Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al., 521 U.S. 702 (1997)

Glucksberg was a doctor in the state of Washington. Along with several other physicians, a few terminally ill patients who later died, and a nonprofit organization, Glucksberg brought suit challenging the state’s ban on physician-assisted suicide.
The question before the Court was whether the state’s ban on physician-assisted suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by denying terminally ill adults the right to choose death over life. Using a two-part analysis, the Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional. The Court interpreted the statute using a historical, contextual test as well as a rationality test. Both parts of the analysis achieved the same result.
Washington’s suicide assistance statute made it a felony to knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide. In its examination of the history surrounding suicide assistance statutes, the Court stated that for over 700 years Anglo-American common law has disapproved or punished suicide or the assistance thereof. However, such prohibitions have never been considered in light of those people near death. But in recent years this incongruity has been re-assessed, culminating with the presidential signing of the Federal Assistance Suicide Funding Restriction Act in 1997. The law prohibited the use of federal funds to perform or support physician-assisted suicide. Therefore, the Court reasoned that suicide has been prohibited in Anglo-American law and saw no constitutional purpose in deviating from that historical norm.
The next step of the Court’s two-part analysis was a rationale test. The Due Process Clause was intended to protect fundamental rights and liberties. Given the historical perspective of suicide, the Court reasoned that there existed no right to assistance in committing suicide. To suggest the alternative would violate America’s traditions and values. It would reverse hundreds of years of practice and doctrine, and it would go against the commonly accepted policy choice of a majority of the states.
In order for Washington’s law to pass constitutional muster, it must be substantially related to a governmental interest. The primary interest served by this statute is to preserve human life. Other interests fulfilled include protecting the integrity of the medical profession, preserving the role of doctors as healers rather than killers, preventing the problem of suicide in society, and shielding vulnerable groups and persons from outside pressures to end their lives.
Previous case law, namely Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, had no stare decisis effect in the Court’s opinion. Cruzan focused on the right to refuse hydration and nutrition as the right to refuse medication. Any person may refuse lifesaving treatment at any time as an exercise of his or her personal rights. Casey also recognized that many rights, liberties, and interests protected by due process are grounded in the notion of personal autonomy: the notion that individuals are in control of their own bodies and can make personal decisions regarding how they use their bodies. However, the case at hand is distinguishable from these cases.
Glucksberg embraces the dignity of human life. Other cases speak to the right to accept or refuse medication, the right to use birth control, or other such matters. None of the cases relied on by the petitioners deal with the alleged right to end one’s life. Granted, refusing lifesaving medication is in fact a means to end one’s life; however, it is medication that is being refused, not an affirmative action taking place that would directly result in the termination of human life. Using this reasoning, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Washington statute that made it a felony to assist in the suicide of another person.

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