International Whaling Commission (marine mammals)

The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is the intergovernmental body established in 1946 to conserve whale stocks and regulate whaling. Membership is open to any sovereign state. There were 40 member nations (Table I) in the year 2000.

I. Historical Background

Whaling cannot be put forward as an example of the successful sustainable management of a renewable resource. From the start of the “commercial” exploitation of whales, the story was usually one of eventual overexploitation. Modem commercial whaling began with the invention of the explosive harpoon combined with the development of steam-powered catcher boats in the 1860s. This allowed whalers to take the faster swimming rorquals (e.g., blue and fin whales, Balaenoptera musculus and B. physalus). The promise of large numbers of whales caused whalers to investigate the Antarctic, and the first whaling station was established on South Georgia in 1904 and took 195 whales. Bv 1913, there were 6 tine land stations and 21 floating factories that had to be moored in suitable harbors; the total catch was 10.760 whales. The inv ention of the stern slipway in 1925 allowed vessels to operate in offshore waters and bv 1930/1931, 41 factory ships took over 37.000 whales. This overproduction led to a catastrophic decline in the price of whale oil.

TABLE I

List of Members of the IWC in August 2000″

“Note some nations have left and subsequently rejoined. The year of entry applies to their most recent adherence. ”Engaged in aboriginal subsistence whaling. ‘ Whaling under scientific permit. ”Commercial whaling.

It was the fear of low prices rather than the fear of overexploiting whale stocks that was the driving force behind early moves to limit catching. Despite attempts under the auspices of the League of Nations to establish some international control, the production agreements negotiated among themselves by the whaling companies produced the first effective limitation of catches in the early 1930s.

World War II caused a world shortage in the supply of fats, and several nations had their eyes on profits from pelagic whaling. It was in this light, and with the experience gained in developing international agreements just before the war. that discussions were held in London in 1945 and in Washington in 1946 on the international regulation of whaling.

II. Establishment of the International Whaling Commission

The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was signed at the 1946 conference. It was a major step forward in the international regulation of natural resources, as it was one of the first to place “conservation” at the forefront. The convention was established “to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.” This was a laudable aim, but finding the difficult balance between “conservation” and the development of the whaling industry has dominated the history of the IWC.

An important feature of the convention was that it established a mechanism whereby regulatory measures included in the Schedule to the convention (catch limits, seasons, size limits, inspections, etc.) could be amended when necessary by a three-quarters majority of members voting (excluding abstentions).

The convention also formally assigned importance to the need for scientific advice, requiring that amendments to the regulations “shall be based on scientific findings.” To this end, the commission established a scientific committee comprising scientists nominated by member governments (and later invited experts when appropriate).

Despite this, there are aspects of the convention that have attracted criticism. For example, any government can “object” to any decision with which it does not agree within a certain time frame. This (along with the right of nations to unilaterally issue permits to catch whales for scientific purposes) has led to accusations that the IWC is “toothless.” However, it should be recognized that without these provisions, the convention would probably have never been signed.

From a management perspective, a more serious flaw was that the IWC could neither restrict operations by numbers or nationality nor allocate quotas per operation. Although it may be questioned whether the IWC could have agreed to national quotas or numbers of vessels, certainly if such limitations had been reached, this would have reduced the management problems associated with increasing numbers of vessels chasing limited quotas.

The convention formally established the International Whaling Commission. The IWC comprises one commissioner from each government who has one vote and may be accompanied by one or more experts and advisers.

III. The IWC before 1972

Perhaps the most serious problem of early management was the use of the blue whale unit (BWU). In terms of oil yield, one blue whale was considered equal to 2 fin, 2.5 humpback (Megaptera novaeangliae), or 6 sei (B. borealis) whales. In 1945, a catch limit of 16,000 BWU was set (suggested by three scientists as being a “reassuring” value in the middle of their estimate of 15-20.000). The flaw in the BWU system is apparent: it allows catching of depleted species below levels at which catching that species alone would be economically unviable. This is apparent from catch data up to the 1970s, which reveal that as blue whale catches declined, so fin whale catches (the next largest species) increased until they too were overexploited and sei whale catching began.

The lack of national quotas resulted in an “Olympic” system, where it became a race to catch as many whales as possible before the total quota was reached, leading to waste during processing and the use of increasing numbers of catcher boats (129 in 1946/1947 and 263 in 1951/1952). This neither made economic sense nor encouraged conservation.

