AFRICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
The African Jewish Congress was founded in 1992 as a representative coordinating body for the Jewish communities in Sub-Saharan African countries. Its main aims are (a) to enable smaller Jewish communities to establish and maintain contact with larger Jewish communities, which in turn provide them with access to various facilities, and (b) to give Africa and African Jews a voice in international Jewry through a properly constituted forum. The establishment of the ajc was made possible by the demise of white minority rule in South Africa, which ended South Africa’s isolation on the international stage and enabled its large Jewish community to take the lead in setting up a representative body for African Jewry. The ajc has its head offices in Johannesburg, *South Africa, located within the administrative structure of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (sajbd) and is affiliated to the *World Jewish Congress. The main professional officer of the ajc is its spiritual leader, who regularly travels to the affiliated countries to, amongst other things, officiate at religious services and life-cycle events, visit individual Jews living in isolated areas, and oversee the maintenance of Jewish cemeteries. Rabbi Moshe Silberhaft has fulfilled this role since the organization’s creation while founder-member Mervyn Smith, a former national president of the sajbd, has served as its president and represented the organization at the World Jewish Congress. The Ajc holds annual meetings on a rotational basis in the various affiliate countries. These include Botswana, Democratic Republic of the *Congo (Zaire), *Kenya, Lesotho, *Madagascar, Malawi, *Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, *Uganda, *Zambia, and *Zimbabwe.
AFTALION, ALBERT
(1874-1956), economist, born in Bulgaria. Aftalion acquired distinction through his work on the theory of crises, which he attributed to cyclic trends in economic growth. His teaching at the universities of Lille and Paris reflected the influence of the economic theories of the Viennese school. His work represents an analysis of the events of the interwar period, an examination of French inflation from 1919 to 1924, and the movements of gold and international currency in relation to the balance of payments. Aftalion’s writings include Les crises periodiques de surproduc-tion (1913), La valeur de la monnaie dans leconomie contempo-raine (19483), Lor etsa distribution mondiae (1932), Lequilibre dans les relations economiques internationales (1937), and Lor et la monnaie, leur valeur. Les mouvements de lor (1938).
AFTERLIFE
Judaism has always maintained a belief in an afterlife, but the forms which this belief has assumed and the modes in which it has been expressed have varied greatly and differed from period to period. Thus even today several distinct conceptions about the fate of man after death, relating to the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the dead, and the nature of the world to come after the messianic redemption, exist side by side within Judaism. Though these conceptions are interwoven no generally accepted theological system exists concerning their interrelationship.
In the Bible
The Bible is comparatively inexplicit on the fate of the individual after death. It would seem that the dead go down to *Sheol, a kind of Hades, where they live an ethereal, shadowy existence (Num. 16:33; Ps. 6:6; Isa. 38:18). It is also said that Enoch "walked with God, and he was not; for God took him" (Gen. 5:24); and that Elijah is carried heavenward in a chariot of fire (11 Kings 2:11). Even the fullest passage on the subject, the necromantic incident concerning the dead prophet Samuel at En-Dor, where his spirit is raised from the dead by a witch at the behest of Saul, does little to throw light on the matter (1 Sam. 28:8ff.). The one point which does emerge clearly from the above passages is that there existed a belief in an afterlife of one form or another. (For a full discussion see Peder-sen, Israel, 1-2 (1926), 460 ff. A more critical view may be found in G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols., 1962.) Though the talmudic rabbis claimed there were many allusions to the subject in the Bible (cf. Sanh. 9ob-91a), the first explicit biblical formulation of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead occurs in the book of Daniel, in the following passage:
"Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to reproaches and everlasting abhorrence" (Dan. 12:2; see also Isa. 26:19; Ezek.
In Second Temple Literature
In the eschatology of the apocryphal literature of the Second Temple period, the idea of heavenly immortality, either vouchsafed for all Israel or for the righteous alone, vies with the resurrection of the dead as the dominant theme. Thus iv Maccabees, for instance, though on the whole tending toward Pharisaism in its theology, promises everlasting life with God to those Jewish martyrs who preferred death to the violation of His Torah, but is silent on the subject of resurrection. ii Maccabees, on the other hand, figures the latter prominently (cf. ii Macc. 7:14, 23; iv Macc. 9:8; 17:5, 18). The doctrine was, however, stressed by sectarian groups and is vividly expressed in the New Testament. For Philo the doctrine of the resurrection is subservient to that of the immortality of the soul and is seen by him as a figurative way of referring to the latter. The individual soul, which is imprisoned in the body here on earth, returns, if it is the soul of a righteous man, to its home in God; the wicked suffer eternal death (see H.A. Wolfson, Philo, 2 vols. (1947-48); index, s.v. Soul, Resurrection).
In Talmud and Midrash
When a man dies his soul leaves his body, but for the first 12 months it retains a temporary relationship to it, coming and going until the body has disintegrated. Thus the prophet Samuel was able to be raised from the dead within the first year of his demise. This year remains a purgatorial period for the soul, or according to another view only for the wicked soul, after which the righteous go to paradise, Gan Eden, and the wicked to hell, Geihinnom (Gehinnom; Shab. 152b-153a; Tanh. Va-Yi-kra 8). The actual condition of the soul after death is unclear. Some descriptions imply that it is quiescent, the souls of the righteous are "hidden under the Throne of Glory" (Shab. 152b), while others seem to ascribe to the dead full consciousness (Ex. R. 52:3; Tanh. Ki Tissa 33; Ket. 77h, 104a; Ber. 18b-19a). The Midrash even says, "The only difference between the living and the dead is the power of speech" (pr 12:46). There is also a whole series of disputes about how much the dead know of the world they leave behind (Ber. 18b).
In the days of the messianic redemption the soul returns to the dust, which is subsequently reconstituted as this body when the individual is resurrected. It is somewhat unclear whether the resurrection is for the righteous alone, or whether the wicked too will be temporarily resurrected only to be judged and destroyed, their souls’ ashes being scattered under the feet of the righteous. A view supporting the doctrine of eternal damnation is found, but this is disputed by the claim, "There will be no Gehinnom in future times" (rh 17a; Tos. to rh 16b; bm 58b; Ned. 8b and Ran, ibid.; Av. Zar. 3b). The doctrine of the *resurrection is a cornerstone of rabbinic eschatology, and separated the Pharisee from his Sad-ducean opponent. The Talmud goes to considerable lengths to show how the resurrection is hinted at in various biblical passages, and excludes those who deny this doctrine from any portion in the world to come (Sanh. 10:1; Sanh. 9ob-9ia; Jos., Wars, 2:i62ff.). The messianic reign is conceived of as a political and physical Utopia, though there is considerable dispute about this matter (Ber. 34b; Shab. 63a; and the glosses of Rashi). At its end will be the world to come (olam ha-ba), when the righteous will sit in glory and enjoy the splendor of the Divine Presence in a world of purely spiritual bliss (Ber. 17a). About this eschatological culminating point the rabbis are somewhat reticent, and content themselves with the verse "Eye hath not seen, O God, beside Thee" (Isa. 64:3; Ber. 34b), i.e., none but God can have a conception of the matter. In the world to come the Divine Presence itself will illuminate the world. (For a general discussion see "The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead in Rabbinic Theology" by A. Marmor-stein in Studies in Jewish Theology, 1950.)
In Medieval Jewish Philosophy
The medieval Jewish philosophers brought conceptual and systematic thought to bear on the more imagist rabbinic es-chatology, and one major problem they faced was to integrate the notions of immortality and resurrection. *Saadiah Gaon was perhaps the most successful among them, since he conceived of the state of the reunited soul and body after the resurrection as one of spiritual bliss (Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 9:5). Due to the nature of Greek psychology, however, the emphasis among the other Jewish philosophers, both Platonist and Aristotelian, is on the soul’s immortality – the resurrection being added only because of doctrinal considerations. It is clear in the case of *Maimonides, for instance, that the immortality of the soul is paramount (Guide, 2:27; 3:54). Though he makes the belief in the resurrection, rather than in the immortality of the disembodied soul, one of his fundamental principles of Jewish faith (cf. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, introd. to Helek), it is only the latter which has meaning in terms of his philosophical system. Indeed the resurrection does not figure in the Guide of the Perplexed at all.
