special case. For instance, Parfit has argued that normally saying that
someone is made better off requires a comparison between two states of
affairs for that person. However, that requirement might be relaxed if
one makes comparisons between existence and non-existence:
We can admit that, in every other kind of case, we benefit someone
only if we do what will be better for him. In the case of giving someone
life, we understand the special reason why the alternative would not
have been worse for him. We might claim that, in this special case,
the Requirement need not be met. 17
I think that we should not accept any exceptions to those requirements.
Contrary to what has been suggested by proponents of relaxing the
requirements, doing so is not necessary for accounting for the harm
of death. We can account for the harm of death without making such
exceptions. We benefit a person if we help him experience more rather
than less welfare in his life. That is why saving someone's life might
benefit that person. We harm a person by depriving her of welfare.