As early as 1952, it was recognized that the catch quota was too high. The difficulty was in getting all the whaling nations to agree to a reduction: if one nation objected, then all objected. This was the start of a difficult period for the IWC, trying to match the evidence of science against the needs of the industry. At one stage, both the Netherlands and Norway withdrew from the commission and its survival seemed in doubt. After considerable argument and controversy, by 1971/1972, the catch limit had been reduced to 2300 BWU. and certain species, including the blue and humpback whales, had been protected from commercial whaling.

IV. A Period of Change: 1972 to the “Moratorium”

In 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment called for an increase in whale research, a 10 year “moratorium” on commercial whaling and a strengthening of the IWC. Although proposals for 10 year moratoria were subsequently tabled at the IWC. they failed to reach the required three-quarters majority. largely because the IWC scientific committee believed that management on a stock-bv-stock basis (Antarctic catches were first set by species in 1972) was the most sensible approach; if required. each stock could be independently protected. The UN resolution was, however, taken seriously by the IWC. By 1976, a permanent secretariat had been established in Cambridge, an international decade of cetacean research had been declared, and a management procedure [the new management procedure (NMP)] had been adopted. The NMP was aimed at bringing all stocks of whales to an optimum level at which the largest number of whales can be taken consistently [die maximum sustainable yield (MSY)] without depleting the stock. It also gave complete protection to stocks at 54% of their estimated preexploitation size, i.e., well before they became endangered. The NMP was regarded as a major step forward in the management of whaling. It appeared to take the issue of catch limits largely out of the hands of die politicians and place diem in those of the scientific committee. In addition, from 1973, die long-awaited international observer scheme was in operation (from 1973) that aimed at ensuring that new catch limits were enforced.

A major feature over this period was the increase in IWC membership. In 1963, there were 18 member nations, of which only 4 were nonwhaling countries; in 1978, there were 17, of which 8 were nonwhaling, and by 1982, membership was 39. Of the 13 whaling nations, 3 had only aboriginal/subsistence operations (Denmark, the United States, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines).

The 1979 meeting was a turning point in the commission’s history. Doubts had been expressed by some over (1) the theoretical and practical application of the NMP and (2) the morality of whaling, irrespective of the status of the stocks. At that meeting, a proposal to end pelagic whaling for all species except minke whales was adopted and a sanctuary was declared for the Indian Ocean outside the Antarctic. Whereas the onus in the past had been for positive evidence of a decline in stocks before a reduction in catch limits was agreed, positive evidence was now required if a catch limit was to be set. By 1982, a Schedule amendment was adopted that implemented a pause in commercial whaling (or to use popular terminology, a “moratorium’) from 1986. Originally, four whaling nations, Japan, Noway, Peru, and the USSR, lodged objections to this decision, although Peru and Japan subsequently withdrew theirs. In the year 2000, only Norway carries out commercial whaling under an objection.

One obvious question to ask as the IWC’s moratorium came into effect was whether the commission had been a success? At one level the answer must be no; indeed, it could be argued that it had been a disaster. For example, in the Antarctic, the most important area to the IWC initially, (i) blue and fin whales had been reduced to at best 5 and 20% of their original numbers, and possibly much less, respectively; hardly a good example of “conservation of whale resources”; (ii) the 1983/1984 catch was 6655 minke whales (Balaenoptera honaerensis), a species not considered worth catching in 1947/1948 when the catch in BWU was 25 times greater; hardly “the orderly development of the whaling industry.”

So, had the IWC achieved anything? First of all, while it is easy with current levels of knowledge to criticize the IWC’s performance, it has to be said that modern whaling had not resulted in the extinction of any species; IWC actions, while insufficient, were better than nothing. Since the 1970s, the trend has been very much toward conservative catch limits based on scientific advice, to a degree probably unparalleled in any fisheries commission. It has been argued by some that this trend reached unreasonable limits with the introduction of the “moratorium.” It is indicative of the inherent problems within the commission that the same decision is hailed by some as its greatest success and by others as its most abject failure.

V. The Commission Today

Since 1976, the IWC has had a full-time secretariat (of 15-20 people) with headquarters in Cambridge, UK. Each year, the annual meeting of the commission is held, either by invitation in any member country, or in the United Kingdom. The scientific committee (comprising up to 120 scientists) meets in the 2 weeks immediately before the main commission meeting and may hold special meetings during the year. The information and advice it provides form the basis upon which the commission develops the regulations for the control of whaling.

A. Management Issues

The primary function of the IWC is the conservation of whale stocks and the management of whaling. In addition to commercial whaling, the IWC has recognized the discrete nature of aboriginal subsistence whaling, and allowed aboriginal catches from stocks that have been reduced to levels at which commercial whaling would be prohibited.