In general the neoplatonists saw the soul’s journey as an ascent toward the Godhead, and its beatitude as a purely spiritual bliss involving knowledge of God and spiritual beings and some form of communion with them. Their negative attitude toward the flesh, in favor of the spirit, left no room for a resurrection theology of any substance. The Jewish Aristotelians, who thought of the acquired intellect as the immortal part of man, saw immortality in terms of the intellectual contemplation of God. Some of the Jewish Aristotelians held that in their immortal state the souls of all men are one; while others maintained that immortality is individual. This emphasis on salvation through intellectual attainment was the subject of considerable criticism. Crescas, for example, claimed that it was the love of God, rather than knowledge of Him, which was of primary soteriological import (Or Adonai, 3:3).
In Kabbalistic Literature
Kabbalistic eschatology, more systematic than its rabbinic predecessor, is, if anything, more complex in structure and varied as between the several kabbalistic subsystems. The soul is conceived of as divided into several parts, whose origin is in Divine Emanation, and is incarnated here on earth with a specific task to fulfill. The soul of the wicked, i.e., of he who has failed in his assigned task, is punished and purified in hell or is reincarnated again (*gilgul) to complete its unfinished work. In certain cases, however, the wicked soul is denied even hell or reincarnation and is exiled without the possibility of finding rest. Much of the literature is devoted to detailing the various stages of ascent and descent of the soul and its parts. (For a discussion of the various kabbalistic systems, and the variety of views held, see G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, particularly ch. 6.)
In Modern Jewish Thought
Orthodox Judaism has, throughout, maintained both a belief in the future resurrection of the dead as part of the messianic redemption, and also a belief in some form of immortality of the soul after death. The former figures in the liturgy at a number of points, including the morning prayer (Hertz, Prayer, 18), expressing the believer’s trust that God will return his soul to his body in time to come. It is also a central motif of the second benediction of the *Amidah (ibid., 134). The belief in the soul’s survival after death is implicit in the various prayers said in memory of the dead and in the mourner’s custom of reciting the Kaddish (ibid., 1106-09, and 212, 269-71). Reform Judaism has, however, given up any literal belief in the future resurrection of the dead. Reform theology concerns itself solely with the belief in a spiritual life after death and has modified the relevant liturgical passages accordingly.
AFULAH
(Heb 
Ir Yizre’el), city in the Jezreel Valley, Israel. It lies at the foot of both the southwestern and northwestern slopes of Givat ha-Moreh and received municipal status in 1972. Afulah was founded in 1925 by the American Zion Commonwealth, which planned to make the town the urban center of the Jewish settlements in the Jezreel Valley. Old Afulah’s location on a highway and railroad crossroads (N. and N.W. to Nazareth and to Haifa, N.E. to Tiberias, S.E. to Beth-Shean, S. to Jenin and Nablus, S.W. to Megiddo and Haderah) was seen as a promising asset. The hopes attached to Afulah, however, only materialized to a small degree, because the kibbutzim and moshavim of the valley rarely used its facilities, except for the regional hospital of Kuppat H olim (the first in the country). Instead they developed their own services or preferred to use those of Haifa. In addition, the speculative sale of building plots to absentee, mostly overseas, proprietors hampered the town’s development. In 1948 Afulah had a population of 2,500.
After the establishment of the State of Israel, however, many immigrants were housed in Afulah, and a new section, Afulah Illit (Upper Afulah), was laid out at a distance of 1.8-3.1 mi. (3-5 km.) from the older part of the town on Givat ha-Moreh, climbing to about 984 ft. (300 m.) above sea level. Industries – principally textile as well as a sugar refinery and a plastics factory – were opened in the city, which became the seat of the Jezreel subdistrict, its territory extending over 11 sq. mi. (28.6 sq. km.). The population of Afulah grew to approximately 17,000 in the late 1960s and 38,500 in 2002. Among the city’s residents are recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and Ethiopia.
The name Afulah, preserved by a small Arab village al-’Afula (which lay at the site until World War 1), may come from the Canaanite-Hebrew root ofel ("fortress tower"), possibly mentioned in the list of Thutmose 111. In excavations carried out at the ancient tell of Afulah, remnants of the Middle and Late Canaanite and Early Israelite periods were discovered. A settlement of the transition period from the Chalcolithic to the Early Bronze Ages (c. 32nd century B.c.E.) was discovered in the vicinity. Near the site of the present-day town Napoleon’s army defeated the Turks in 1799. The place became a station on the narrow-gauge railway built in 1905, from Haifa to Damascus, and a second railway was laid from Afulah to Jenin and Nablus in 1913. The former ceased operating in 1948, and the latter in 1936.
AGA
Family name of Crimean Karaites, originating in the title given to the holder of an important office (Turk.). The first person to go under this name was Samuel ben Abraham (1717-1770), the son of *Abraham ben Josiah Yerushalmi, the prominent Karaite scholar of the Crimea. Samuel lived in Chufut-Kale and was the leader of its community, also known by the title rosh ha-golah (exilarch). He was a "court Jew" in the court of Tatar Khan Qirim Giray, who appointed Samuel to mint coins for the Khanate in 1768. Samuel protected the interests of his community before the officials. He wrote a number of liturgical poems and some of them were included in the Karaite siddurs. Unknown persons murdered him on his way from Bakhchisarai, the capital of the Khanate, near Chufut-Kale. He had three sons: Eliezer, Benjamin, and Simh ah.
His son benjamin aga (d. 1824) was a leader and intercessor for the community of Chufut-Kale. He also was appointed to mint coins for the Khanate in the court by the new Khan, Shahin Giray. In 1781 Benjamin leased the custom duties on the sale of wine. He became one of the Khan’s unofficial court advisers. Like his father, he protected his community’s interests. In 1777 he succeeded in annulling a harmful decree of Devlet Giray, the pretender to the Khan’s throne, who falsely accused the Karaites of stealing the Khan’s money. Benjamin corresponded with Karaite leaders of Poland, Lithuania, Constantinople, and Jerusalem and financially supported their communities in times of distress. Following the Russian annexation of the Crimea he continued to serve as the official head of the community and to represent it before the Russian authorities. In 1795 Benjamin was chosen together with two other community leaders of the Crimean Karaites to travel to St. Petersburg on a special mission to the government. Their delegation won exemption for Crimean Karaites from the double taxation imposed on all the Jews of the Russian Empire, and to secure other rights, such as the purchase of immovable property. In 1806 Benjamin reestablished, together with his brother Simhah, a publishing house in Chufut-Kale. Benjamin was an expert in Karaite halakhah and an authority on the Karaite calendar.
AGADATI (Kaushanski), BARUCH
(1895-1975), dancer, visual artist, filmmaker, and cultural animateur. Agadati was born in Bessarabia (Russia). As a teenager, he arrived in Jerusalem and enrolled in the Bezalel Academy for Fine Arts, founded and run by the sculptor Boris *Shatz. He was then one of many students from abroad (mainly Russia) who enrolled before World War i in Bezalel or in the Herzliyyah Gymnasium in Tel Aviv. In the summer of 1914 when wwi broke out, Agadati was visiting his parents abroad and could not return for the next term.
In Odessa he studied visual arts as well as ballet. At the age of 18 he became soloist of the ballet company of the municipal theater there. He was interested in Jewish culture and prepared a series of cartoon portraits of types of men of the shtetl which he performed with great success.
Agadati returned to Erez Israel in 1919. After a few months he began to perform what he called concerts, dancing solos with the accompaniment of a piano. He was deeply influenced by the "constructivist" abstract painting style prevalent in Russia at the time, making his movements slow but powerful, sculptural, and cubistic, and designing his own costumes in abstract forms. He soon added new "portraits in movement" to his shtetl characters, such as an effeminate Arab dandy from Jaffe and a Yemenite agricultural worker from Petah Tikvah.
In the mid-1920s he published a book on "The Hebrew Dance," calligraphically handwritten in a limited edition of only 100 copies, with many photos and illustrations. He also began organizing Purim balls, which developed into the Tel Aviv *Adloyada – a procession of floats and much dancing.
Every year Agadati would tour in Europe, to great critical acclaim. His attitude to the musical accompaniment was radically new: sometimes he would let his accompanist play the music and only after the end of the music would he dance in silence – to the music he had just heard. In 1929 he decided to go a step further and composed a dance to be performed in total silence – an approach used many decades later by Jerome *Robbins (in Moves) and Merce Cunningham. In 1929, however, the audience was unprepared for such a radical experimental approach and after Agadati finished the performance there was no applause. Agadati felt he had lost contact with his audience and decided to stop dancing altogether.
