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EU is clearly tilted towards the former when it comes to deciding about the
organization of policy fields.
Central to the concerns in this chapter is the fact that any move toward
policy integration in Europe requires simultaneously changes in the allocation
of power across levels of government and changes in the voting procedures
with the Council, as well as modifications in the balance of power between the
latter and the Parliament (Hix
2005
; Thomson et al.
2006
).
In the specific policy areas of interest to this study, interpersonal redistribu-
tion via taxes and transfers, and interregional redistribution via policies such
as the Structural Funds, institutional change is subject to the strictest control
by national governments. Decisions by the Council on these matters follow the
unanimity rule and the Parliament lacks co-decision powers. Any movement
away from the status quo toward the centralization of interpersonal redistri-
bution would entail not only a transfer of powers within the policy domain to
Brussels but a removal of the unanimity voting rule and a modification of the
balance of power between the latter and the Parliament. In this instance, the
endogeneity between the choice of fiscal structures and political representation
becomes particularly apparent: by centralizing interpersonal redistribution, EU
member states would also be contributing to undermine the centrifugal nature
of the system of representation. Within this dynamics, the notion that represen-
tation is exogenous at the time contentions over fiscal structures unfold appears
particularly extravagant.
The experience of Spain over the last three decades provides yet another
illustration of this logic. As outlined previously, Spain was designed to func-
tion and remain a centripetal political union. The Senate was conceived of and
remains an empty shell, undermining the effective representation of territorial
interests during the legislative process at the national level. More importantly,
the Spanish electoral system is one of proportional representation, built upon
the D'Hondt Law. Proportional representation is well known to generate incen-
tives to build broad political appeals, platforms across cleavages transcending
specific territorial interests (Austen-Smith and Banks
1988
;Cremer and Palfrey
1999
; Dixit and Londregan
1998
) that materialize in encompassing coalition
governments. In the case of Spain, the adoption of the D'Hondt version pur-
sued the overrepresentation of rural provinces, with lower levels of population
density and a higher likelihood to opt for conservative forces, and to ensure
the generation and stabilization of a two-party political system at the national
level (Montero
1998
: 53-80). The goal was to keep the number of parties at
bay and limit the scope of influence of regional, identity based parties. The
political game was to be played by two strong and centralized national party
organizations, never to be held at ransom by local barons of any sort. The
presence of territorially integrated organizations on each side of the ideological
spectrum constituted a key element of the centripetal design of representation.
Only the existence of important nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque
Country counterbalanced this design.