1. Commercial Whaling At the outset of its discussions on the work to be carried out after die moratorium came into place, the scientific committee recognized the need to develop management procedures diat did not repeat past mistakes and recognized the limitations of both data it had and data it was likely to obtain. Clearly, it was not acceptable to try out experimental management procedures in the wild. Apart from the serious consequences of getting it wrong, on long-lived species such as whales, it would take a considerable time to assess whether it really worked. The approach adopted was therefore to use computer simulations of whale populations over a long (100-year) period.

The most important part of any development process is the determination of management objectives. These were set by the commission and can be summarized as: (1) catch limits should be as stable as possible; (2) catches should not be allowed on stocks below 54% of the estimated carrying capacity (as in the NMP); and (3) the highest possible continuing yield should be obtained from the stock. The highest priority was given to the second objective.

After 8 years of intense work, the committee developed a procedure for determining safe catch limits that required knowledge of only two essential parameters: estimates of current abundance taken at regular intervals and knowledge of past and present catches. Intensive testing of the procedure against numerous assumptions and problems had been undertaken; some of these are summarized in Table II.

The way in which catch limits are calculated from the required information is specified by the Catch Limit Algorithm (CLA). This is a “feedback” procedure; as more information accumulates from sighting surveys (and catches if taken), then the estimates of necessary parameters are refined. In this way, the

TABLE II Examples of Trials

Several different population models and associated assumptions

Different starting population levels, ranging from 5 to 99% of the

“initial” population size Different MSY levels, ranging from 40 to 80%

Different MSY rates, ranging from 1 to 7% (including changes over time)

Various levels of uncertainty and biases in population size Changes in carrying capacity (including reduction by half) Errors in historic catch records (including underestimation and underreporting by half or more)

Catastrophes (irregular episodic events when the population is halved)

Various frequencies of surveys procedure monitors itself constantly. Catch limits are set for periods of 5 years. The CLA was initially tested on the assumption that it is applied to known biological stocks. To date, testing for specific species and areas has only been carried out for minke whales in the North Atlantic and Southern Hemisphere. Without such trials, catch limits will be zero under the Revised Management Procedure (RMP). It is clear that for very many populations, such as blue whales in the Southern Hemisphere, it will be a very long time before catches would be allowed under the RMP,

The CLA plus the rules about, inter alia, stock boundaries, allocation of catches to small areas, and what to do if many more of one or other sex are caught form the RMP. The RMP sets a standard for the management of all marine and other living resources. It is very’ conservative, and this is a reflection of the relative priorities assigned to the objectives, the level of uncertainty in the information on abundance, productivity and stock identity of whale stocks, and the fact that many years are required before the CLA refines its estimates of the required parameters.

Although these scientific aspects were adopted by the IWC in 1994, its actual implementation is a political decision. The IWC will not set catch limits for commercial whaling until it has agreed and adopted a complete Revised Management Scheme (RMS). Any RMS will also include a number of nonscientific issues, including inspection and enforcement, and perhaps humaneness of killing techniques. The importance of an international inspection scheme was highlighted by the discovery of widespread falsification of catch data by Soviet whaling operations prior to 1972.

2. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Aboriginal subsistence whaling is permitted by Denmark [Greenland: fin and minke (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) whales], the Russian Federation [Siberia: gray (Eschrichitius robustus)] and bowhead [(Balaena mysticetus) whales)], St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Bequia: humpback whales) and the United States (Alaska: bowhead and gray whales). It is the responsibility of the committee to provide scientific advice on safe catch limits for such stocks. With the completion of the RMP, the scientific committee began the process of developing a new procedure for the management of aboriginal subsistence whaling (AWMP) that takes into account the different objectives for the management of such whaling as compared to commercial whaling. The commission will be establishing an aboriginal whaling scheme that comprises scientific and logistical (e.g., inspection/observation) aspects of the management of all aboriginal fisheries. The scientific component will comprise some general aspects common to all fisheries and an overall AWMP within which there will be common components and case-specific components. The first components are expected to be completed in 2002.