He turned to films and directed and produced (with others) the first Hebrew-speaking movie. He also returned to painting. His wooden shack in Tel Aviv became the unofficial center of modernist artists active in Erez Israel in the 1930s and 1940s. "Agadati’s Shack" was later torn down by small-minded municipal officials.
AGADIR
Atlantic seaport and important tourist resort in southwestern Morocco; the site of the ancient Roman Portus Risadir. It lies near the Haha province and the Sous, the latter region having served in past centuries as an important marketplace (suq) on the fringes of the Sahara Desert. Because Agadir was strategically located on both the Atlantic seaboard and near the Sous Valley, it became a vital trade depot for European and local merchants. Important caravans passed through Agadir into the Sous from the earliest times to the 19th century. They brought African slaves, gold dust from western Sudan, and ostrich feathers from the southern Sahara Desert. Textile products and leatherwork from *Marrakesh also found their way to the Sous through Agadir, as did European medicines and guns.
In the latter half of the 15th and early 16th centuries the Portuguese penetrated Morocco – then ruled by the Wattasid dynasty – and took control of the coastal areas. In 1505, they occupied Agadir and held on to it until 1541, when the new Sa’dian kings of the Sous, who then founded the Moroccan Sharifian Sa’di dynasty, liberated the city. Under the Portuguese occupation and subsequently, Agadir and the Sous attracted Genoese merchants who traded in Sudanese gold and in local products like wax, hides, gum, and indigo.
Agadir’s importance as a trade/transit route reached its zenith in the 1760s. Until then the trade activities of the local merchants, many of whom were Jews, gained considerable support in Moroccan ruling circles. In 1764, however, that city lost out to the new port of Essaouira (*Mogador), which was constructed by the Sharifian Alawite sultanate with the aim of replacing Agadir as the outlet for the Sous trade. Essaouira then became the most important port in Morocco until the end of the 19th century.
To attract merchants from different parts of Morocco to Essaouira, including Jewish entrepreneurs, known as tujjar al-sultan ("Sultan’s merchants"), the makhzan (governmental administration) built, or allowed the merchants to build, houses, extended credit, and lowered customs duties for the new arrivals. Not only did prominent Jewish merchants from Agadir relocate to Essaouira, moving their businesses to the new town, other members of the Jewish community settled there permanently.
Agadir captured the attention of European diplomacy during the colonial period, as Morocco was about to be divided into French and Spanish protectorates. At the time, local Moroccan opposition culminated in revolts against the French. France responded by sending an occupation force to *Fez in May 1911. Germany, which then regarded itself as a serious contender for influence inside Morocco, saw in French aggression an effort to curtail Moroccan independence and sought to challenge it. In a veritable show of force and under the pretext of "protecting our interests and the safety of our citizens," the Germans dispatched the gunboat Panther to the shores of Agadir (July 1911). It was done with the clear intent of pressuring France to reduce her territorial aspirations in Morocco to a minimum. In November, a Franco-German accord was signed. The agreement stipulated that the Germans would not oppose the imposition of a French protectorate over Morocco in return for some French sub-Saharan territories to be ceded to Germany. Two years later the French were in full control over Agadir.
Under the French Protectorate (1912-56), growth in Agadir began with the construction of a major port (1914), the development of the Sous plain, and exploitation of inland mineral resources as well as the fishing and fishing-canning industries. After the 1930s, the French turned Agadir into an attractive tourist resort and encouraged extensive urbanization, laying the groundwork for modern infrastructures.
Agadir has also known tragedies. Early in March 1960 two earthquakes, killing 12,000 people, destroyed the city. Among those killed were several hundred persons belonging to Agadir’s 2000-strong Jewish community, buried under the rubble of the collapsed buildings. As many as 800 Jewish survivors were lodged temporarily at an army base on the outskirts of *Casablanca. After prolonged negotiations with the authorities, the Casablanca Jewish community took many refugees into their homes. Orphans whose parents were killed in the earthquake were adopted by Casablanca’s leading families. A new central city, including an international airport, was built in the 1960s to the south of the old town, linked by road with *Safi and *Marrakesh. As many as 110,000 people subsequently lived in Agadir; few among them were Jews.
AGAG
(Heb, 
the name of an *Amalekite king who was captured by *Saul (1 Sam. 15). By sparing Agag’s life Saul dis-obeyed *Samuel’s order to annihilate the Amalekites. This occasioned the final break between Samuel and Saul. Later Samuel killed Agag at Gilgal "before the Lord" (ibid. 33).
One of Balaam’s oracles sets Israel’s king "higher than Agag" (Num. 24:7). The Septuagint adds "Agag" as the subject of another short oracle (ibid. 23). The name may have served as a recurrent designation for Amalekite chieftains or a clan.
Agagite
(Heb. ‘MX) is the gentilic name of *Haman, in the *Scroll of Esther (3:1; 10:8, 5, etc.). It connects the archenemy of the Jews in Persia with the Amalekites. It has been suggested that designation of Haman as an Agagite sounds legendary. It may represent a nickname, applied to this persecutor of the Jews because the Amalekites are denounced as the archenemy of Israel in the Torah (Deut. 25:17-19). Some scholars prefer the Septuagint’s reading: Bouyaio^ ("Bugaean" instead of "Agagite"), a Persian gentile name, baga, meaning "God."
In the Aggadah
Agag’s death came too late. Had he been killed by Saul during the course of the battle, a later generation of Jews would have been spared the troubles caused by Haman. It is taught that in the short span of time between the war and the execution of Agag, he became the ancestor of Haman (ser 20). The delay is attributed to the powers of persuasion of Doeg the Edomite over Saul. He argued that the law prohibits the slaying of an animal and its young on the same day. How much less permissible was it to destroy old and young at one time (Mid. Ps. 52:4).
When Agag was eventually sentenced to death, it was according to heathen, and not Jewish, law. Thus, there were no witnesses to his crime, and he was given no warning of his punishment (pdRK 3:6).
AGAI, ADOLF
(A. Rosenzweig; 1836-1916), Hungarian novelist, editor, and physician. Born in Janoshalma, Agai was the son of a prominent physician. After studying medicine in Vienna, he accepted a hospital appointment in Budapest. He also turned to writing, and his features in Budapest dailies, written under the pen-name "Porzo," were extremely popular. In 1868 Agai abandoned medicine when he began the publication of a successful satirical weekly, Borsszem Janko. Three years later he launched and became editor of the first long-lived Hungarian children’s newspaper, Kis Lap ("Little Paper"), which appeared until 1904. Although he was opposed to Zionism, Agai contributed to Herzl’s Zionist journal, Die Welt. In his essays, he frequently depicts scenes from provincial Jewish life, based on memories of his childhood. Collections of his feuilletons are included in Porzo tarcalevelei ("Por-zo’s Feuilletons," 1876) and Utazas Pestrol Budapestre ("Trip from Pest to Budapest," 1908). His collected novels appeared under the title Igaz tortenet ("True Story," 1893).
AGAM, YAACOV
(1928- ), Israeli painter and sculptor. Born Ya’akov Gibstein in Rishon le-Zion to an Orthodox Jewish family. His father, a rabbi, sent him to religious schools. Agam was arrested in 1945 by the British on suspicion of being a member of the Jewish underground and kept in prison for 18 months. He received his professional training at the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design in Jerusalem under the influence of his modernist teacher Mordecai *Ardon. Agam continued his art studies in Zurich with Johannes Itten and at the Atelier d’Art Abstrait in Paris. In 1953 he had his first one-man show at the Galerie Craven, in Paris, where he presented his preliminary Kinetic Art. These works went under the general title of "Transformable Pictures" and characterized his style during the 1970s (Pace of Time, 1970, Tel Aviv Museum of Art). The works featured parallel triangles painted with abstract forms. Through the movement of the spectator the views changed and the kinetic quality of the work came to the fore. Agam said that his interest in concepts of time derived from Jewish spirituality, in which the world is seen as involved in a perpetual dynamism.
With his kinetic sculpture the spectator was required to be more active, to touch and move the sculpture’s components. More than once Agam referred to these works in the terminology of the world of games. The images appearing in them were mostly derived from Jewish symbolism (The Hundred Gates, 1972, President’s Residence, Jerusalem). Over the years, Agam enlarged his repertoire of works. His involvement with the environment was expressed through his decoration of building facades and interiors. His famous kinetic fountain combining water, fire, and music altogether, is a very impressive and complex piece of art (Fire and Water, 1986, Dizengoff Square, Tel Aviv).
In 1996 Agam was awarded the UNESCO Prize for Education on his didactic plan for combining art and science.
