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decentralization in the presence of diverging preferences across regions, in turn
associated with large economic geographical disparities.
If, under these conditions, changes in the geography of inequality facilitate
the mobilization of a regionalist platform, the latter will meet the resistance of
a political system organized around national, income classes-based, political
parties. This resistance is a matter of electoral survival for national elites. As
shown previously, a growing gap between national and regional distributions
of income
increases the electoral cost of decentralizing redistribution
for the national elite. By implication, centripetal representation limits the extent
to which territorial inequalities manage to constrain redistributive efforts and
reproduce themselves over time. An important implication for the study of
inequality follows from this analysis.
The scenarios in between (0
(
n
−
r
)
1) vary significantly in the balance of
regional and national electoral concerns, and therefore in the extent to which
pressures to either retain or move toward more decentralized fiscal structures
succeed. Strongly malapportioned chambers (upper and lower) work hand in
hand with heterogeneous and fragmented party systems to reduce the salience
of national electoral contests as opposed to regional, territorialized, ones.
15
To
the extent that this is the case, the institutional implications of a more diverse
and polarizing geography of inequality will be more visible.
Consider the case, for instance, of wealthier elites in poorer regions. The
above analysis suggests that these elites have incentives to both prevent
the development of interpersonal redistribution and seek the extraction of
resources via interregional redistribution. Under most distributional scenarios,
H is their first preference.
In federations with powerful senates and/or strongly malapportioned lower
houses, these elites will constitute a blocking minority able to steer the design
of fiscal structures towards their own interests. This logic of
local strongholds
is particularly feasible under institutional conditions, such as strong malappor-
tionment in the legislature, leaning toward centrifugal representation.
16
In contrast, insofar as the system of representation offers fewer opportunities
for local representatives to act as brokers of local interests, their imprint on
the design of fiscal structures will be less marked. This has implications for
understanding both the centralization of interpersonal redistribution and the
level of interregional transfers. To the extent that the wealthy elites of poorer
areas enjoy a privileged position in the system of representation, they will
block any attempt to launch a comprehensive and fully centralized system of
interpersonal redistribution. In turn, the size of interregional transfers (T) is a
<<
15
For an empirical analysis of the effects of these features on the economic performance of
federations, see Rodden and Wibbels (
2002
). For an empirical analysis of the scope of electoral
coattails in federations see Rodden and Wibbels (
2010
).
16
For an empirical example of this logic in the study of macroeconomic performance in Latin
America, see Gibson, Calvo and Falleti (
2004
). For an application of this analysis to developing
federations, see Beramendi and Diaz-Cayeros (
2008
).
