Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)

This case follows a long line of cases that have been decided since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In 1986 the state of Missouri passed legislation placing restrictions on abortions performed in the state. The preamble to the statute stated that life begins at conception, and it put into effect the following limitations: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother’s life, encouragement and counseling to have abortions were prohibited, and physicians were required to perform viability tests on women who were in their twentieth week of pregnancy or later.
On appeal from the Eighth Circuit, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Missouri statute restrictions infringed upon the right of privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court stated that it need not decide any matters relating to the preamble of the statute. Previous case law stated that no state could justify any abortion regulation otherwise prohibited by Roe v. Wade because it embodied that state’s view as to when life begins. The preamble, in and of itself, is not regulatory in nature, nor does it state any restrictions in the abortion practice. Rather, the Court held that the language of the preamble was nothing more than a “value judgment.” Nothing in prior case law, including Roe v. Wade, had barred a state from expressing itself, and until the state applied the preamble to a situation or case, the Court felt it would be inappropriate to address or interpret its meaning.
The Court also considered the subsequent language of the statute. The statute prohibited the use of public employees and facilities for the performance or assistance of abortions. The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause prevents the state from depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property interests, but it does not give citizens any affirmative right to governmental aid or place any duty upon the state to give it (DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). In other words, this particular provision does not prevent a woman from receiving an abortion; rather, it leaves her with the same choices as if the state had chosen not to run any hospitals. It simply restricts her ability to obtain an abortion from a physician working for a public hospital. The Court simply stated that nothing in the Constitution forces a state to enter or remain in the business of abortion.
For the second part of the statute, the Court used the same reasoning. However, the appellees in the case no longer sought relief under this part of the statute, and therefore the court of appeals was instructed to vacate the district court’s judgment with prejudice pertaining to this part of the statute.
The third part of the statute requires a physician, before performing an abortion on an unborn child of 20 gestational weeks or more, to determine if the unborn child is viable. The Court considered this part to be constitutional. The Court determined that the state had a permissible interest in protecting potential human life. The section of the Missouri statute expressly states that Missouri had chosen viability as the point at which its interest in potential life must be protected. Although medical evidence clearly shows that a 20-week-old fetus is not viable, the evidence also clearly showed that there might be a 4-week error in estimating gestational age. Thus, the language of the statute requiring testing at 20 weeks was to compensate for any error in estimating gestational age. Therefore, the last part of the Missouri statute was found to be constitutional.

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