°AGATHARCHIDES OF CNIDUS
(second century b.c.e.), Hellenistic historian and scholar. A native of Cnidus, Ag-atharchides lived in Egypt (Alexandria) during the reigns of Ptolemy vi Philomater (181-145) and Ptolemy vii Euergetes (145-116). His principal works are a history of Asia in ten books and a history of Europe in 49 books, neither of which is extant. There is no evidence that he referred to Jews very much in his work, except for a passage quoted twice by Jo-sephus (Apion, 1:205-11; Ant. Jud., 12:5-6) referring to the "superstition" of the Jewish defenders of Jerusalem which prevented them from fighting on the Sabbath: "The people known as Jews … have a custom of abstaining from work every seventh day; on those occasions they neither bear arms nor take any agricultural operations in hand, nor engage in any other form of public service, but pray with outstretched hands in the temples until the evening."
AGDE
(Heb. 
, town 13 mi. (20 km.) E. of *Beziers in southern France. Jews are mentioned in Canon 40 promulgated by the Council of Agde held by the church there in 506. By the middle of the 13th century Jews had settled permanently in Agde under the jurisdiction of the bishop. The majority of these became liable to the crown tax in 1278. The Jews of Agde buried their dead in the cemetery of nearby Beziers. After the general expulsion of the Jews from the Kingdom of France in 1306, some of the Agde community found refuge in Perpignan and *Carpentras, then not under French suzerainty. At the beginning of World War 11 about 2,000 Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany were sent to a forced labor camp near Agde, the number increasing to 3,000 after the Franco-German armistice in June 1940. Most of them were deported on Aug. 24, 1942.
AGE AND THE AGED
Old Age in the bible. Extreme longevity is attributed to the Fathers of Mankind (e.g., Methusaleh, 969 years) and the Fathers of the Israelite People (Abraham, 175; Isaac, 180; Jacob, 147; Moses, 120). By some, Genesis 6:3 is taken to mean that God has set a limit of 120 years to human life (Hizzekuni, cf. Ibn Ezra); in accord with this notion is the popular Jewish reckoning of a long life. However, sober reality is reflected in Psalms 90:10: "The days of our years are 70 years, and if by reason of strength, 80 years." The Bible regards longevity (Isa. 65:20; Zech. 8:4; Ps. 92:15), a long life followed by death at "a good old age" (Gen. 15:15; et al.), as a blessing; whereas the opposite is regarded as a curse (i Sam. 2:31-32). Long life is promised as a reward for observing certain commandments (Ex. 20:12; Deut. 22:7; 25:15), or for obeying the Law as a whole (Deut. 6:2). But there are also some grim descriptions of old age (ii Sam. 19:33-38). Especially instructive are the descriptions of old age in Ecclesiastes (12:1-7) in which old age is "the calamitous days" in which a man takes no pleasures. It may be noted that a similar view of old age can be found in the Epic of Gilgamesh (See *Flood). A realistic observation prompted the moving prayer: "Do not throw me away in the time of old age; when my strength is failing me, do not forsake me" (Ps. 71:9).
The experience of the aged caused the belief that old age and wisdom went together (Job. 12:12; cf. ibid., 20). Nevertheless, the Book of Job also stresses that there are young men who are wiser than old men (Job 32:6ff.; Eccles. 4:13). The Bible enjoins respect for the aged: "You shall rise before the aged and show deference to the old" (Lev. 19:32). This was probably the custom throughout the whole ancient Middle East (Ahikar 2:61). Consideration for old age and its disabilities is mentioned frequently in the Bible. Disrespect for the aged was regarded as a sign of a corrupt generation (Isa. 3:5). Ruthlessness toward the aged is a manifestation of extreme harshness by an enemy: "… who will show the old no regard" (Deut. 28:50); "Upon the old man you made your yoke very heavy" (Isa. 47:6); and "He has shown no favor to the elders" (Lam. 4:16; cf. 5:12). The actual chronological age of a man was not an absolute factor in regard to the disabilities of old age; thus, Samuel says of himself "I have grown old and gray" (i Sam. 12:2) when he is only 52. And King David is described as "very old" (i Kings 1:15) when he was 70. There are few descriptions of the physical signs of old age in the Bible: that of Isaac when his eyes were dim (Gen. 27); that of the manner of Eli’s fall, "because the man was old and heavy" (i Sam. 4:18); and Barzillai’s deafness (ii Sam. 14:33-38). By contrast with these descriptions, there are idyllic descriptions of old age: "There shall yet be old men and women in the public squares of Jerusalem" alongside "boys and girls playing in her public squares" (Zech. 8:4). The biological process of aging is seen as the depletion of the body’s "natural heat" as, for instance, in the case of King David. ("King David was now old, advanced in years; and though they covered him with bedclothes, he did not feel warm" (i Kings 1:1)). This view was a basic premise with Galen and was accepted by preceding generations almost until modern times.
Ecclesiastes (12:1-6) gives an outstanding description of old age. Later geriatric literature was based on this section. Many Jewish commentators found biological symbolism in its details and in the 16th to 18th centuries John Smith and others also explained these verses in medical terms. In its crisp and concentrated metaphorical style, Ecclesiastes contains one of the most striking descriptions in world literature of the infirmities of old age. It appears to be entirely expressive of the state of mind and view of life of an aging or old man, and it was thus interpreted by the sages. King Solomon, who in his youth is supposed to have written The Song of Songs, in his maturity Proverbs, and in his old age Ecclesiastes, was regarded by them as a symbol of the changes which take place in the being and in the experiences of a man in the course of his life: "When a man is young, he quotes poetry; when he matures, he quotes proverbs; when he grows old he speaks of futilities …" (Song R. 1:10). Similarly, A. Schopenhauer states, "Only in his 70th year does a man understand the full meaning of the [second] verse of Ecclesiastes." In the Second Temple era old age was regarded as a blessing and the aged as worthy of respect (Eccles. 8:9; ii Macc. 6:23, 27; iv Macc. 5:4^; 7:13-15). Yet it was stressed, that not the number of years was important but wisdom and honesty (Wisdom of Solomon 4:8-9, 16). Ben Sira (30:24) recognized that anxiety ages a man, while in the Book of Jubilees (23:11) premature aging accompanied by mental confusion is caused by sin. That is why in the Dead Sea Sect nobody above 60 years of age could act as judge (Damascus Covenant X7-10); yet in general the Sect and the Essenes respected old men (Manual of Discipline vi:8; Philo, Prob. 81, 87; Josephus, Wars, 2:9-10).
Rabbinic period. According to the Talmud, old age (zik-nah) begins at 60, ripe old age (seivah, "grey hairs") at 70 (Avot 5:21), though oldness may appear prematurely (Shab. 152a; Eruv. 56a; Tanh., H ayyei Sarah 2). Like Ecclesiastes, the rabbis viewed the later years of life as unattractive (Shab. 151b); the old resemble apes (Lam. R. 1:2), they cannot reason (Shab. 89b). The afflictions of the old are described, as in Ecclesiastes, metaphorically: "The rocks have grown tall, the near have become [too] distant [to visit], two [legs] have become three [with a cane], and the peacemaker of the house has ceased [to function as such]." So it is said, "Youth is a crown of roses; old age a crown of [heavy] willow rods" (Shab. 152a). A man must pray that in his later years "his eyes may see, his mouth eat, his legs walk, for in old age all powers fail" (Tanh, Mi-Kez 10).
There are some rare instances of praise for oldness itself. R. Simeon b. Eleazar valued the advice of the old: "If the old say ‘tear down’ and the children ‘build’ – tear down, for the ‘destruction’ of the old is construction; the ‘construction’ of the young, destruction" (Meg. 31b). According to R. Johanan, only elders sat in the Sanhedrin (Sanh. 17a). These statements reflect the ancient view that age, with its experience, is a guarantee of wisdom, and without age there is no understanding. The general opinion, however, is that with age comes loss of intellectual capacity. Elisha b. Avuyah said, "What does learning when old resemble? It is like writing on blotted-out paper" (Avot 4:20). Oldness itself is not a virtue – wisdom and knowledge of Torah determine its value (Kin. 3:15). Even the opinions of the old were not universally preferred to those of the young. When R. Abbahu claimed authority in a given dispute due to his age, R. Jeremiah answered, "ls the matter decided by age? – It is decided by reason" (bb 102b). Tar-gum Onkelos also reflected this view when translating "You shall rise before the aged" (Lev. 19:32) as "Arise before those knowledgeable in Torah." The rabbis held that even a young scholar is called zaken ("elder") and should be honored, while no honor is due the ignorant or sinful, though old (Sifra, Ke-doshim, 7:12). However, Isi b. Judah differed: "’You shall rise before the aged’ – all the aged"; R. Johanan agreed, even concerning gentile elders; but R. Nahman and Rav did not act in this manner (Kid. 32b-33a). According to Maimonides, one must honor the exceedingly old, even if they are not wise, by rising (Yad, Talmud Torah 6:9).
