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perhaps the most extreme case of a widespread phenomenon: “factional flu-
idity and discontinuity probably make a government especially susceptible to
individual pressures and especially disposed toward favoritism. Or to put the
reverse of the proposition,
the strength of organization reflecting something of a
group or class solidarity creates conditions favorable to government according
to rule or general principle
(Key 1949: 305). [ . . . ] Organization is not always
necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained
program in behalf of the have nots[ ...]” (p. 307). As we shall see in detail
in
Chapter 5
, the beneficiaries of this factionalist policy, Southern democratic
elites, also had a privileged position in the Senate due to the seniority system,
exercising a very strong influence on the formation of the political will (Hacker
and Pierson
2002
). Finally, the political fragmentation of state and local elites
in both unions also meant that the Depression overcame by large factors their
limited capabilities. Thus, the Depression opened an era of confusion on both
sides of the border, staggering local and state officials, and setting the stage for
a political conflict over the launching of new comprehensive public insurance
programs. At the onset of this process both Canada and the United States were
decentralized federations, unions in which the formation of the political will
retained strong centrifugal components.
The organization of political will in Germany's “semi-sovereign state”
(Katzenstein
1987
) offers a contrasting case, one much closer to the centripetal
end of the continuum, capturing the balance of power between central gov-
ernments and subnational units. Centripetalism emerges in several features
of the German political system. Chief among them is the system of propor-
tional representation governing both federal and state elections (Schmidt
2003
).
According to Lijphart (
1999
: 162), the resulting gap between seats and votes
in the Bundestag elections during the second half of the twentieth century was
significantly lower than that observed, for instance, in the British House of
Commons. In addition, the existence of a 5% entry threshold, again at the
federal and state level, guarantees moderate levels of party system fractional-
ization. What is more, the organization of shared rule in Germany contrasts
sharply with the one in North America in the 1930s. Germany's “
unitarian
fed-
eralism[...]emphasizes the preservation of the legal and economic unity . . .
[...]Furthermore,Germany's federalism is characterized by extensive coop-
eration and interlocked politics between the federal government and the state
governments, as well as by no less extensive horizontal coordination between
the states” (Schmidt 2003: 15-16). In this context, the political weight of the
l ander
during the legislative process is not based on their full legislative and
administrative capacities in a number of policy areas, but on the role that the
Bundesrat, the territorial upper chamber, has in passing national legislation.
9
The Bundesrat is composed of delegations from each land, appointed by the
9
On this point, a distinction between
Einspruchsgesetz
(the Bundesrat can veto but the Bundestag
(the Parliament) can overrule) and
Zustimmungsgesetz
(in which the majority of the Bundesrat
has to consent) is in order. More than 50% of federal legislation belongs to the second category.
