The roots of Japanese war propaganda date back to the Meiji government’s programs to nationalize the population while instilling the idea that Japan was simultaneously attempting to modernize itself and protect Asia. In World War II Japanese propaganda operated on three main fronts: domestically; China and Southeast Asia; and the West.
Massive propaganda programs went well beyond mere military information campaigns. The government planned to popularize the notion that it was Japan’s manifest destiny to expand into Asia and bring Asia itself into the modern era. Officially the Cabinet Board of Information, the Japanese government’s attempt to copy what it felt was Nazi Germany’s proper course of action, with a centralized Ministry of Propaganda, managed nonmilitary propaganda. However, actual propaganda campaigns developed in a variety of areas. Privately owned entertainment companies such as film giants Toho and Shochiku and the entertainment company Yoshimoto sent platoons of entertainers to China to amuse the imperial troops. These brigades then returned to the home islands and publicized Japanese military success in China. Government-sponsored programs urged writers to reorganize into “voluntary” blocs and write about the effort to educate the civilian population during wartime. Semiprivate advertising companies, employed as subcontractors for the Imperial General Headquarters, designed and produced propaganda leaflets that blanketed villages and fields in China and Southeast Asia. The Japanese military itself often distributed these materials and kept records of how local areas responded.
On the home front, the police and their various special agencies maintained careful surveillance of the domestic population, tabulating rumor campaigns, arresting so-called spies, and censoring media deemed anti-imperial. The government and private business were also interested in boosting tourism as a means of instilling support for the war effort, as well as educating foreigners about Japan. Tourism campaigns were partially orchestrated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as were later campaigns to encourage Asian students to travel to Japan to study.
Following the “China Incident” of 7 July 1937, which restarted war between Japan and China, the Japanese authorities increased censorship and social pressure to support Japanese military aims. As the war in China stagnated, newsreels became a prominent source of propaganda. The prime minister even called the heads of the newsreel companies to his residence and asked them to support the war effort.
After 1937 press controls were tightened even further by the passage of laws such as the Newspaper and Publication Control Ordinance in January 1941. Military press matters came under the direct supervision of the Daihonei Honbu, or Imperial General Headquarters Press Department. This section oversaw all press reports that dealt with any matter, however tangentially related to the military. Even weather reports were banned following the attack on Pearl Harbor on the assumption that such information could provide vital information to the enemy. Japanese newspapers continued to provide coverage— albeit biased—of the war. With few exceptions, a majority of writers and journalists avoided arrest even in the face of draconian laws and censorship regulations. As Japanese military triumphs mounted, domestic excitement created by the initial victories peaked. Editors and writers, along with the general population, believed in the justice of Japan’s cause and its ability to defeat its enemies.
With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japan was faced with the daunting military task of fighting on two fronts simultaneously—in China and the Pacific. The Japanese government asked its people, already under duress since the mid-1930s, to endure further economic restrictions, recycle scarce materials, do with less, and live by wartime slogans such as “luxury is the enemy.” During the many Pacific island battles, American troops found it difficult to take Japanese prisoners alive. A great number of both Japanese civilian and military personnel often chose suicide over capture. Intense domestic pressure and propaganda campaigns often left Japanese infantrymen little choice.
While Japanese propaganda generally failed in Asia, domestically the results were different. By the summer of 1945 the United States had to acknowledge that Japanese rule, with the emperor as head, must be left intact or a viable peace would not be obtainable. Following the Japanese capitulation on 15 August 1945, the U.S.-managed occupation was quick to install its own pro-Western propaganda institutions. However, the occupation forces soon realized that they had neither the human resources nor the ability needed to “democratize” Japan single-handedly. Ironically, American occupation forces employed many of the same high-level Japanese special police and military propagandists who, only months earlier, had been fighting against the West.