An age limit existed, past which one was not to hold a responsible position. Already in biblical times, the levites’ service in the Tabernacle was limited: "At the age of 50, they shall retire from the work force and serve no more" (Lev. 8:25-26). The retired could do less strenuous work, either assisting their fellows, or guarding. In talmudic times, it was forbidden – for psychological reasons – to have the very old serve as Sanhed-rin members (Sanh. 36b. Maim., Yad, Sanhedrin 2:3). In kab-balistic literature and tradition, those well-versed in mystic knowledge are represented as aged; many of the names in the Zohar are followed by "elder" (saba).
Care of the Aged
In the society of ancient Israel the aged and elderly were highly respected, and accorded a central position in family life and the tribal structure. This continued after a national organization based on kingship was adopted. This attitude is essentially linked with the biblical precept enjoining fear and honor of, and obedience to father and mother (kibbud av va-em, cf. Lev. 19:3, 32). Barbarism in an alien nation is described by denouncing it as one "that shall not regard the person of the old" (Deut. 28:50). A state of anarchy in Israel is characterized by the fact that "the child shall behave insolently against the aged" (Isa. 3:5; 47:6). The term "elders" appears throughout the Bible, Mishnah, and Talmud as a synonym or designation for judges, leaders, or sages. The Jewish image of the aged was therefore originally one denoting leadership and rule. Of course, physical facts asserted themselves and horror of weakness and senility was frequently acknowledged. In talmudic times the problem of earning a livelihood in old age was faced: "Every profession in the world is of help to a man only in his youth, but in his old age he is exposed to hunger" (Kid. 82b). Respect alone was of little assistance to the aged in the changed circumstances of late antiquity and the transformation which society had undergone. However, no attempt was made to issue specific regulations or create institutions to help the aged or care for them as such. If not living among the family, as was customary, destitute aged people were treated as part of the general social problem created by poverty and weakness and the precepts concerning *charity and alms giving (zedakah) applied to them. Thus, although old age was originally invested with strength and majesty, people of the lower strata of society who had lost the support and care provided by the family underwent much suffering, if not humiliation, in their old age. The transition from the position of the powerful elder to that of an aged pauper requiring special assistance outside the frame of the family is an outcome of the heritage of Judaic-Muslim-Christian civilization.
In the middle ages. The aged are singled out in medieval Jewish ethical works and general halakhic regulations (tak-kanot) as worthy objects for special charity and tender treatment. In the 11th century *Rashi defined the age requiring assistance as "when I shall be 60 or 70" (commentary to Ps. 71:17). Persecutions and massacres in the Middle Ages led to the breakup of families, and large-scale migrations brought additional suffering for the aged. A resolution passed at the Council of Lithuania (see *Council of the Lands) in 1650, after the *Chmielnicki massacres, stressed the duty to support "… in any case married and unmarried women and old persons" and reflects the breakup of the family under catastrophe. About the same date, the Jewish community in Rome introduced care of the aged as one of the four divisions of its charitable activity. A home for the aged was founded in Amsterdam by the Sephardi community in 1749.
EIGHTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES
From the second half of the 18th century the need for introducing special treatment and care of the aged was felt more strongly in Jewish societies which were beginning to experience the breakup of the traditional family cohesion. These were more prepared to view old age as a social problem separate from poverty. In this period the time-honored concept of respect for the aged began to combine with new feelings of estrangement between the generations together with compassion and understanding for the weakness of the old as part of social responsibility. Thus an increasing number of Jewish foundations to care for the aged were established. The Mishenet Zekenim ("Support of the Aged") society, established in Hamburg in 1796, made weekly provision for the needy aged. An old-age home was founded in Berlin in 1829, and in 1839 the Hamburg community set aside a building for old men and women where they received lodging, support, and clothing. The Frankfurt community founded a home in 1844 for men and women aged over 60 without means of support. A Viennese family donated several houses for accommodating aged Jews of the community. The number of Jewish homes for the aged increased from the middle of the 19th century, as social care of the aged developed. By the present century most large communities in Europe included a home for the aged (often called Moshav Zekenim) among their welfare institutions. In 1938, there were in Germany 67 homes for the aged with 3,568 beds.
The revolutionary changes in society affecting the general attitude toward the aged and provisions for their welfare which began at the end of the 19th century are deepening and becoming increasingly pronounced and complicated. Among general factors responsible for this change are the modern appreciation of youth and understanding of its specific psychological and social needs, coupled with a corresponding understanding of the needs of the old, their psychology and social requirements; the demographic changes, first throughout the western world and later in other countries, resulting from birth control on the one hand and the prolongation of life expectancy on the other; and the introduction of pension laws and schemes as the problems of the aged emerge as a political factor in appealing to electorates with an increasing percentage of aged persons.
Contemporary period. In addition, factors specific to Jewish society are the huge emigration from Europe from the end of the 19th century, the Nazi Holocaust, and forced emigration from Arab countries in the Near East and North Africa after the creation of the State of Israel. The impact of these general changes is most clearly seen in the main Jewish centers of today, and in the experiments currently being attempted to solve the problems to which they have given rise.
U.S. care for aged. In the United States, the cultural and social estrangement that developed between "second-" or "third-generation" Jews and their "first-generation" immigrant parents and grandparents inevitably strained the close, tightly knit Jewish family life that was a legacy of Europe. The first homes of the aged, therefore, often tended to be institutions of "last resort." Care of the aged in America was also originally hindered by a resistance to paid social workers. Similarly, family agencies displayed a reluctance to deal with the aged. Over the years this pattern has significantly altered so that care for the aged is largely in professional hands. Family agencies served about 20,000 persons aged 60 and over in their homes in 1966.
The general tendency in the United States is to avoid employing terms or arrangements traditionally linked with old age and care for the aged; aged persons are referred to as "senior citizens," for whom "towns" and "resorts" have been established. Emphasis has been placed on providing services to enable the aged to remain in their communities where they can retain the satisfactions of normal community life. At the same time experiments to meet the specific needs and inclinations of the aged are made while attempting to provide them with accommodation apart from the family. This trend is gaining ground in Jewish society. The concept of institutional care for the aged has changed from one of a permanent retreat to a resource to be used as needed.
In israel. Two basically different traditional patterns of family life are encountered: the Oriental in families from the Near East and North Africa, and the European in families from Europe and the United States. The Oriental family has retained much more of the traditional veneration for the aged and is much less influenced by the modern attitude toward youth than the western family. However, the mass exodus from the Arab countries created a problem of care for the aged in families who have been broken up by forced migration. Thus, the traditional Oriental family also encountered modern problems concerning its old people in Israel. Provision also had to be made for the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust and concentration camps. The combined problems of abandonment, physical weakness, illness, premature aging, and old age were dealt with by the *Malben organization, founded and maintained by the ^American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and its institutions. In addition, a new social phenomenon in Israel was that of family life in the kibbutz, which had specific problems concerning aging and the relationship between the generations. Although the kibbutz provided collective support and care of the individual member irrespective of his family status, health, or psychological problems, the strain on the aged and the aging was particularly great since it was a society originally created by the senior members themselves, founded on the ideal of physical labor and appreciation of the supreme and eternal value of youth.
In this framework the spiritual and psychological side of aging is present in its "pure form," i.e., separate from the usual physical and material problems.
In Israel in 1964, 5.5% of the male population and 5.9% of the female population were aged over 65 (the age of retirement). The majority were living within the family or independently. About 7,500 old persons were in special institutions. These consisted of the traditional old-age homes (moshav ze-kenim) and the more modern living centers for the aged, of which there are different forms. By the early 2000s, 10% of Israel’s population was aged over 65, with 250,000 Israelis aged over 75. The consequence has been a great strain on public facilities and a proliferation of upscale retirement homes and the fashion of employing live-in Filipino caretakers among the well-to-do. The care of the aged in 21st century Israel therefore fully reflected the economic imbalances that prevailed in the country. The poor among the aged have become a marginal group barely able to survive.