3. Scientific Permit Whaling A major area of discussion since the moratorium has been the issuance of permits by national authorities for the killing of whales for scientific purposes. The right to issue them is enshrined in Article VII of the convention (that furthermore requires that the animals be utilized once scientific data have been collected), and prior to 1982, over 100 permits had been issued by a number of governments, including Canada, the United States, USSR, South Africa, and Japan. Since the “moratorium,” Japan, Norway, and Iceland have issued scientific permits as part of their research programs. The discussion has centered on accusations that such permits have been issued merely as a way around the moratorium decision contrasted by claims that the catches are essential to obtain information necessary for rational management and other important research needs. All proposed permits have to be submitted for review by the scientific committee, but the ultimate responsibility for their issuance lies with the member nation. Only Japan has issued scientific permits for the year 2000 [400 ± 10% Antarctic minke whales in the Antarctic, the 12th full-scale survey of a 16-year program; 100 northern minke whales, 50 Bryde s whales (Balaenoptera edeni), and 10 sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus) in the western North Pacific], As in previous years, a majority of the commission members urged Japan to refrain from issuing the permits.

4. Small Cetaceans It can be argued that no species of large whale is endangered by whaling today and will not be by any resumption of whaling under the RMS. Threats to those species, such as the North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis), which remain severely reduced, do not include direct hunting. The most seriously threatened cetaceans (by direct hunting and incidental captures in fisheries) are a number of species and populations of the smaller cetaceans. At present, there is no single international body responsible for their conservation and management. There is considerable disagreement within the IWC as to whether the present convention is sufficient to allow the IWC to assume such a role. Fortunately, there is general agreement that the IWC scientific committee can consider the status of small cetaceans and provide advice to governments even though the IWC cannot set management regulations: it is to be hoped that governments respond individually and collectively. It remains a matter of some urgency that an international agreement or series of regional agreements be reached to ensure the conservation of small cetaceans.

5. Whale Watching The IWC has become involved (in a monitoring and advisory capacity) with aspects of the management of whale watching as one type of sustainable use of cetacean resources. It has adopted a series of objectives and principles for managing whale watching proposed by the scientific committee.

B. Other Scientific Issues

The commission funds and acts as a catalyst for a good deal of cetacean research. In die year 1999/2000 some $400,000 was allocated to scientific research in addition to die IWC-related work undertaken by individual member governments. One major program is a series of Antarctic cruises to estimate abundance diat has been carried out since 1978. These are now called Southern Ocean Whale and Ecosystem Research (SOWER) circumpolar cruises and include a component dedicated to blue whales.

With increasing awareness that detrimental environmental changes may threaten whale stocks, the IWC has accorded priority to research on the effects of such changes on cetaceans. While the RMP addresses such concerns adequately, the scientific committee has agreed that the species most vulnerable to such threats would be those reduced to levels at which the RMP, even if applied, would result in zero catches. It has developed two major research programs: one (POLLUTION 2000+) on the effects oi chemical pollutants on cetaceans and another on the effects of climate change and ozone depletion (SOWER 2000). It is also increasing collaboration and cooperation with governmental, regional, and other international organizations working on related issues.

The work carried out by the IWC scientific committee is recognized worldwide. The commission has increasingly published scientific reports and papers; this culminated in the launch of the Journal of Cetacean Research and Management in 1999.

C. Politico-ethical Issues

Of prime consideration from both a scientific and an ethical viewpoint is the possibility of extinction of any population due to whaling. No population of whales is currently under threat of extinction from whaling, and it is clear that any acceptable management procedure will ensure that this cannot happen. However, this presumes an acceptance that whales are a natural resource to be harvested. While this is certainly the stated position of many members of the IWC, it is not universally accepted. A wide range of opinions have been expressed, ranging from the belief that whales are such a “special” group of animals that they should not be killed under any circumstances, through the view that they should not be killed commercially as whale products are not essential, to the view that the whales are a natural resource like any other.

In this regard, the question of humane killing has once more arisen within the IWC, with some nations stating that even if a safe management procedure is adopted, catch limits should not be set unless a “satisfactorily humane” killing method is available. This subject has been addressed several times during the history of the IWC, and the commission has been active in promoting work on more humane killing techniques for both commercial and aboriginal subsistence whaling. However, obtaining agreement on what comprises a “satisfactorily humane” technique will not be simple. In particular, in the case of aboriginal subsistence whaling, arguments of tradition and culture can clash with the adoption of modern technology.

VI. Conclusion

Many of the “politicoethical” issues listed are linked to questions of culture and freedom; they are complex and almost inevitably will not be resolved unanimously. There is clearly a divergence of opinion within the IWC on such matters to an extent unparalleled in any similar organization. It is, for example, difficult to think of any fisheries organization where some of the members believe it is immoral to catch fish under any circumstances. This is not the place to enter into a philosophical debate over the rights of nations or groups of nations to impose their moral values on others, but merely to point out the necessity of such a debate and the need for a degree of compromise if the IWC is not going to fragment, with potentially serious consequences for the world s cetaceans.