While often characterized as enforcers of the law, police in America must also be upholders of the law. In carrying forth their law enforcement functions the police are sworn to uphold the Constitution. This oath demands that all arrests, searches, and the like be conducted in compliance with constitutional rules. Although all courts possess the power to declare a law to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the final judge of constitutionality is the Supreme Court. This article will highlight the primary Supreme Court decisions that have most affected the way police officers perform their law enforcement role.
Arrest and Detention of Suspects
Today, the circumstances under which an arrest may lawfully be made are normally specified by state statute, but certain minimum constitutional standards, such as the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, must be met. The Supreme Court has indicated that the law of arrest has constitutional dimensions beyond the requirement of probable cause, however. In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976), the Court ruled that while the preferred practice is to obtain an arrest warrant prior to making an arrest, the Constitution does not require issuance of a warrant prior to arresting a suspect in a public place, even if officers had the time and opportunity to obtain a warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,100 S. Ct. 1371,63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), the Court ruled that absent exigent circumstances or consent, police officers may not enter a private home to make a warrantless arrest. Issuance of an arrest warrant is a prerequisite to a valid entry in nonemer-gency circumstances. Further, the warrantless entry into a home to arrest an individual for a minor offense is rarely permissible, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984). Justices have also held that the Constitution permits full custody arrests even for minor traffic offenses punishable only with a fine, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001), and that the motive behind an officer’s decision to arrest is irrelevant to its legality so long as constitutional minimum standards are complied with, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed. 2d 89 (1996).
Recognizing the need to balance reasonable police procedures against the constitutional right of citizens to be free from unreasonable seizures, the Supreme Court has granted limited power to the police to conduct temporary detentions short of an arrest. In a case styled Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the Court ruled that when an officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot and offers identification as a police officer, the officer may lawfully stop an individual for questioning. If the results of the inquiry do not dispel fear that the suspect is armed, the officer may conduct a frisk for weapons for the purpose of self-protection.
Search and Seizure
A prime investigatory activity of law enforcement is the gathering of evidence to aid in case solution and prosecution. Such seizures of physical evidence may occur as an adjunct to an arrest for some viewed offense or may be the result of direct questioning for previously identified items, such as a murder weapon. Concurrently, due to the potentially violent circumstances in which the police become involved, safety of the officer from those the officer seeks to arrest is a major concern to the police and the courts. It is in this area of search and seizure of items for prosecutorial purposes and officer safety that the day-to-day work of police officers has been most affected by Supreme Court opinions.
Search Incident to Arrest
While the authority of a police officer to conduct a search at the time of an arrest has long been recognized, the case styled Chi-mel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), involving a search of a burglary suspect’s home, presented the opportunity to clarify the rule. In Chimel, the court ruled that a peace officer may conduct a search of the person and the area within the person’s immediate control contemporaneous with an arrest for the purpose of removing weapons, preventing possible escape, and locating evidence that might otherwise be destroyed. The scope of the search is limited to the body of the arrestee and the general arm-span area. Since the search is protective in nature, absent a search warrant or an emergency, no constitutional justification exists for extending the search further.
In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court ruled that the search incident to arrest doctrine applied to any ”full custody” arrest, regardless of the severity of the offense. Thus, the arrest of a traffic offender who will be taken to jail justifies a search of the offender’s person, but mere detention for issuance of a ticket, without more, does not warrant a search.
Additionally, in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), the Court held that following the lawful full custody arrest of the driver, the interior passenger compartment of an automobile may be searched.
Warrantless Searches for Evidence
Use of a magistrate as an intervening arbitrator between the police and the citizen is a matter of continuing emphasis by the Supreme Court. However, the Court recognizes circumstances do exist where obtaining judicial approval prior to questing for evidence would be impractical.
Searching a motor vehicle for evidence is likely the most frequent application of this exception to the warrant requirement. Police officers are permitted to conduct warrantless searches when probable cause exists to believe the automobile contains evidence, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). If officers have the requisite probable cause, they may search a vehicle, including its trunk, glove box, and any packages therein that could reasonably contain the evidence they seek.
Search under a Warrant
Courts have jealously protected privacy rights when a search of an individual’s residence is involved. Barring an emergency, such as a crime in progress or the immediate destruction of evidence, the Court requires a search warrant to enter a residence without the resident’s consent, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).
Confessions
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court evidenced concern that the traditional ”voluntary-involuntary” test for confession admissibility did not provide sufficient citizen protection in cases of psychological coercion by the police. Following a finding that the Fifth Amendment also encompassed an absolute right to silence, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964), the Court sought to develop a bright line rule to provide police officers guidance when interrogating criminal suspects.
The rule came in one of the most controversial court cases in American legal history: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). A majority of the Court ruled that any questioning of a person who is under arrest is inherently coercive and jeopardizes the free exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to silence. A divided Court ruled that the prosecution may not use statements that are a product of custodial interrogation of a suspect unless it proves that the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination was protected and a knowing waiver of that privilege was made.
Protection of the privilege against self-incrimination was to be accomplished by advising in-custody suspects that they had the right to remain silent, anything said could be used against them in court, they had the right to talk to a lawyer prior to questioning, and if they could not afford a lawyer, one would be provided. If a suspect did confess, the burden fell upon the state to prove that the warning had been given and a knowing waiver of rights had occurred.
Later rulings have clarified the scope of the coverage of the Miranda holding, including a determination that the procedure ”has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture,” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).
Use of Force
In providing police officers with the authority and duty to enforce the criminal law, the government has granted them the privilege to use reasonable force, including deadly force, against persons to carry out that responsibility. Historically, the Court has deferred to the state legislatures to define the level of force that police officers were permitted to use, but in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that a common law rule permitting use of deadly force against any fleeing felon was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, unconstitutional. The court noted that it was not better that all persons die than that they escape. Deadly force may be constitutionally used only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a serious threat of harm to the officer or another person.
Conclusion
The legal authority of police officers is significantly influenced by judicial decisions. Foremost are the opinions of the Supreme Court that attempt to balance the constitutional protection of the citizenry against the needs of the government, through its police forces, to maintain law and order and bring criminal offenders to justice.