AGEN
Capital of the Lot-et-Garonne department, southwestern France. A charter of 1263 specifies the charges imposed on Jewish residents in Agen for all articles brought into the city, in addition to dues they owed to the bishop. In 1309 (not 1250, as stated by U. Robert) the seneschal of Agen was directed to seize copies of the Talmud and other Jewish works, probably left behind after the general expulsion of the Jews in 1306. A number of Jews returned to Agen in 1315 and perished in the *Pastoureaux massacres of 1320. The "Rue des Juifs," first documented in 1342, certainly existed earlier. Remains of the synagogue were still visible in the 16^ century. In 1968 the Jewish community in Agen, which consisted of approximately 500 persons, mostly immigrants from North Africa, had a synagogue and community center.
AGENCY
Legal concept whereby the lawful acts of someone authorized by, and acting on behalf of, another are as effective as if performed by the principal; recognized in Jewish law from ancient times. A basic concept in the Talmud is that "a man’s agent is as himself," i.e., that a man is bound by the acts of his duly constituted agent as if he himself had acted. Throughout the ages Jewish law developed a complex and sophisticated civil law of commerce and finance in which the law of agency played an important part, being the subject of many talmudic discussions and halakhic rulings. For example, the contrary principle was enacted that there can be no agency to do a wrongful act; the sender is not held accountable for the deeds of his agents. The law also laid down rules governing the manner of constituting an agency, its limitations, its mode of execution, and its revocation or termination. The appointment, competence, and powers of an agent are also dealt with. Because of their contractual aspects, agency was also recognized in matters of marriage and divorce, whereby an agent could legally acquire a wife for his principal or effectively deliver to her a bill of divorce on his principal’s behalf. Generally the Jewish law of agency was developed to meet the social and commercial needs of the community as it constantly changed from age to age; therefore it was inclined to be more flexible and adaptable than some other legal subjects, which, consequently, did not always enjoy the same degree of contemporary relevance. In the State of Israel agency is a matter of civil law and is governed by a principal statute of 1965.
Details
As a result of agency, the possible field of legal activity is extended beyond the normal physical and other limitations.
The concept of agency was not recognized in ancient legal systems. Only in the later stages of Roman law did agency achieve a limited form of recognition – a phenomenon ascribed to the powerful status of the Roman pater-familias ("family head") on whose behalf all acquisitions by his kinsmen or servants were made in any event, thus obviating any urgent need for developing a doctrine of agency. In Jewish law the principle of agency was, however, already recognized in ancient times. While there is no express scriptural provision for it, the tannaim applied the doctrine of agency in various halakhic fields, i.e., to the laws of mamonot ("commercial law"), terumah ("heave offering"), sacrifices, divorce, and betrothal, and established the rule that "a man’s agent is as himself" (Sheliho shel adam kemoto). According to the Tosefta (Kid. 4:1), Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agreed that a person appointed to carry out a specific mandate is disqualified from acting as a witness in a case involving such mandate, whereas amoraic sources quote a tannaitic tradition to the opposite effect (Kid. 43a) and the talmudic halakhah was decided accordingly. The agent is not regarded as the principal, in the full sense of the term "as himself," since the agent is competent to testify with regard to the subject matter of his mandate in circumstances where the principal is disqualified from being a witness.
Criminal law. In this field a contrary rule was laid down, namely, that "there can be no agent to do a wrong" (Ein shali ah li-devar averah; Kid. 42b). The reasoning behind the rule is derived in answer to the hypothetical question: "Whose words does one obey? Those of the master" (i.e., the Almighty) "or of the pupil" (i.e., the mandator)? The legal import of the rule is that the agent himself is the transgressor, and liable, whereas the principal is exempt in respect of any transgression committed by the agent in execution of the former’s mandate. There is, on the other hand, a tradition that a person who says to his agent, "Go forth and kill that soul!" (Kid. 43a), is personally liable, but the halakhah was decided to the effect that "in all matters a person’s agent is ‘as himself’ except with regard to wrongdoing …" (Isserles to Sh. Ar., h m 182:1). However, the scholars laid down that in three fields the doctrine of agency applied also to transgression: (1) misappropriation of a deposit (shelihutyad); (2) slaughtering and selling (of stolen animals -see *Theft and Robbery); and (3) conversion of consecrated property (see *Hekdesh) to profane use (me’ilah).
In addition to these three specifically excepted cases, there are also a number of general exceptions to the rule that there can be no agent to do a wrongful act. According to the amora Ravina, the rule does not apply if the prohibition does not extend to the agent himself, e.g., where a priest commissions an Israelite to celebrate kiddushin with a divorcee on the priest’s behalf (a marriage prohibited to a priest). Similarly, the amora Samma is of the opinion that an agency is constituted when the agent, in committing transgression, fails to act of his own free will; e.g., when he is unaware that his act amounts to a transgression (bm 10b; Isserles to Sh. Ar., h m 182:1 and 348:8). Furthermore, an agency to do a wrong is constituted whenever an agent delegated to commit a wrong must be presumed likely to execute his assignment because he is known to commit such wrongs (Sh. Ar., h m 388:15, gloss; see also Siftei Kohen, ibid., 67 for a contrary opinion). Whenever the law recognizes agency in the commission of a wrong, the agent himself will be liable (Siftei Kohen sub. sec. 4 to Sh. Ar., h m 292; see also Netivot ha-Mishpat to Sh. Ar., h m 348:4).
Limitations. The rabbis of the Talmud, relying on the scriptural text, excluded the operation of the maxim that a person’s agent is as himself in certain instances (tj, Kid. 2:1; Yev. 101b). Some of the posekim exclude agency when the mandate cannot be carried out at the time of the agent’s appointment (Darkhei Moshe to Tur, h m 182:1, based on Naz. 12b); but others differ (Responsa Maharit 2:23; Arukh ha-Shulhan to Sh. Ar., h m ibid.). On the question of the husband’s competence to annul the vows of his wife on the day of hearing them (Num. 30:9), the rabbis decided that it would not be the same if the vows were heard by an agent, and that the latter was not competent to annul them since "the appointment of an agent is not appropriate to a passive act" (be-midi de-mi-meila; Ned. 72b). Similarly, there can be no agency with regard to a precept (mitzvah) which one is personally obliged to perform, such as laying tefillin or sitting in a *sukkah (Tos. to Kid. 42b). So, too, the rabbinical enactment permitting ^assignment of debt by way of ma’amad sheloshtan, has been interpreted as requiring the participation of the parties themselves and the assignor could not appoint an agent for this purpose (Sh. Ar., h m 126:20). Some scholars hold that an agent can not deliver an oath on behalf of his principal (Responsa, Noda bi-Yhu-dah, first series, yd 67 and last series yd 147).
It is not a requirement of agency that the manner of carrying out the mandate should be specifically detailed; the principal may grant his agent a degree of discretion, e.g., in celebrating kiddushin on his principal’s behalf, an agent may be authorized to treat either with a specific woman or with one of a larger group (Maim., Yad, Ishut 3:14). Or, the principal can instruct his agent, "Go and purchase for me a field which you consider suitable," in which case the choice of the field is left to the full discretion of the agent. To be properly constituted, agency requires that the parties thereto are both legally competent and it was laid down that einam benei da’at ("persons who lack proper understanding," i.e., Eleresh, sho-teh, ve-katan ("deaf-mutes, idiots, and minors")) were disqualified from acting as either principal or agent (Git. 23a; Sh. Ar., h m 188:2).
Appointment and powers. It appears from tannaitic and amoraic sources, neither of which specifically discuss the manner of appointing an agent, that such appointment may be done orally. The halakhah was so decided, it being held that there was no need for a formal kinyan (see Modes of *Acqui-sition). In various places it nevertheless became the practice to assign by way of a formal kinyan. This was partly due to the influence of an analogous procedure in certain matters where an act of kinyan was required by law, such as the appointment of an agent in a lawsuit or for the purposes of agency in divorce – although the kinyan is not essential to the underlying agency itself but rather for the purpose of bittul modaah (see *Ones). It was also due in part to the desire of the parties to express in a formal act that the decision to conclude an agency was a serious one, and not one undertaken irresponsibly (Maim., Mekhirah 1, 12-12).
The agent is required to act strictly within the scope of his mandate, and if he exceeds his authority, all his actions are rendered null and void. The same result follows if the agent errs in any detail of his mandate, since the latter is appointed "to uphold and not to depart from the mandate" (Maim., Yad, Sheluh in 1:3, Sh. Ar., h m 182:2). The possible consequences of a complete nullification can, however, be averted by especially stipulating for such a contingency (Maim. and Sh. Ar., ibid.). Thus it became the practice for a condition of this kind to be inserted in written instruments (see Hai Gaon, Sefer ha-Shet-arot, 65-67).
