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differ in a trait known to relate to P-hood, this strongly supports the
claim that the first instance really has zero P.
Luper compares a shoe that is not befallen by any positive or negative
values at time T and a person that is not befallen by any positive or nega-
tive values at time T. According to Luper, if the person has the capacity
to experience positive or negative values (even though those capacities
might be temporarily blocked), the person still is responsive in Luper's
sense and thus can have welfare. Thus, Luper brings forward a relevant
difference between an instance of zero P-hood and a known instance of
P-lessness (the shoe). That difference (responsiveness) can be explained
in terms of P-hood (i.e. welfare): one is only responsive if one's welfare
level can rise or fall.
As we have seen, responsiveness is a vague concept. It is unclear what
it means that one's welfare level can go up or down. For instance, does it
mean that it can rise without external help or that the rising is metaphys-
ically conceivable? Furthermore, why should this be relevant? This is in
need of further specification. Arguably, something like Luper's concept of
responsiveness can at least explain the difference between those who have
welfare and those who don't have welfare. According to this reasoning,
the non-existent do not have welfare, not even zero welfare.
5 For whom would non-existence have neutral value?
So far, as we have seen, the arguments are not on the side of those who
claim that non-existence can be accorded zero value on the welfare scale.
Let us now move beyond this issue.
If non-existence could be accorded zero value on the welfare scale, a
further question would come to the fore. Those who assume that non-
existence has neutral value must point out for whom it has neutral
value. Neutral value is about welfare. Welfare is a prudential value. It
is about what is good for someone. For whom would it be good in the
case of non-existence? It seems that there is nobody in the case of non-
existence whom this 'value' could befall.
It seems that in the case of non-existence the non-existent must have
neutral welfare; however, the non-existent can have no properties, not
even neutral welfare. If one wants to argue that non-existence can be
neutral for a person, then one speaks about a genuine relation, holding
between a state of affairs (non-existence) and a subject (the person). For
such a claim to be true, both the state of affairs and the subject must
exist in the same world. But the person does not exist in the case of her
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