Some authorities went so far as to hold that even in the absence of such a condition, there was a presumption – if the mandate were carried out – that the principal had authorized the agent to "uphold and to depart from the mandate," unless the contrary could be proved by the principal (Sh. Ar., h m 182:4). An agent who departs from the terms of his mandate and deals with a third party without disclosing that he is acting as an agent, will be liable for his actions (Maim., Sheluh in 2:4; Sh. Ar., 182:2 and 6).
Revocation. The mandate of the agent may be revoked by the principal. The Talmud records a dispute between the Palestinian amoraim, Johanan and Resh Lakish, as to whether or not revocation can be done orally (tj, Ter. 3:4, 42a and Git 4:1, 45c; see also Kid. 59a), and the halakhah was decided in favor of such revocation. Where a formal kinyan accompanies the agent’s appointment, some take the view that the "act" of kinyan cannot be revoked orally, but the general opinion is in favor of it. In order to prevent the principal from withdrawing his agent’s mandate, it became customary to submit the former to an oath to this effect. This procedure normally served as an effective deterrent, but if, despite the oath, the principal revoked it, the revocation is effective. Agency is also terminated upon the death of the principal.
It was recognized that a revocable mandate could prejudice a third party who was unaware of it, e.g., a debtor who paid his debt to the creditor’s agent would continue to be indebted to the creditor or his heirs if it subsequently transpired that the agent’s mandate had previously been revoked. It was determined, on various grounds, that in such circumstances the debtor would be released from his obligation. Isaac b. Abba Mari expressed the opinion that a defendent who received a deed of authorization from the agent, would suffer no damage even if it later transpired that the mandate had been revoked (Sefer ha-Ittur, harshaah). Abraham b. David of Posquieres justified the debtors release on the ground that the creditor’s revocation of the mandate was tantamount to negligence. Later the above rule was justified on the further ground that, even if by the laws of agency the defendant had dealt with a person who was no agent, the transaction was nevertheless afforded legal validity by virtue of the laws of suretyship (Arukh ha-Shulhan to Sh. Ar., h m 122:2).
Brokerage. On the question of the agent’s failure to observe the terms of his mandate, Jewish law distinguishes between an agent who acts in a voluntary capacity (shalia) and one who does so for payment called a sarsur ("broker" or "factor,") e.g., one who receives property for the purposes of sale, the latter being required to make good any consequent loss to the principal. Maimonides adds that in a case where the broker sells property at less than the authorized price, the purchaser must restore the goods to the owner if he knows that it was being sold by a broker on behalf of the true owner (ibid., 2:6; and see Sh. Ar., h m 185:1). Similarly, in case of theft or loss the liability of the broker is equal to that of a bailee for reward (Maim. and Sh. Ar., ibid.). An agent may not purchase for himself the property which he has been authorized to sell, even at the authorized selling price (Sh. Ar., ibid).
NON-PERFORMANCE OR IMPROPER PERFORMANCE BY THE agent. The principal has no claim for pecuniary compensation against an agent who relinquishes his appointment without fulfilling his mandate (Sh. Ar., ibid., 183:1). However, one opinion says that the principal has a claim for "loss of profits" against an agent who acts for payment, e.g., for the profits likely to have been earned by the principal had the mandate been properly carried out (Netivot ha-Mishpat to Sh. Ar., ibid., Beurim, 1).
When the agent is given money by his principal in order to purchase property, and such property is purchased by the agent for himself with his own money the transaction is valid, "although the agent is a rascal," but the transaction will be for the benefit of the principal if the agent purchased for himself with the money of the principal (Sh. Ar., ibid., and Isserles).
Agency for the recovery of debts. The appointment of an agent for the recovery at law of a debt owing to a claimant, is the subject of particular problems. The rabbis of *Nehardea decided (bk 70a) that the claimant’s representative must be equipped with an "instrument of permission" (ketav harshaah, "power of attorney"), bearing the following written instruction by the claimant: "Go and take legal action to acquire title and secure for yourself." Unless this is done the defendant may plead that the representative has no standing in the matter. The possibility of a plea of this nature arises from the talmudic principle that a creditor’s representative cannot seize property in settlement of a debt owing to his principal, if there are additional creditors (Ket. 84b). This principle was construed at the commencement of the geonic period as applying whether the action of the agent is likely to prejudice other creditors, or merely the debtor or himself (She’iltot de-Rav Ahai Gaon, 150). Another explanation offered for the aforesaid plea is the possible suspicion that the mandate was no longer in force, because of the principal’s death or because it had been revoked by him. The aforesaid wording of the authorizing instrument rendered the agent a party to the legal proceedings, which in turn gave rise to the fear that the agent would keep whatever he recovered for himself. It therefore became customary at first to supplement the authorization with a further formality such as the principal’s declaration before witnesses that he was appointing the agent as his representative (Hal. Gedolot, bk 88, col. 3), and in other ways. Gradually these additional measures were abandoned, and the instrument of authorization itself was accepted – without further formality – as constituting the agent a party, along with the defendant, to the proceedings and at the same time as safeguarding the rights of the principal (Temim De’im, 61; Or Zaru’a, bk 4:300). Since, according to the abovementioned wording of the authorization, or power of attorney, the principal in effect assigned (haknaah) to the agent the subject matter of the power of attorney, it was impossible – according to talmudic halakhah – for such power of attorney to relate to matters which could not validly be assigned. Thus the rabbis of Nehardea decided that no power of attorney could be written relating to movables, in respect of which the defendant denied the claim. In the post-talmudic period these restrictions were removed – by way of interpretation, custom and rabbinical enactment – and Jacob b. *Asher records the practice of giving a power of attorney unrestricted as to subject matter (Tur., hm 123:2). A convenient act of kinyan employed to accompany the authorization, was assignment of the subject matter of the claim aggav karka (incidental to land; see Modes of ^Acquisition).
In the geonic period, when most Jews had ceased to be landowners, it became necessary to find ways of employing the method of kinyan aggav karka, making it applicable to those who possessed no landed property. Thus arose the custom of assignment by way of *arba ammot be-Erez Israel ("four cubits of land" which every Jew was considered to own in Erez Israel; Responsum Nahshon Gaon, Responsa Geonica, ed. 1929, p. 31; see Modes of ^Acquisition). In post-geonic times, diminishing reliance was placed on this method, and Maimonides was of the opinion that an assignment (i.e., power of attorney) so effected was not binding on the debtor (Yad, Sheluhin 3:7). In Germany and France it became customary to rely on hodaah (i.e., an admission by the principal that he owned land; see *Admission; Modes of ^Acquisition). Nahmanides suggested kinyan or assignment incidental to a synagogue seat or a place in the cemetery, common to all (Novellae to bb 44b) and further modes of assignment are discussed by other scholars.
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY THROUGH A THIRD PARTY other than an appointed agent. This may arise through an application of the rule that "a benefit may be conferred on a person in his absence" (Eruv. 7:11). Thus A may acquire property from B on behalf of C without the latter’s knowledge, if this is to his benefit – for instance, a gift. C becomes the owner of the property as soon as A’s acquisition thereof is complete, unless C, upon hearing of the matter, rejects such ownership, in which event the transaction is void ab initio (Maim., Yad, Zekhiyyah, 3:2; Sh. Ar., h m 243:1; see also Modes of ^Acquisition).
In the State of Israel the laws of agency are governed by the "Agency Law, 5725-1965," which confirms the doctrine that "a man’s agent is as himself" and further provides that the actions of the agent, including his knowledge and intention, are binding on and benefit the principal – as the case may be (sec. 2).
Legal Acts that Are Not a Subject for Agency
There are certain acts that by definition cannot be an object of agency and others in which it is the law that proscribes their performance by way of an agent.
AN ACT WHICH BY DEFINITION REQUIRES PERSONAL performance. In principle, any legal or religious act can be performed by way of an agent, provided that performance of the act is not also its purpose. This is the case, for example, with the betrothal of a woman, in which giving the money is not the goal as such, but is rather a means for altering the woman’s status from that of an unmarried woman to that of a married woman. However, when the actual performance of the act is also the goal, such as donning tefillin or dwelling in the sukkah, such an act cannot be an object of agency (Responsa, Iggerot Moshe, eh. 1 #156).
AN ACT WHICH BY LAW REQUIRES PERSONAL PERFORMANCE. By way of example, the law does not permit the agent to act on the principal’s behalf when his act involves the violation of third party rights (Ket. 84b; Piskei ha-Rosh, Gittin, 1:13). There are certain acts regarding which opinions are divided as to whether the law permits their performance by way of an agent, such as the abandonment of an asset (Bet Yosef, oh. 434:4; cf. Commentary of Gra (Vilna Gaon) ibid); an undertaking (Netivot ha-Mishpat, 45:2. cf. Kezot ha-Hoshen, ibid. 2); admission (Resp. Ribash, 392, cf. Resp. Ma-harshdam, hm, 439); oath (summary of positions in Resp. Maharsham, 5:26).
"There is no agency for [the commission of] an offense." The codifiers disputed the legal import of this rule. According to some, this rule is exclusively relevant in the criminal realm. In other words: One does not punish a person for an offence committed by another person operating as his agent, despite the fact that in the civil sense the legal consequences of the act are the same as they would have been had the principal performed it himself (Netivot ha-Mishpat 182:1). On the other hand, there is a view that extends this rule to the civil dimension too, arguing that a prohibited action performed by an agent also lacks any legal effect on the civil level too, because by definition the act was not a subject of agency (Resp. Nodah bi-Yehudah, 1st ed., eh, 64, 75).
The halakhic authorities disputed the applicatory scope of the rule "there is no agency for [the commission of] an offence". According to Rabbina, there can be agency for an offence wherever the agent "does not incur liability" ("eino bar hiuva") (bm 10b). In reliance on this view, there are authorities who rule that there can be agency for an offence wherever the agent does not hesitate over whether to obey the teacher (= God) or the student (the principal) and the principal can rely on him to perform the agency, as in the case in which the agent acts on the basis of a mistake (shogeg) (Rema, hm, 182:1, and 348; and see Sema, ibid.).
According to R.Sama, the possibility of agency for an offense is restricted to cases in which the agent does not exercise free will or discretion regarding whether or not to commit the act. In reliance on this view, other authorities ruled that can be agency for the commission of an offence in cases in which the agent acted under duress. However, other authorities dispute this view too, and in their opinion the denial of agency for an offence even applies where an act is committed under duress, because the agent’s act itself is nonetheless volitional, hence the principal will not incur liability. On the other hand, the agent too is exempted from liability for the same act by force of the rule in Jewish Law, that a person acting under duress is exempt from liability (Resp. Nodah bi-Yehudah, 1st ed., eh, 75; ibid., 80:16).
Legal capacity. Apart from the disqualification of the deaf, the mute, and minor from serving as an agent or a principal, there is also a requirement that the agent and his principal be of the same religious identity, even for the performance of a legal action which is not of a religious character, such as purchasing and selling. As such, one who is not Jewish (ben brit) is disqualified from serving as the agent of another Jewish person, or as his principal (Bavli, Kiddushin 41a). However, these restrictions were only established in relation to agency for the performance of a legal act, but where it concerns the performance of a material act (nuntius), even if that act has legal ramifications, such as the paying of debt, nothing prevents its performance by one who is not Jewish (Resp. H attam Sofer, oh 201).
DIGRESSION FROM AUTHORIZATION AND DAMAGE TO the principal’s interests. If the agent fundamentally digresses from the terms of his authorization, his action is invalid ab initio (Maim, Yad. Hilkhot Sheluh in ve-Shutafim, 1:2). If he discharged his agency in a manner that harms the economic interests of the principal, his agency can be annulled by the principal, who may claim "I sent you to repair and not to damage" (Maim, Yad. Hilkhot Sheluh in ve-Shutafim, 1:2-3; Sh. Ar. h m, 182:2-3, 6). As a rule, regardless of whether the agency was invalidated ab initio or annulled by the principal, the third party must restore to the situation to what it was initially.
On the other hand, there are cases in which even if the agent digressed from his authorization, or harmed the principal’s interests, it is impossible to invalidate his actions in respect of a third party or to return to the original situation. In these cases the agent must indemnify the principal for the damage he caused. For example: Where the agent did not present himself as an agent in his dealings with a third party, in other words, where the agency was hidden (Maim, Yad. Hilkhot Sheluhin ve-Shutafim, 2:4; Sh. Ar. h m, 182:2); where the principal does not succeed in proving that the agency was only for the purpose of repairing and not to damage (Sh. Ar. hm, 182:6, and Sema ibid., s.10); and according to some authorities, where the agent intentionally mislead the third party into thinking that he was acting under authorization (Shitah Mekubezet, bm 74b, in the name of the Ra’abad).
In this context, the liability of an unpaid agent does not differ from that of a paid agent (a middelman) (Sema., h m 185:1: "For even when not paid, the agent is liable when he digresses"), however, if the agent has possession of the principal’s asset, then the liability imposed on him is that of a paid bailee, if he was a paid agent; and of an unpaid *bailee if he was an unpaid agent.
Secondary Agency
An agent can appoint a secondary agent, whose action will directly credit and obligate the principal (Kid. 41a), provided that the principal himself has no opposition (to the appointment) and the agency itself is not defined as ‘words’ (mili). There is a dispute regarding the precise definition of the concept ‘mili’, but all agree that an action defined as mili is one that does not achieve a legally valid result. For example, an agent for the writing of a get (divorce bill) cannot appoint a secondary agent, because the actual writing of a get has no legal consequences (Mordechai, Gittin, 420)
The death of the principle agent does not annul the secondary agency (Git. 29b). From this it may be inferred that the secondary agent operates as the extended arm of the principal. Even so, it is still disputed whether the main principal can annul the agency of the secondary agent (Taz, eh 26, and on the other hand, Kezot ha-H oshen, 188:2)
The Decisions of the Israel Supreme Court
The provisions of Jewish law regarding agency served as a basis for the decision of the Israel Supreme Court in the case of Moverman (ca 604/77 Moverman v. Segal, pd 32(3) 85). In that case the Court was required to make a determination regarding the validity of an agreement that the executor of an estate made with a woman who was designated as a beneficiary of the estate. The agreement provided for a waiver of the woman’s rights under the will in exchange for the receipt of a fixed monthly payment from the executor of the estate. The Court found that the agreement contained a number of legal flaws, such as a suspicion that the executor of the estate exerted undue influence on the woman prior to her signing the agreement. The Court (Justice Menachem Elon) did not rely on that suspicion as the only reason for invalidating the agreement, and ruled that according to Jewish law, a transaction that the executor of an estate carries out regarding the estate for his personal needs, requires prior approval by the court, and if the executor did not take steps to obtain such approval prior to carrying out the transaction, the court must engage in a "thorough examination of the reasonableness and fairness of the transaction, vis-a-vis the estate and the beneficiary (ibid., p. 97). The Court ruled on the question from the perspective of the laws of agency:
The question of invalidating a legal transaction because of a suspicion of conflict of interest has been dealt with thoroughly in Jewish law … regarding the sale of the object of the agency … ‘an agent cannot buy it for himself even for the price at which the owner has authorized him to sell it’ (Sh. Ar., HM, 185:2).
According to the view of some of the sages … the reason is one of suspicion, in other words, a conflict of interest between his acting on behalf of the principal and his acting on his own behalf (see, e.g., Beit Yosef on the Tur, hm. ibid.; Prisha on the Tur, hm 175:30, and Bach. ibid; Sema, Sh. Ar. hm 175:26).
According to the view of other sages, the flaw inherent in an agent buying for himself is rooted in the fact that in such a case there has been no transfer from one domain to another:
‘For an agent cannot buy for himself, even at the price that the owner has authorized him to sell it, inasmuch as he was made an agent to sell the land to a client, but he cannot authorize himself to buy it for himself, for a man cannot sell to himself; for the definition of a sale is the transfer of the object from one domain to another, and this hasn’t left his domain insofar as he is acting in place of the owner’ (Tur, h m, 185.3, in the name of Rashba)" (Ibid, p. 98).
In accordance with the above, in addition to a similar conclusion that is arrived at from the perspective of the laws of inheritance and guardianship in Jewish Law (see under Apotropos), Justice Elon rules that the validity of the transaction that the executor has carried out for himself with regard the estate that he is administering is contingent upon the prior approval of the court. Because no such approval was given, the transaction is subject to judicial review and the court must "examine the nature and the essence of the transaction from the perspective of what is in the best interests of the beneficiary" (ibid, p. 101).
